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SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 23/73

Item 2 on the Agenda for the Fourth Meeting of *a/final*
USCIBEC, held on 6 July 1953. *Minutes.*

Subject:

Final Report and Papers of the U.K.-U.S. Conference *by Mrs T.*
on the Communications Security of NATO Countries *Pierce 9 76*
(USCIB 23/65). *Mrs Folevsky*
on 29 March.
DM

The CHAIRMAN opened discussion on the above subject by stating that the CIA member had prepared a paper (USCIB 23/67) which set forth CIA views and recommendations regarding the conference papers. He inquired if there were any objections to the recommendations made by CIA.

LT. COLONEL LONG said that after reading the CIA memorandum it would appear that they wanted to reconvene the International Committee.

The CHAIRMAN said he did not think that was their intent.

[redacted] agreed. He said he thought that there were several aspects of the report which should be looked into further, for example the fact that the conference had not determined who the "Cognizant U.S.-U.K. Authorities" would be, and the fact that we appeared to be committed to use only Standing Group channels of approach when there might be other, better, ways of proceeding.

OGA

LT. COLONEL LONG inquired of [redacted] whom he visualized the Executive Agent would be.

[redacted] replied that it would probably be the Department of State.

At this point CAPTAIN AGNEW said he would like to call on Mr. Friedman.

The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Friedman to speak.

MR. FRIEDMAN said that as Chairman of the conference he would prefer to have the representatives on the delegation from the U.S. side who were present speak before he did. He added that the CIA memorandum took him by surprise in that it contravened what was agreed to at the International Conference.

The CHAIRMAN said he would get the opinions of the members regarding the conclusions and recommendations of the CIA paper as the meeting progressed and would like Mr. Friedman's views first.

MR. FRIEDMAN discussed the points which he thought CIA used as a basis for urging a change in the conclusions and recommendations.

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He pointed out that all of the points raised in the CIA paper had, in fact, been considered thoroughly at the conference, and added his opinion that the CIA paper did not offer sufficient new material to warrant new conclusions and recommendations. He pointed out that the conference had agreed, first of all, that the Foreign Office and the State Department were cognizant UK/US authorities, and it had been originally so stated in the conference report. He said that he thought the specific reference to these departments had been deleted at the suggestion of the CIA member of the delegation.

MR. KEAY said he would agree with Mr. Friedman that the points were well considered by the conferees. He added that he thought it was correct to change the language to "appropriate authorities", in the event USCIB would want to designate someone else as cognizant authority. He added that as a member of the conference and of the Executive Committee he would have to stick to the original conference paper for the reason that these are not new issues.

OGA then explained that CIA was not taking issue with the work of the conference, but thought it advisable to raise these points. He added that the important point they wished to raise at this time was the question of whether or not the NATO COMSEC organization was the only means of approach to the NATO countries.

MR. GODEL said that with respect to paragraph 7 of subject paper he would agree that the diplomatic and the military problem was somewhat different. He added that the conferees at this International Conference, with Board representatives present, also agreed that the Standing Group was not the only but certainly the most appropriate body through which this approach could be made. Therefore he said he non-concurred with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the CIA paper.

MR. KEAY pointed out that if the Committee accepted paragraph 9 of the CIA paper it would be contrary to the U.S. position at the conference which was a joint approach to the French. He explained that the British position had been a country-by-country approach, and if the Committee accepted paragraph 9, the U.S. would be walking into a British spider web. He added that he thought the minutes of the conference would show that a country-by-country approach was not too good.

MR. PACKARD said that later the British had wanted an individual approach and the U.S. wanted a collective approach.

The CHAIRMAN asked for further comment from Mr. Friedman.

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MR. FRIEDMAN then said he would like to go over individual points of difference again and at the same time comment on those points of difference. He added that he had already covered the point of difference concerning how CIA felt about "cognizant authorities". The next point, he said, was the problem of the specific approach to the [redacted] which was deliberately left out of the conference report. He recalled that at the 1951 Conference it was felt that the only way we could put our point across [redacted] however, he pointed out that the 1953 Conference approach was more conservative in that we did not want to spell out the steps.

At this time, the CHAIRMAN said he did not think it was the intent of the CIA paper to make the conference account for its activities and added that he thought Mr. Friedman had already answered the questions raised, and that State Department would no doubt take appropriate steps if designated the cognizant U.S. authority.

[redacted] pointed out that in effect CIA recommended that State Department take appropriate action. He added, however, that CIA was reluctant to approve the recommendations of the conference report.

OGA

The CHAIRMAN asked that it be made a matter of record that Mr. Friedman explained what the conference intended.

MR. POLYZOIDES said he would like to get a clearer idea from CIA as to what they hoped to gain by deferring acceptance of paragraph 30, and added that if paragraph 30 were dropped out, no progress would have been made.

