

THE INFLUENCE OF C-POWER* ON HISTORY.

LECTURE NO. 3

MAKING THE MOST OF A CRYPTOLOGIC OPPORTUNITY.

← [PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Walter Cronkite Television Story Entitled

"The Secret Message that Plunged America into War!" —

one of the episodes of his "You Are There" ^{Series} ~~Program~~
Columbia Broadcasting System
presented over the TV network

on

23 October 1955, repeated on 4 August 1957.

Insert attached →

I imagine that for many of ~~those present this morning~~ the name Alfred

Zimmermann, German Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin in the years 1914-1916, or

these days;

is not one that arouses much interest; in fact, I doubt that the name means

a great many

anything to ~~most~~ of you. Yet, this gentleman, of whom I find it difficult to

say "may his soul rest in peace", was the diplomat whose ~~stony~~ and unimaginative

constituted a fine example of how not to make friends and

conduct of German foreign affairs in the three critical years I've mentioned

Here Zimmermann's culminating cap in a career of ~~stony~~ ^{clumsiness} ~~characteristic~~

brought the United States of America into World War I as an active belligerent

~~within a month~~ after it had become known to ~~the~~ the Americans. The military

on the side of the Allies; ~~and the~~ ~~side of the United States~~ could easily have been

~~it was wrong for our country~~, that is, on the side

thrown to the other side--during the critical months of the year 1916--had the Germans

and particularly I lived through that period and I know from first-hand Zimmermann been more astute. The consequences of such an event can hardly be

gauged;

~~perhaps~~; it would be an understatement to say that ~~possibly~~ the course of

not

history would have been changed in a spectacular manner.

*"C-power" = Cryptologic power.

experience that there were several occasions when it wouldn't have tilted in much to the balance in favor of Germany.

influence people; in fact, it can out be seen paid by many historians that:

What did Herr Zimmermann do or fail to do to merit so strong a statement

What did he do or fail to do that tipped the balance suddenly in favor of Britain?
as the one I've just made? What he did was to send a telegram on 16 January 1917

to the German Ambassador in Washington--a telegram which was in German ^{a German office} enciphered

code and which was intercepted and solved by the British cryptanalytic unit in ^{first, to realize that Americans might react if they learned the contents of his message;} London. ^{What he failed to do was to see to it that the cryptosystem that had to}
^{Now Zimmermann}

be used to encrypt his message was technically sound enough to protect its

^{In the aftermath of the discovery of his diplomatic dumbness he}
contents. ^{He} did and failed to do something else in connection with his now

famous message--but of that, more later.

In order to prepare a proper background for the Zimmermann Telegram of

16 January 1917--that's what it's called in history--I ^{will} give you a brief

~~with~~ picture of the situation from the outbreak of the war, on 1 August 1914, up

^{about the time}
to ~~the~~ ^{the} telegram was sent. ~~The picture I'm going to depict is a condensation~~

~~of the excellent story set forth on pages 22 and 23 of Admiral Sir~~

~~William James' book entitled The Eyes of the Navy, published in Boston in 1955.~~

By 1914 England had become so dependent on sea-borne imports that her people couldn't live, let alone wage war, for more than four or five weeks after her sea-routes were broken. Keeping these routes open was therefore the principal task of the British Navy. On the other hand, her principal enemy, Germany, was

Let's see what the telegram says. I show slide of 1917 version.

not dependent on sea-borne imports, so that the British Navy's historic function of arresting an enemy's sea-borne trade lapsed after German shipping had found refuge in neutral ports.

There were, then, the British Grand Fleet and her hardly much inferior protagonist, the German High Seas Fleet, ~~glaring~~ ^{glaring} at each other at a distance, and, although the Grand Fleet was becoming impatient and spoiling for a fight, the Germans didn't dare risk their fleet in major battle, ^{They} confined their attacks to sporadic forays by fast units and to minelaying.

