

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		REF ID: A55710	NEVER USED FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS
1	NAME OR TITLE <i>Col. Paterson</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>AFSA-12</i>	DATE	COORDINATION
2			FILE
	<i>Mr. Friedman</i>		INFORMATION
3	<i>AFSA-007</i>		NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <i>Herewith revision of 1st draft. Pse let us have your comments soon</i>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>F</i>		DATE <i>15 Nov 50</i>	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>007</i>		TELEPHONE	

NME FORM NO 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 OCT 48 1 ADR 48, which may be used.

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REPORT BY THE USCIB COORDINATOR TO
THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS BOARD

001

MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

THE PROBLEM

1. What additional measures should be taken to protect (1) present COMINT sources and (2) such new sources as may be expected soon to yield vital information?

FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-12 in the Enclosure.

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

a. A review of the entire problem of the security of present COMINT sources is warranted in the light of the present situation wherein there appears to be a gradual lessening of security in the face of a more pressing need therefor.

b. The possibility of some approach, in the not distant future, to a state of readability of certain high-level cryptosystems makes it imperative that there be no delay in the re-examination of present COMINT security measures and the formulation and application of new or additional measures which may prevent a repetition of the losses suffered in the recent past.

c. In connection with all high-level COMINT problems it is possible and it may be advisable to institute security safeguards such as were in force in connection with certain high-level COMINT problems in World War II.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

a. USCIB direct the USCIB Security Committee to make the review referred to in Par. 3a and to submit recommendations arising from a study based upon consideration of Pars. 3b and 3c of the foregoing conclusions.

b. The USCIB Security Committee be directed to submit its report to USCIB not later than 15 December 1950.

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ENCLOSURE

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. Since the end of World War II there has been a continual improvement in the types of cryptosystems employed by foreign governments and a steady tightening of communication security practices, making the production of COMINT a problem of constantly increasing difficulties. This is true especially as regards COMINT dealing [redacted]

2. In the face of the increasing difficulties in its production, the demand for COMINT has become even greater and the need for the protection of all COMINT sources increasingly imperative. Not only is this true as regards all current COMINT sources, but we must anticipate even greater needs for the protection of new sources. For example, when as a result of concentrated effort AFSA succeeded in solving certain [redacted]

[redacted] the fruits thereof were soon denied us because of the withdrawal [redacted] soon after success in their solution was attained, and we have now been virtually out of touch

[redacted]

3. a. The basic essentials for effective security control of COMINT have finally been established after years of effort and the security situation has been considerably improved.

b. There is a general appreciation of the value of COMINT and the need for protecting its sources; and we now have the following mechanisms for better protection:

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- (1) A federal protective law (Public Law No. 513)
- (2) Improved investigative machinery
- (3) An interdepartmental authority (USCIB)
- (4) A single U.S. producer of high-level COMINT (AFSA)
- (5) Common security standards
- (6) Security agreements with our foreign collaborators

4. a. The part played by USCIB in the foregoing improvements in security ^{is} are notable. USCIB Directive No. 1, approved on 16 November 1948, and revised as of 13 October 1950, provides:

"4. ... The Board will perform such functions as may be required to accomplish its objective, but it will place particular emphasis upon the following:

* * *

(a) Prescribing basic security standards and dissemination policies to protect all Communications Intelligence activities and sources."

b. The same reference (Par. 12) establishes, among other standing committees, a Committee on Security with the following responsibilities:

"(b) Security. Formulation of interdepartmental security and dissemination policies, and coordination of other security matters under cognizance of USCIB."

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e. USCIB Directive No. 4, approved on 14 January 1949, and revised as of 25 October 1950, establishes "Instructions for the Compartmentation of COMINT information", including certain "Precautions in dissemination and utilization of results."

5. As a consequence of the foregoing, there has been instituted within AFSA itself a fairly rigid system of compartmentation of problems, a feature which militates against technical efficiency in COMINT production but which is considered essential for security.

