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HEADQUARTERS  
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WDGSS-14

12 March 1946

SUBJECT: Evaluation Studies

TO: Assistant Chief, Staff

1. The time will soon arrive when nearly all the available facts which have any bearing on signal intelligence activities prior to and during the last war will have been assembled. To evaluate them properly will require a permanent force of capable and experienced people. All of life constitutes three irrevocable, irreversible, successive phases, viz: The past, the present, and the future. Ignoring anyone of these phases is a fatal error. Only by a patient and thorough study of the past can we wisely make plans in the present for efficient operation in the future.

2. All too often the combination of insufficient personnel spread over too many operational jobs causes us to neglect the proper study of the past. As a result, in such a situation, everything not strictly operational is often neglected. This tendency will become greater as time progresses and the inevitable decreases in appropriations will be felt. The present situation at ASA is good. We have found it worthwhile to devote time and personnel to writing the ASA history. We have profited by the organization and study of the Ticom material, both from the intelligence and the security viewpoints. We have taken the time to set down in writing the methods of solution of many successfully completed cryptanalytic problems. This is progress -- it is no good for everyone to go around with a lot of this knowledge in his head, for when this is allowed to happen nobody can use it except the person in question.

3. Let us list the material that is available or probably could be made available for study:

a. United States:

- (1) ASA History.
- (2) ASA, Division, and Branch Reports and Minutes.
- (3) Wire and mail correspondence between ASA, theaters, and the rest of the Army.

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- (4) Op-20-G History.
- (5) Op-20-K & L Histories.
- (6) ETO SID History.
- (7) MTO SIS History.
- (8) CBI SIS History.
- (9) CBB SIS History.
- (10) Many individual Signal Radio Intelligence Companies' histories.
- (11) U. S. Signal Intelligence from the foreign viewpoint (from Bulletins and Ticom materials)

b. Axis Powers:

- (1) Bulletins.
- (2) Ticom raw material.
- (3) Ticom evaluation studies.
- (4) CSDIC Reports.
- (5) ATIS Reports.
- (6) SEATIC Reports.

c. Other Powers:

- (1) Bulletins.
- (2) Liaison Reports.

4. a. We could come up with some pretty good comparisons as to how organizational, operational, and research and development problems were handled in the various signal intelligence establishments in the U. S. Army, the U. S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy. We can learn from them all the bad and good points, and profit thereby.

b. Similarly, problems regarding personnel, administration, and training, as well as problems regarding the interchangeability of know-how between signal intelligence and signal security are of great importance to us. Other problems can easily be cited.

c. In the case of other powers, our information would not be so extensive, but it would all add up. Here we would not only profit by the experiences of others who are in the same business, but in addition we might gain much in operational intelligence.

5. a. It will not be long before the initial reports from the Ticom section will be completed (see par. 3b(3)). These will constitute mainly appraisals of the organization and successes of German signal intelligence. They will be

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based almost entirely on interrogation reports and a very few translations. The great bulk of microfilms of captured documents have scarcely been touched. There will be a tendency to dissolve the Ticom working group after the initial reports are made, but this should not be done. Rather, it is very necessary that it continue and perhaps take on additional fields from the material mentioned in paragraph 3.

b. The work of the Historical Unit is scheduled to be completed in the coming summer (see par. 3a(1)). At this time it is scheduled to be reduced from 9 to 2 persons whose duty it will be then to get out the annual reports. Here again it would be wise to retain the unit at its present strength and assign to it much of the material outlined in paragraph 3.

6. Now is the time to decide to keep this evaluation on a high priority level, so that, when it comes time to lop off here and lop off there, this activity will continue to function. It will pay for itself in the long run many times over.

7. What this all seems to boil down to is that we should establish an Information and Research Section on the ASA Staff, which would take over the studies called for here, and which might possibly also take over the Trends Research Unit. It should also establish an Information Coordination Center. Our Staff now includes all of a General Staff's functions except a G-2, and this should be it. It may be preferable to add these functions to those of the Director of Communications Research since the Director of Communications Research already operates the Historical Unit and is Chairman of the Ticom Committee.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN  
Director of  
Communications Research.

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