German hopes of quick victory were shattered when trench warfare in France

brought ~~things~~ ^{the war} to a stalemate, ~~and~~ ^{each} with the passing ~~of each~~ month it became clear

that there could be no victory ~~for Germany~~ ^{German} unless British overseas trade was cut

Even in 1915 ^{in certain German circles}, there were those who had off. ^{Some high up in the} Government ~~thought~~ what appeared to be a good idea, ^{very}

^{these people thought that the} ~~inherent~~ success of the German small sub Flotilla of 1914 pointed the way out

without risking the ^{eyes} High Seas fleet, ^{But the time was not yet ripe for such violent} and the good idea was to give highest

priority to building submarines and use them to destroy British ^{if necessary,} and all other

shipping to ~~and~~ ^{the} British Isles.

^{The time wasn't ripe because} ~~Now it happened that~~ civilized rules of maritime warfare required that no merchant ship be sunk without warning; ^{and before the crew could take to life}

boats. ~~Observance of~~ ^{these rules} ~~had hitherto been required~~ ^{were being respected} by both belligerents

but for ^{the} Germany ^S this ~~of course~~ ^{severely} reduced the destructive power of ^{their} ~~the~~ submarines and from time to time their commanders ^{either on their own initiative ignored or they} were ordered to ignore them, ^{That this was especially true} in

the case of the British merchantmen. ^{goes almost without saying,} But there were bound to be mistakes and ^{Sometimes} the ships of neutrals were ^{with the result that} ~~sunk,~~ ^{also} ~~that~~ ^{the} German unrestricted submarine warfare, as it came to be called,

Government, ^{Many bitter and} ~~and there were~~ ^{were sent} acrimonious notes ^{by our} to that government, especially from ~~the~~

~~American~~ Government, when ^{our} ~~our~~ ships were sunk and specious excuses were given for ^{it couldn't pay the price of} Germany ~~decided that~~ ^{unrestricted} submarine warfare in the form of universal condemnation, ^{and} such sinkings. ^{from some up the practice. But as regards American sentiment} American antagonism was heightened by the discovery of plots and ^{had continued to be terrible and} sabotage activities of German agents in America.

The powerful German submarine offensive in 1916, ^{even though unrestricted,} soon began to take a dreadful

turn for the British. ^{Soon} the daily toll of ~~the~~ shipping losses ^{became} was so heavy that it began to be obvious ^{that} unless some new tide set in -- or unless ^{the} United States of America could be

drawn into the war on the Allied side -- there could be only one end to ^{the war,} ~~it,~~ and that end would come soon.

Britain's ^{First,} ~~the~~ problem then was two-fold: (1) To labor prodigiously to gain mastery over

the German submarines; but this, it was recognized, would be a slow, a very slow, ^{Second,} process (2) to try not to irritate or antagonize the United States, and certainly

not to exasperate America, ^{were} as the Germans ^{was, of course,} ~~were~~ ^{The} hope that the letter would ^{of Germans}

"Were serious doubts being cast in America on the genuineness of the instructions to the German Minister in Mexico the authorities here might reconsider their position, but as Zimmermann has admitted their genuineness in the Reichstag this can hardly be the case."

7
That is what Hall greatly feared would happen--but his fears turned out
to be groundless.

sooner or later, the sooner the better, good ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Americans~~ into joining the war on the English side:

later ~~against Germany~~. The British were fortunate in both respects. It turned out that

thanks to the tremendous exertions of ^{their} British shipbuilders, ~~scientists~~, and sailors,

mastery over the submarines was attained, but ~~not~~ ^{that didn't come} until early in 1918. With this

phase of the British problem as I've just stated it, we shall not concern ourselves

today. It is with the other phase of it that my talk will deal.

Let's see how the Germans behaved so as to outrage ^{nearly} practically all Americans and ^{to} make President Wilson ask Congress to declare war on ^{the} ~~them~~ ^{Germans}.