6. a. Nevertheless, the USCIB Coordinator is becoming increasingly concerned over what appears to be a gradual lessening of the security of COMINT in the face of a more pressing need therefor. Although important and basic steps have been taken since the war to establish security on a firmer foundation, other developments have occurred which have, to a large extent, nullified the effects of our advances.

b. Despite the mechanisms and factors for better control, it is not believed that the security situation has been improved to a degree which warrants brushing aside of all fear that current and future success on high-level problems may be nullified by leakage of information to the Governments whose communications are now being or soon will be successfully attacked. In fact, the basis for continued apprehensions on this score remains the same or even stronger than before, because of certain new factors in the COMINT security picture. Among them are the following:

(1) There has been a steady and substantial increase of both workers and consumers. The list of indoctrinated consumers alone has risen from 594 in February 1947 to 1,552 in June 1950. In addition,

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there have been innumerable individuals brought into the fringe of knowledge for administrative, budgetary, or other reasons.

(2) Certain dissemination safeguards have gradually been relaxed. Material is now distributed and maintained in a number of areas in Washington outside the producing agencies, where it was never permitted before. Moreover, distribution has been authorized to additional agencies. Restrictions on the distribution of material to, and maintenance in, occupied areas have also been eased.

(3) The administrative, control, and budgetary machinery and procedures are such that large numbers of individuals must be apprised of numerous details of COMINT activities. (The large number of agencies, offices, boards, and committees concerned with the operation and administration of COMINT activities necessitates innumerable reports, justifications, etc., which are very hazardous to security. The arrangements governing the operation of CIA are much more conducive to secrecy.)

(4) The dissemination of results is far too voluminous for safety. (Over 1,000,000 copies of COMINT translations, representing some 16,000 individual decrypted messages, were disseminated in September, 1950. The handling of the German problem proved that COMINT can be effectively used even with the most drastic restrictions on dissemination.)

(5) There is no over-all authority to insure observance of COMINT security regulations within offices of COMINT consumer agencies and organizations. Possibly too much individual authority and discretion are left to individual consumer and producer agencies to insure uniform application of adequate security measures. (The security control of atomic energy information is more centralized and rigid. Inspection

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authority such as that which was vested in and exercised by the Cryptographic Security Board might well be vested in and exercised by USCIB.)

7. It is obvious that under the foregoing conditions the laws of probability are bound to operate to produce inadvertent leakage of information, even though the question of loyalty may not enter into the picture at all. The chances for the leakage increases in direct proportion to the number of persons who are taken into the picture; the chances for loss of documents increases in direct proportion to the number of documents disseminated, and in the COMINT field the loss of a single document, sometimes regardless of its specific contents, may have disastrous consequences. If the document should fall into the wrong hands it most certainly will be followed by such consequences upon our COMINT activities.

8. During World War II certain special security safeguards were established in particular segments of the German COMINT problem. Actual experience with these safeguards amply demonstrated their feasibility and the practicability of operating successfully with an extremely limited number of operational personnel who had a real "need-to-know" and with the absolute minimum of dissemination. That experience proved the possibility of maintaining the utmost security under difficult circumstances and constitutes a contradiction of the frequently-heard contention that operational effectiveness of COMINT is inevitably defeated by too strict limitation of dissemination to consumers.

9. It is possible to safeguard COMINT by employing special disguises which will not handicap its usefulness and which at the same time will serve to hide the exact source from which it comes.

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10. The latter possibility, together with more rigid limitations on dissemination may be necessary to insure us against the drying up of the sources of this vital information.

11. a. In considering what additional steps should be taken as soon as possible it is convenient to divide the whole problem of COMINT security into four principal segments:

(1) Security precautions applicable to all steps in the production of the information.

(2) Format of the final product (whether or not the source of the information, when it leaves the production agency, is obvious).

(3) Control of production of copies and their dissemination to consumers.