[redacted] explained that CIA disliked paragraphs 30 c and d because they felt that a Standing Group might not turn out to be the proper channel.

LT. COLONEL LONG inquired if paragraph 23 didn't take care of the situation in that if the Standing Group failed, other steps could be taken.

MR. POLYZOIDES agreed.

MR. GODEL remarked that these things were discussed in the conference where the delegates took the easiest and fastest means of trying the first step and if this didn't work, they would have to go further, but added he did not think we should go further when an organization for that purpose already exists.

[redacted] inquired if this was pre-committing all of our activities through the NATO COMSEC Group.

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OGA

MR. GODEL said this was suggested as an initial step.

[redacted] said he wanted to be sure this was a step that would not produce embarrassing international effects, and added that in his opinion the contact should be someone from State Department who knew the French people as well as the whole French structure. He pointed out that when the representative sits down and starts planning his approach, he might find that an approach through NATO might not be the thing, and his hands would be tied.

MR. GODEL said he did not agree that his hands would be tied because an additional course of action was open in paragraph 23.

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought the reason the international committee preferred the Standing Group method of approach is ^{worth noting} important. In the first place, he said, the U.S. won an argument when we got the British to back off from their country-to-country approach. He added that there had been an approach by the French on the basis of insecurity of the

[redacted] He pointed out that the French had come to the British through non-COMINT channels, ^{to complain about the COMSEC weaknesses} and asked what was more natural than the US and UK to say to the French, "You have something. We think, with you, that we should do something about it." ^{By that sort of an approach, he thought we get the French to agree.} He explained that the basis for the improvement on COMSEC NATO-wise is more or less a matter of all getting together to improve our communications security. ^{the an} Consequently, he said, we do not require ^{which would be} an approach that has been outlined ^{to} namely, that each nation come forth and confess its cryptographic deviations. He added that it is known that certain NATO countries have already approached the US and UK for help and the record shows what they asked for. He noted that the CIA paper also made mention of another representative on the NATO COMSEC Boards. He stated that only the U.S. and the U.K. are represented thereon. Regarding the inadequacy of Appendix "B" of the conference report, he said that Appendix "B" was drawn up by technical experts of both countries. He pointed out that where this approach to NATO nations does not work, the nations may have to be contacted individually. ^{to} In concluding, he summarized his views and said he hoped there would be no delay in approving this report as time is pressing.

The CHAIRMAN inquired if this answered the questions CIA wished to bring out.

[redacted] replied in the affirmative and asked that the Committee just take note of his paper. He added that he had been unable to get in touch with Mr. Dulles, but he would do so to see how he felt, and added that the only point now is in "tying our hands to the NATO COMSEC organization."

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* of those two countries,

** and that this could easily be done through the regular COM SEC channels

*** through channels other than COM SEC and that he could see no bar to doing so

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if and when it became necessary or desirable to do so.

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The CHAIRMAN said that he felt that most of the questions had been answered except whether or not the Standing Group is the desirable channel. He inquired if the members of USCIBEC wished to make any recommendation.

MR. POLYZOIDES inquired if the CIA paper was being withdrawn.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it was now being presented for information.

MR. POLYZOIDES said he thought the first proper action would be to decide whether or not this Committee accepts the conference report.

The CHAIRMAN recommended that the conference report be approved. He then asked if the members of USCIBEC wished to call to the attention of USCIB the fact that it is USCIBEC's belief that the State Department should be the "cognizant U.S. authority".

MR. POLYZOIDES said he did not think it was necessary.

OGA inquired if the Board wouldn't have to appoint the "cognizant U.S. authority".

MR. KEAY said he agreed with Mr. Polyzoides that it was not necessary to apprise the Board on this point.

The CHAIRMAN said it was apparently the opinion of the Committee that it was not necessary to take any specific action to the Board on the CIA paper.

MR. POLYZOIDES said another reason he felt so strongly is that the Board had become more deeply enmeshed in this subject than anything in the past, therefore it had a strong proprietary interest. He further stated that he did not think we should try to influence their opinion too much in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN then said it seemed to be the sense of the Committee that it approves the report with the exception of the CIA member who reserves his comment for the Board.

It was so agreed.

MR. FRIEDMAN said he would like to call attention to page 8, paragraph 10 d, of the conference report. He then proceeded to read this paragraph. He said that the future of the communications intelligence business looks pretty bad because Mr. Hagelin has new and effective machines that he is getting ready to put on the market. He


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The CHAIRMAN suggested that it be put on the agenda by the NSA member for a subsequent meeting.

It was so agreed.

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DECISION: (6 July 1953) USCIBEC, with the exception of the CIA member, approved the conference report and directed that it be forwarded to USCIB for consideration. It was understood that the CIA member would reserve his position for presentation at the time the report is considered by USCIB.

The meeting adjourned at 1640.

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