As I've already related,

During the first ^{two} years of submarine warfare the German Government respected and followed the rules of civilized warfare. the rights of neutral nations, ^{but} when faced with the prospect of losing the war

^{Germany felt forced to} unless all imports to the British Isles were cut off, ~~it~~ ^{it} made a fateful decision.

important *alter* ^{German} ~~on~~ 1 February 1917, ~~it~~ ^{it} announced that as of that date ~~German~~ ^{its} submarines would

sink at sight ALL ships met on the high seas; in short, ^{the German Government officially} ~~it~~ ^{proclaimed} that unrestricted submarine warfare was being resumed. And it was ^{without further} ~~it~~ ^{add.}

What did President Wilson do on receipt of the German proclamation? Why,

two days later, on 3 February, he informed German Ambassador von Bernstorff that ~~his career in the~~

United States was at an end ^{was cutting} ~~and~~ the United States ~~had~~ ^{severed} diplomatic relations

with Germany. Von Bernstorff's ^{career in the United States was over;} he wasn't given much time to pack his belongings and

go home. And ^{of course, American} Ambassador Gerard ^{in Berlin} was called home. But note that severing diplomatic relations doesn't mean war — and it didn't in this case.

P L E A S E N O T E ! ! !

Advance Registrations MUST BE RECEIVED IN SECRETARY'S OFFICE PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER 30TH. THEREAFTER THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY

RICHARD D. HIGGINS
Archivist of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Chairman Local Arrangements Committee, SAA
State House, Boston 33, Massachusetts

Fredman Chief AS... 12 - J. Lee King script 49
then 11.5

Ray Apple

4146

Handwritten signature

It was only natural if Britain to hope that we ^{her in} ~~of course, Britain had hoped that the United States would now join the war~~ ^{but, as to say we held back -} To many of us our ^{we were unable to} ~~we were unable to~~ ^{it seemed that} ~~that she could not give our own merchantmen any protection whatever, that is, she just~~ ^{provide protection} ~~couldn't without going to war, and President Wilson had promised to keep America~~ ^{that was something not to do; he said he was going} ~~out of the war.~~ ^{But nothing he hadn't promised to keep} ~~Hence, after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine~~ ^{our} ~~warfare, American ships kept within American harbors, because they were afraid to~~ ^{leave and become helpless victims of submarine torpedoes--with large losses in} ~~life to be expected.~~ ^{I've said, President Wilson was determined to keep America} ~~out of war--just like the Scandinavian and certain other countries in Europe were~~ ^{keeping out of it.} ~~But his position was a very difficult one; his own ambassador~~ ^{in London wrote in his diary:}

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How
down
to
p. 7
insert

from Fed every night to be.

^{Solve an enemy's cryptosystem and as a result}

It's a nice thing to ~~have solved~~ ~~the~~ code, or cipher, or enciphered code, gain information which in pretty nearly all cases is indubitably authentic because it comes ~~not to have as a result some~~ information right out of the horse's mouth; but the information without arousing the enemy's suspicion as to its origin if you can't use ~~it~~, what good is it except, perhaps, for historical purposes?

in the COMINT business we try our best to eat our cake and still have it, and we try this hard

In other words, it's one thing to have COMINT—and another, to use it properly,

that is, so as ~~not to try up the source of the COMINT~~ to continue to receive

the blessings which flow from your crypto-astuteness and good security. Another way of putting the matter I'm going to discuss at some length ^{today} is to say that ~~it's~~ pretty nearly every day. Our record hasn't been too bad and now ~~this afternoon~~ we're going to observe an excellent case illustrative of

two phenomena ^{so} an enduring cryptologic these ~~points~~ which are often hard to join in marriage, viz, using the COMINT to its utmost advantage and at the same time protecting its ~~source~~ ^{source} so as not to dry it up at its source.

of strict neutrality which seemed to be almost a part of his religion."

But maybe a bit of politics got mixed up with the religion because, as some of you may remember, the Democratic slogan for President Wilson's campaign for a second term was: "he kept us out of war". And let's not forget the other famous explanation he gave for keeping out of war; his statement that "there is such a thing as being too proud to fight!" *I would try to defend that.*

There was another factor we must keep in mind. For a large part of the United States, especially the Middle and Far West, the war in Europe was 3,000 miles across the Atlantic. ~~It~~ *It* might as well have been on another planet so far as

the people who lived in those parts of our country were concerned.