(4) Security precautions applicable to the operational use of COMINT.

b. Under its charter USCIB prescribes basic security standards and dissemination policies and therefore it has cognizance of all four of the above-mentioned segments.

12. a. The USCIB Coordinator has ^{operational} jurisdiction over only the first segment (Par. 11a(1)) and has instituted within AFSA as rigid security controls in the production of COMINT information as practicable under the mechanics of processing. Compartmentation has been especially rigid in respect to the processing of the principal high-level cryptosystems and it is doubtful whether further steps can be taken in that direction

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toward increased security. However, USCIB may wish to look into this question and inquiry is welcomed by DIRAFSA.

b. The USCIB Coordinator has no jurisdiction, however, over the other three segments of the problem and believes that it is to those areas, especially (2) and (3), that USCIB should now direct its attention.

c. The USCIB Security Committee could be directed to study those segments of the problem and submit recommendations as regards the greater security protection of current as well as anticipated new sources of COMINT.

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1 NAME OR TITLE <i>Capt Weingart</i>	INITIALS <i>W</i>	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
<i>OOT This looks like a good start. I shall get another draft when you have received comments of the others</i>		INFORMATION
		NECESSARY ACTION
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	<i>W</i>	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Herein the revision of 1st draft. Am getting comments from Mason, Peterson, Dyer & will discuss with you.

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DATE

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ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

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REPORT BY THE USCIB COORDINATOR TO
THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS BOARD

on

MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

THE PROBLEM

1. What additional measures should be taken to protect present and future COMINT sources?

FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-12 in the Enclosure.

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:
 - a. A review of the entire problem of the security of present COMINT sources is warranted in the light of the present situation wherein there appears to be a gradual lessening of security in the face of a more pressing need therefor.
 - b. It is imperative that there be no delay in re-examining present COMINT security measures and in investigating the possibility and desirability of formulating and applying new or additional measures which may prevent a repetition of the losses suffered in the recent past.
 - c. In connection with all high-level COMINT problems, it is possible and it may be advisable to institute security safeguards such as were in force in connection with certain high-level COMINT problems in World War II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

a. USCIB direct the USCIB Security Committee to make the review referred to in Par. 3a and to submit recommendations arising from a study based upon consideration of Pars. 3b and 3c of the foregoing conclusions.

b. The USCIB Security Committee be directed to submit its report to USCIB not later than 15 January 1951.

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ENCLOSURE

FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. Since the end of World War II there has been a continual improvement in the types of cryptosystems employed by foreign governments and a steady tightening of communication security practices, making the production of COMINT a problem of constantly increasing difficulty.

2. In the face of the increasing difficulties in its production, the demand for COMINT has become even greater and the need for the protection of all COMINT sources increasingly imperative. Not only is this true as regards all current COMINT sources, but we must anticipate even greater need for the protection of new sources.

3. a. The basic essentials for effective security control of COMINT have finally been established after years of effort and the security situation has been considerably improved.

b. There is a general appreciation of the value of COMINT and the need for protecting its sources; and we now have the following mechanisms for better protection:

- (1) A federal protective law (Public Law No. 513).
- (2) Improved investigative machinery.
- (3) An interdepartmental authority (USCIB).
- (4) A single U.S. producer of high-level COMINT (AFSA).
- (5) Common security standards.
- (6) Security agreements with our foreign collaborators.

4. a. The part played by USCIB in the foregoing improvements in security is notable. USCIB Directive No. 1, approved on 16 November 1948, and revised as of 13 October 1950, provides:

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"4. ... The Board will perform such functions as may be required to accomplish its objective, but it will place particular emphasis upon the following:

* * *

(c) Prescribing basic security standards and dissemination policies to protect all Communications Intelligence activities and sources."

b. The same reference (Par. 12) establishes, among other standing committees, a Committee on Security with the following responsibilities:

"(b) Security. Formulation of interdepartmental security and dissemination policies, and coordination of other security matters under cognizance of USCIB."

c. USCIB Directive No. 4, approved on 14 January 1949, and revised as of 25 October 1950, establishes "Instructions for the Compartmentation of COMINT information", including certain "Precautions in dissemination and utilization of results."

