

~~SECRET~~ OKLCS(53)/OR/R(1). (FINAL DRAFT).COPY NO: 30UK/US COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY CONFERENCE 1953Report of the Operational Requirements Sub-Committeeto theExecutive Committee.Expression of Security Requirements.

1. The Operational Requirements Sub-Committee recommend that using Services express their security requirements in accordance with the following:-
 - a. The proposed level of use.
 - b. The expected traffic load per day.
 - (1) Average.
 - (2) Maximum.
 - c. Message lengths.
 - (1) Expected average
 - (2) Required range.
 - d. Details of any special traffic peculiarities (Stereotypes, pro-formae, tabulators, etc.)
 - e. Procedural requirements.
 - (1) Acceptable length restrictions.
 - (2) Desired cryptoperiod.
 - (3) Acceptability of:
 - (a) Disguised message indicators.
 - (b) Bisection.
 - (c) Variable spacing.
 - (d) Paraphrasing.
 - f. The classifications of traffic to be passed in the system (Estimated proportion of Top Secret.)

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- (g) The intelligence importance of the traffic to the enemy.
 - (1) Short term.
 - (2) Long term.
- (h) Cryptonet requirements and likely number of holders per net.
- (i) The physical security conditions.
- (j) Operator training limitations and expected quality of operators.

2. This will enable a "confidence factor" to be calculated for the using Services by the security evaluators, if it is required. This may be defined as the odds against successful enemy cryptanalysis within a stated period of time.

3. Where it is desired by using Services to calculate confidence factors in advance, a statement of the acceptable confidence factor should accompany the statement of security requirements.

2nd November, 1953.

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