Insert 1 from p. 6 suggest attached

which involved what I've termed "a"

~~What came the "cryptologic opportunity" which formed the principal part of~~

It was an event (almost

in the title of my talk, this morning, and which, overnight, it seems, the episode

of the interception and solution by the British of the Zimmermann Telegram.

entirely changed the picture. What was this opportunity? It was the disclosure
event and the

Now, historians may disagree as to why the United States became a belligerent

in World War I; ^{even} some of them ^{still} ~~even~~ believe ~~that~~ we went in on the wrong side. But I

think that most historians would now agree that it was the ^{interception and} solution of the Zimmermann

Telegram and the brilliant way in which the British used it, that brought ^{us} ~~the~~ United

~~into~~ ^{just in the nick of time, and on the right side —} into the war ~~when she was brought in, and brought in on the side of the Allies.~~

could now be no doubt whatever as to the outcome of the war.

Insert 2 attached

After severing diplomatic relations with
Germany something had to be done, of course,
to try to give our merchant ships some
protection and the question of arming them
to protect themselves was discussed.
The idea was to let the Navy provide
guns and trained gunners to handle them.
And on 26 February, President Wilson

addressed Congress in joint session to advocate that course of action. A bill known as the Armed Ship Bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress, and on 1 March it passed the House by a vote of 403 to 13. In the Senate it was less fortunate; it became the subject of acrimonious debate which finally developed into a filibuster led by (2)

Senator Fa Follette of Wisconsin. The filibuster was successful and succeeded in preventing passage of the bill Wilson wanted. But the President still had a way open to him to do what he wished done - his constitutional powers to direct the Navy to furnish the guns and gunners for American ships that had to pass through the German-declared war zones.

"While the Armed Ship Bill was under discussion in Congress another ... ~~an~~ event occurred, ^{which} caused the greatest excitement throughout the country and aroused the people of the United States even more; Secretary of State Lansing wrote, "than the announced policy of submarine ruthlessness." What was the event? It was the one

(4)

is for the most part a strictly authentic and truthful account. J.
 The Cronkite film hardly needs comment to indicate the importance which
 that it ~~will~~ portrays

the ~~publication of the~~ Zimmermann Telegram exercised upon history, ~~and~~ because what
 almost immediately followed the disclosure of its contents
 publication must inevitably be considered in any study of the causes which

led to ~~the~~ ^{our} entry of the United States ~~of America~~ into World War I and the role played
~~incidentally~~ by our country.

The whole episode is replete with drama, and ^{found} ~~it~~ has been reported in a really ^{one of the most dramatic of the} ~~really~~ dramatic manner on a recently presented TV program that was one ^{of the series} ~~of the series~~ of historical episodes recounted on Walter Cronkite's "You are There!" ^{series.} Some of you

may have seen it when the program was presented "live" ^{over WTOP-TV}; some of you may have seen it as recorded on motion-picture film, a copy of which ^{is owned by NSA and which} I've borrowed from the Office

of Training, ^{and that} ~~and~~ ^{sound-track} ~~that~~ film we now are about to see and hear. I'd like to add that

the Zimmermann Telegram of 16 January 1917 was the subject of a radio broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation ^{on} ~~as~~ as recently as ²⁶ May 1958. I'm

trying to get a transcript of that broadcast. I mention this to show you that

the ^{Subject} ~~Zimmermann Telegram~~ is ^{still} quite a live ^{one} ~~subject~~ today -- ^{more than} ~~40~~ years later!

Now let's have Walter Cronkite's ^{film} ~~"You are There!"~~ account of the Zimmermann

Telegram episode which he presented under the title ~~"The secret message that~~

~~plunged America into war.~~ ^{After that I'll take up the background and detailed} ~~account of this spectacular and fateful cryptologic episode of World War I.~~ * * * * *

careful study by ^{cryptologists} ~~historians~~ as well as ^{historians} ~~cryptologists~~. It is a story replete with lessons on the disastrous consequences of weakness in "C-power", ^{as well as} ~~and with~~ lessons on the opportunities attendant upon ~~great~~ strength in "C-power". ~~And,~~ ~~in passing, I may add that the story as it now appears in the history books and popular accounts of the Zimmermann Telegram episode ^{contains} ~~contains~~ errors, in that, some of which will be pointed ~~out~~.~~