5. As a consequence of the foregoing, there has been instituted within AFSA itself a system of compartmentation of problems, a feature which militates against technical efficiency in COMINT production but which is considered essential for security.

6. a. Nevertheless, the USCIB Coordinator is becoming increasingly concerned over what appears to be a gradual lessening of the security of COMINT. Although important and basic steps have been taken since the war to establish security on a firmer foundation, other developments have occurred which have, to a large extent, nullified the effects of our advances.

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b. Despite the mechanisms and factors for better control, it is not believed that the security situation has been improved to a degree which warrants brushing aside all fear that current and future success on high-level problems may be nullified by leakage of information to the Governments whose communications are now being or may be successfully attacked. In fact, the basis for continued apprehensions on this score remains the same or even stronger than before, because of certain new factors in the COMINT security picture. Among them are the following:

(1) There has been a steady and substantial increase of both workers and consumers. The list of indoctrinated consumers alone has risen from 594 in February 1947 to 1,332 in June 1950. In addition, there have been innumerable individuals brought into the fringe of knowledge for administrative, budgetary, or other reasons.

(2) Certain dissemination safeguards have gradually been relaxed. Material is now distributed and maintained in a number of areas in Washington outside the producing agencies, where it was never permitted before. Moreover, distribution has been authorized to additional agencies, AEC, ECA, NSRB, RDB, and probably others. Restrictions on the distribution of material to, and maintenance in, occupied areas have also been eased.

(3) The administrative, control, and budgetary machinery and procedures are such that large numbers of individuals must be apprised of numerous details of COMINT activities. (The large number of agencies, offices, boards, and committees concerned with the operation and administration of COMINT activities necessitates innumerable reports, justifications, etc., which are very hazardous to security. The arrangements governing the operation of CIA are much more conducive to secrecy.)

(4) The dissemination of results is far too voluminous for safety. (About 750,000 copies of COMINT translations, representing some 16,000 individual decrypted messages, were distributed in September, 1950 to consumer agencies.) The handling of the German problem in World War II proved that COMINT can be effectively used even with the most drastic restrictions on dissemination.

(5) There is no over-all authority to insure observance of COMINT security regulations within offices of COMINT consumer agencies and organizations. Possibly too much individual authority and discretion are left to individual consumer and producer agencies to insure uniform application of adequate security measures. (The security control of atomic energy information is more centralized and rigid.) Possibly a periodic review by USCIB of security practices actually employed by activities under the Board's cognizance might be advisable.

(6) Not only has there been a significant increase in the number of personnel who have been brought into the COMINT picture since the end of hostilities in 1945 but also there has been an increase in the rate of replacement or turnover. In time of war this turnover rate may be expected to become greater because of reassignment of personnel to overseas units.

(7) Since the end of hostilities in 1945 and the recent advent of new hostilities, the presence of indoctrinated personnel in combat areas has increased the danger of compromise of COMINT information through capture of such personnel.

(8) The probability of imminent military and political collaboration with allied nations other than the British (NATO) will pose additional and even more difficult problems in the maintenance of COMINT security, especially if that collaboration should include dissemination and usage of COMINT material.

7. It is obvious that under the foregoing conditions the laws of probability are bound to operate against the continued security of COMINT. In the first place, the chances for inadvertent leakage of information, even though the question of loyalty may not enter into the picture at all, increase as the area of dissemination of COMINT increases, since the chances for the leakage increases in direct proportion to the number of persons who are taken into the picture and the chances for inadvertent loss of documents increases in direct proportion to the number of documents disseminated. In the COMINT field, the loss of a single document, sometimes regardless of its specific contents, may have

disastrous consequences; if the document should fall into the wrong hands it most certainly will be followed by such consequences upon our COMINT activities. Secondly, the opportunities for acquiring documents by covert operations of secret agents increase as the number of targets, or offices to which COMINT is distributed, increases.

