

COPY

21 Sept 49

Memo for Gen. Clarke:

1. Herewith memo containing information for your own use in connection with AFCIAC meeting scheduled for 22 Sept re SIBABA release.

2. If this paper is going to be used officially, I think it ought to be signed by somebody else -- preferably yourself -- for the reason that my motives in preparing it might be subject to question.

3. If the paper is going to be circulated some revision might be in order -- a few simple changes.

4. Wenger told me yesterday, during my visit at Naval Hospital that (1) he clearly remembers showing Tiltman the ECM in his own quarters in Navy Dept on Constitution Avenue; (2) he was directed to do so by Adm. Redman, orally via telephone; (3) he does not remember why the director ordered it be done or even if there was any explanation of the sudden change in policy; (4) he remembers that I was with them, had been given authority orally also to join in demonstration to Tiltman, and that we then went to Navy code center where TYPEX was shown to me.

5. Further careful study of Inclosures 4 and 5 shows that Navy technicians (Safford & Smith) recommended disclosing ECM to British after the CCM had been developed and approved as a plan for Combined communications but before mass production of the CCM was begun. They felt it was a question of saving time -- if ECM were released, the matter of Combined communications could be solved by early spring 1943; but if ECM could not be released and production of CCM started, it would involve 12 to 18 months delay before CCM system could be made effective -- a very important point, it proved to be!!

F.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-19-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~TOP SECRET~~

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21 Sept 49

Means for Gen. Clarke:

1. Herein memo containing information for your own use in connection with AF-CIAC meeting scheduled for 22 Sept re SUBARVA release.

2. If this paper is going to be used officially, I think it ought to be signed by somebody else - preferably yourself - for the reason that my motives in preparing it might be subject to question.

3. If the paper is going to be ~~not~~ circulated some revision might be in order - a few simple changes.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
REF ID: A2437279
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J