I think it correct to say that history attributes ^{our} ~~U.S.~~ ^{entry} ~~on~~ 6 April 1917 ~~into~~ ^{World War I} ~~WWI~~ as a belligerent on the side of the Allied Powers to the disclosure of the contents of the Zimmermann Telegram. Note that this statement is qualified

Just before the film Starting started I said I'd get into it after showing the background, ^{of this episode and give you a} and detailed account of this, the most spectacular and fateful, ^{single} cryptologic episode of World War II, for that matter. I think that cryptologic history ^{throughout} an episode of such importance in

You will recall that in the Cronkite story question was raised as to ^{the reasons for} the delay between the date the Zimmerman Telegram was sent, ~~16~~ 16 January 1917, and the date its contents were communicated to the American Ambassador, 24 February, ~~or~~ a period of almost six weeks. Why did it take so long? ^{This was a question} many persons asked. Wasn't that suspicious? What kind of British skullduggery was being covered up? Walter Cronkite ^{tried to} gave an explanation. He said, ^{or rather hinted} that the story was held back until the Germans changed their code. Then the Zimmerman Telegram could be published without harm to British intelligence. Well, let's see. At this point perhaps I should say that ^{the principal} idea behind my talk is to account for ^{this} ~~the~~ delay.

by a date, viz, 6 April 1917. Perhaps that would have come about without the

Zimmermann Telegram, sooner or later, ^{and} for one reason or another, ~~the~~ most

^{because} probably ~~as a result~~ of German ruthlessness in the conduct of submarine warfare.

But "later" might have been too late, because after ~~February 1917~~ ^{the}

unrestricted submarine warfare started there wasn't much time left to help

Britain, ~~and her Allies, because England was being starved for food and munitions,~~

And if ~~America~~ ^{we} had waited until England had been starved into starvation and

capitulation, it is ^{of course} possible that ~~America~~ ^{we might} would never have entered ~~the war.~~ ^{the war.}

Or, if ~~it was~~ ^{we were later} forced to ~~enter~~ ^{fight} by German arrogance, ~~it~~ ^{we} might have ~~been left to~~ ^{had}

^{face} fight a powerful and jubilant Germany all alone. Who knows?

The fact is, however, that the Zimmermann Telegram was ^{sent on 16 January 1917, its decrypted plain} published on

March 1st, and within a little over one month, ^{after publication} on April 6th, ~~we~~ declared war on

Germany. ^{According to practically all historians} There seems to be little doubt, ~~therefore,~~ ^{we} that ~~America~~ entered the

war when ~~we~~ ^{Perhaps we in the cryptologic} did because of the Zimmermann Telegram, ~~or shall we say,~~ rather,

^{field should be a bit more specific and say that we entered} as a consequence, on the one hand, of German obtuseness in affairs diplomatic

and naivete in affairs cryptologic; and, on the other hand, ^{we should add, that we entered into it} ~~as the fruit of~~

^{first because of} British astuteness in affairs diplomatic, and ^{second, because of their} brilliance in affairs cryptologic. Or, ^{should these two reasons be interchanged in their order. I'll let you} be the judges.

impact that disclosing the

The Cronkite film has, ^{in some} dramatic, portrayed the contents of the Zimmermann Telegram had on Congress. It was only to be expected that question and doubt should be raised as to its

~~the~~ authenticity, of ~~the~~ Zimmermann Telegram. The newspapers were full of denunciations and discussions of what many people regarded ^{at first} a complete hoax, a patent fraud. In the Congressional Record the debate on March 1st takes up 22 whole pages--all devoted to the question of the authenticity of the Zimmermann Telegram,

which had so far nothing to back it except the word of the Washington Correspondent of the Associated Press, ^{for} ~~made~~ the disclosure.