8. During World War II certain special security safeguards were established in particular segments of the German COMINT problem. Actual experience with those safeguards amply demonstrate their feasibility and the practicability of operating successfully with an extremely limited number of operational personnel who had a real "need-to-know", and with the absolute minimum of dissemination. That experience proved the possibility of maintaining the utmost security under difficult circumstances, and constitutes a contradiction of the frequently-heard contention that operational effectiveness of COMINT is inevitably defeated by too strict limitation of dissemination to consumers.

9. It is possible to safeguard COMINT by employing special disguises which will not handicap its usefulness and which at the same time will serve to hide the exact source from which it comes.

10. The latter possibility, together with more rigid limitations on dissemination may be necessary to insure us against the drying up of the sources of this vital information.

11. a. In considering what additional steps should be taken as soon as possible, it is convenient to divide the whole problem of COMINT security into four principal segments:

(1) Security precautions applicable to all steps in the production of the information.

(2) Format of the final product (whether or not the source of the information, when it leaves the production agency, is obvious).

(3) Control of production of copies and their dissemination to consumers.

(4) Security precautions applicable to the operational use of COMINT.

b. Under its charter USCIB prescribes basic security standards and dissemination policies and therefore it has cognizance of all four of the above-mentioned segments.

12. a. The USCIB Coordinator has operational jurisdiction over only the first segment (Par. 11a(1)) and has instituted within AFSA as rigid security controls in the production of COMINT information as practicable under the mechanics of processing. Compartmentation has been especially rigid in respect to the processing of the principal high-level cryptosystems and it is doubtful whether further steps can be taken in that direction toward increased security.

b. The USCIB Coordinator has no jurisdiction, however, over the other three segments of the problem and believes that it is to those areas, especially (2) and (3), that USCIB should not direct its attention.

c. The USCIB Security Committee could be directed to study those segments of the problem and submit recommendations as regards the greater security protection of current as well as anticipated sources of COMINT.

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REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY
TO THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS BOARD

via

THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY COUNCIL

on

MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

THE PROBLEM

1. What additional measures should be taken to protect such COMINT sources as may be expected soon to yield vital information, the drying up of which should be prevented at all costs?

FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-12 in the Enclosure.

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:
- a. A review of the entire problem of COMINT security is warranted in the light of the present situation wherein there appears to be a gradual lessening of security in the face of a more pressing need therefor.
 - b. The possibility of some approach to a state of readability of certain high-level cryptosystems makes it imperative that there be no delay in the re-examination of present COMINT security measures and the formulation and application of new or additional measures which may prevent a repetition of the losses suffered in the recent past.

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c. In connection with certain current high-level COMINT problems it is possible and it may be advisable to institute security safeguards such as were in force in connection with certain high-level COMINT problems in World War II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

a. USCIB direct the USCIB Security Committee to make the review referred to in Par. 3a and to submit recommendations arising from a consideration of Pars. 3b and 3c of the foregoing conclusions.

b. The USCIB Security Committee be directed to submit its report to USCIB not later than 15 December 1950.

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
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ENCLOSURE

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. The Director, AFSA is becoming increasingly concerned over what appears to be a gradual lessening of the security of COMINT in the face of a more pressing need therefor. Although a number of important and basic steps have been taken since the war to establish security on a firmer foundation, other developments have occurred which have, to a large extent, nullified the effects of our advances.

2. Since the end of World War II there has been a continual improvement in the types of cryptosystems employed by foreign governments and a steady tightening of communication security practices,



3. Of the types of high-level systems still in use one is unreadable and the other has been read fragmentarily to a very limited degree. In the latter case, work has been surrounded by the most stringent safeguards and virtually no dissemination has been made of end products.

4. Meanwhile there has been a steady and substantial increase of both workers and consumers. The indoctrinated ^{list of} ~~list~~ ^{consumers alone} has risen from 594 in February 1947 to 1,332 in June 1950. In addition, there have


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been innumerable individuals brought into the fringe of knowledge for administrative, budgetary, or other reasons.

5. Aside from the foregoing, certain dissemination safeguards have gradually been relaxed. Material is now distributed and maintained in a number of areas in Washington outside the producing agencies, where it was never permitted before. Moreover, distribution has been authorized to additional agencies. Restrictions on the distribution of material to, and maintenance in, occupied areas have also been eased.

6. In the face of all this, the demand for COMINT has become increasingly great and the need for its protection imperative. We have



7. Since the War, the basic essentials for effective security control have finally been established after years of effort. We now have:

EO 3.3(h)(2)
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- a. A federal protective law
- b. Security agreements with our foreign collaborators
- c. Improved investigative machinery
- d. An interdepartmental authority (USCIB)
- e. Common security standards
- f. A single U.S. producer of high-level COMINT (AFSA)
- g. General appreciation of the value of COMINT

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8. In addition to the foregoing, there has been instituted within AFSA itself a fairly rigid system of compartmentation of problems, a feature which militates against technical efficiency ^{in COMINT production} but which is considered essential for security.

9. a. However, despite the mechanisms and factors listed above, it is not believed that the security situation has been improved to a degree which warrants brushing aside of all fear that further or future success on high-level problems may be nullified by leakage of information to the Governments whose communications have been successfully attacked. In fact, the basis for continued apprehensions on this score remains the same, or even stronger than before because of certain shortcomings in the COMINT security picture. Among them are the following:

(1) Too much individual authority and discretion are left to individual consumer and producer agencies to insure uniform application of adequate security measures. (The security control of atomic energy information is more centralized and rigid.)

(2) There is no over-all authority to insure observance of security regulations. (Inspection authority such as that which was exercised by the Cryptographic Security Board might well be vested in USCIB.)

(3) There is far too wide dissemination of results. (Over 1,000,000 copies of COMINT translations, representing some 16,000 individual decrypted messages, were disseminated in September, 1950. The handling of the German problem proved that COMINT can be effectively used even with the most drastic restrictions on dissemination.)

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(4) The administrative, control, and budgetary machinery and procedures are such that large numbers of individuals must be apprised of numerous details of COMINT activities. (The large number of agencies, offices, boards, and committees concerned with the operation and administration of COMINT activities necessitates innumerable reports, justifications, etc., which are very hazardous to security. The arrangements governing the operation of CIA are much more conducive to secrecy.)

b. It is obvious that under conditions such as the foregoing, the laws of probability are bound to operate to produce inadvertent leakage of information, even though the question of loyalty may not enter into the picture at all. The chance for loss of documents increases ^{in direct proportion} certainly with the number of documents disseminated, and in the COMINT field the loss of a single document, sometimes regardless of its specific contents, may have disastrous consequences - if the document should fall into the wrong hands it will most certainly be followed by such consequences upon our COMINT activities.

10. During World War II certain special security safeguards were established in particular segments of the German COMINT problem. Actual experience with those safeguards amply demonstrated their feasibility and the practicability of operating successfully with the absolute minimum of dissemination and of maintaining the utmost security under difficult circumstances. That experience constitutes a contradiction of the frequently-heard contention that operational effectiveness of COMINT is inevitably defeated by too strict limitation of dissemination. ^{to consumers}

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11. It is possible to safeguard COMINT by employing special disguises which will not handicap its usefulness and which at the same time will serve to hide the exact source from which it comes.

12. The latter possibility, together with more rigid limitations on dissemination may be necessary to insure us against the drying up of the sources of this vital information.

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