~~The~~ publication had not been made on the authority of the State Department. ^{Charge as it may seem, it had} ~~at all!~~ ^{Associated Press} It had strangely appeared merely as a dispatch, ~~sent~~ ^{sent} broad-

^{What was widely distributed} ~~and~~ apparently upon its own responsibility. ^{You will recall this point in the} ~~Edward Cronkite Film of Congressional~~

~~It is~~ certain that for so many years ~~shrouded~~ the Zimmermann Telegram in a

But now let's lift ~~the~~ secrecy veil a bit. ~~It will be of interest to~~ tight veil of secrecy. Let's begin with a brief

~~start~~ in with a brief story about how the British cryptologic organization got

started. I should tell you that according to the historical accounts, and I know they're true, the British Government had no crypt-

^{Read from Ewing lecture at Edinburgh 14 December 1927.} analytic organization in being within World War I, ~~be~~ out. Oh!

^{Read from Ewing Room 49, page 173-4.} ^{previously} I know there had been a long, long tradition of code and cipher solving by British Intelligence agencies

and this is true. ^{But} that's another story and I don't wish to go into it at this time. ^{all} I want to say at this time is that there was ^{no} cryptanalytic organization in the British Government when war came in 1914. ^{Just as}

19

official crypt REF aid 463374 in Washington

There was no ~~in the American Government~~ when we entered World War I as a belligerent in April 1917. In both cases there had to be improvisation with amateurs taking the leading roles, not professionals. Let me read from a letter dated - mark this well - August 23, 1958 written to me by Cmdr A.G. Denniston, who was for a number of years before World War II, and for a couple of years during that war the head of the British crypt-analytic organization.

copy from HTR

See marked portion beginning "But do remember..."

Cmdr. Denniston's mention of Sir Alfred Ewing requires a bit of elaboration. You'll find a good deal of information about him in a book by his son, published in 1939, after some clearance bouts with the authorities. The book is entitled The Man of Room 40: The life of Sir Alfred Ewing (Hutchinson & Co, London, 1939). Has mentioned in several other books, and in particular a book published in 1955 by Admiral Sir William James, entitled Eyes of the Navy. ~~Admiral James~~ James devotes a good deal of space to the part played by Ewing in World War I. Let me quote from that book which is primarily about Admiral Sir William ~~James~~ Spencer Hall.

p. 24 - 1st par.

After follows a few paragraphs on codes and ciphers, there follows this paragraph:

bottom of p. 25 + top 3 on p. 26

* * * * *

p. 28 - 3 paras specifically for intercepting enemy radio signals

A radio receiving station was set up - by amateurs, too, but we won't go into that - and this first station was eventually expanded into 14 stations in the British Isles. Later three overseas stations were established.

James p. 29 - 3 paras + top par on p. 30

Believe it or not, ~~according to some~~ Furing's work for a number of months was entirely a private enterprise effort. It is not clear whether he and his small band of amateurs were paid. - I must assume, somehow or other, ^{Furing's} they were, ~~perhaps~~ ~~what James meant~~ and he says ~~no, was that~~ the small organization did not come under any Director or Sea Lord. This situation was changed when Furing's ~~the~~ group became a section of ~~the~~ Naval Intelligence under the overall direction of ^{a man who soon after the war} gained a great deal of publicity as a result of the work of the people under him, Admiral Sir W. Reginald Hall. Furing continued to be ^{technical} the head of the group until he became Chancellor of Edinburgh University two years later.

Furing and his small team were University men - not naval officers; as a result their translations of German naval signals were strange things in the eyes of the very few men in the Naval Operations staff to whom the translations went. And, of course, the gifted ~~of the~~ ^{cryptanalysts} amateurs became the butt of jokes and it was a long time before Admiral Hall was able to break down the prejudice against their work. The amusing thing to note is that Hall had assigned a Navy Captain to put the translations into proper naval

until 6 November 1914, when he not only was allowed in Room 40 but "became Hall's representative in charge of the staff of cryptographers."

language - but that officer wasn't permitted to have access to the room where the cryptanalysts worked or to have any personal contact with them. It is also reminiscent of certain ^{early} days in the history of our own cryptanalytic organization to learn that ~~it~~ for a good ~~while~~ many months ^{one and} only one person ^{was permitted to} receive the translations - the Chief of Staff, to whom they were personally handed in a locked book! But now it's high time I got down to the real cryptologic details, which had been ^{of the Zimmerman Telegram, details} ~~completely~~ shrouded in mystery for almost ten years before the ~~certain amount of information began to leak out~~ ^{veil of secrecy was lifted a bit by a story in the} November issue of a now defunct American magazine called World's Work, ^{in which was} published the final installment of a book by Burton J. Hendrick, entitled The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. ^{Since then other accounts} have appeared, perhaps the best and certainly the latest one being that in ^{late 1914} Admiral Sir William James' ^{entitled} ~~book~~, The Eyes of the Navy, which I've ^{already} mentioned. But let's begin with the version given in the Hendrick account, ^{not only} because it's pretty accurate, having been based upon certain telegrams exchanged between our ambassador in London and the State Department in Washington but also because it's quite dramatic.

Insert

I think Walter Cronkites story ^{used a lot} ~~was based~~ of information that appeared first in this Hendrick account. And in passing I might quote ~~it~~ from an ^{address} ~~speech~~ delivered on 6 November 1925 by Lord Balfour who, speaking at a luncheon given at Edinburgh University said, as reported in The Scotsman of 7 November 1925:

see me
p. 240 Ewing

Soon we shall learn the part Balfour played in our story of the Zimmermann Telegram.

22

22

Here copy ^{material in} p. 23 & 24 to end of Telegram ^{indicated} Page, 2d col p. 24.

World's Work and from time to time make comments.

indent quote

at the moment

We shall not concern ourselves with the steps taken by President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, culminating in the publication by the Associated Press and Secretary Lansing, culminating in the publication by the A.P. of the text of the Zimmermann Telegram. Our attention will be concentrated upon the minute details of the manner in which the message was intercepted and solved.

first

Copy part of p. 24 1st para p. 25 to point indicated 8th line, ending with

indent

(Continue reading from Hendrick, p. 24 "manner in which" . . . etc to

"the most fateful message sent to America during the war." Go on with following

~~from p. 26, 1st col~~ "In the British Admiralty this Nauen-Sayville thoroughfare was known as "the main line"; it was the most direct and consequently the one most used for sending German dispatches to the United States."

Hendrick cites no authority for the statement that the Zimmermann Telegram was transmitted by radio from Nauen to Sayville. There is very good reason to doubt it.

A few hours after outbreak of war the British, who've always recognized the importance of control of communication channels as well as sea lanes took immediate steps to isolate Germany from the rest of the World that lay beyond the

oceans, by cutting and diverting to her own service the two German cables across the Atlantic, leaving only indirect channels of communication with her ambassador at Washington. These were four in number.

- (1) ^{Best} Radio ^{From Germany, to} ^{London, New York,} ^{and Tuckerton, New Jersey.} ^{Both routes were} ^{(supervised}

by the U.S. ^{and} ^{well supervised} ^{to protect our neutrality.}

- (2) ^{For} Cable from Germany via Berlin-Stockholm-Buenos Aires, Washington--

but this route was secret from ^{the United States Government,} U.S. although there is positive evidence that it was quite

^{You see,} well-known to the British from the first days of its use, ^{for} the cable from Stockholm to Buenos Aires passed through England; ^{and} the route was jocularly called by ^{Room 40}

- (3) ^{Another cable route} ^{to} ^{Via Berlin, Copenhagen,} Washington, ^{and} this cable also touched

English soil. This was a very unusual channel for the Germans because it could be used only with the knowledge and cooperation of the U.S. ^{United States Government.} ^{more about that} ^{channel} ^{later,}

- (4) ^{The last route} ^{Involved inserting} ^{secret text in ordinary news dispatches}

^{we learned about it} ^{when this method} ^(this was what we may call a "concealment method") ^{and was disclosed} ^{after the war by Berjstorff himself.}

^{Now} ^{As to the first method,} ^{the use of the radio channel} ^{was prohibited except} ^{from Nauen to Sayville or Tuckerton; its use} ^{and I am glad to say that} ^{the supervision} ^{under American supervision/exercised by American authorities was very detailed,} ^{and effective.}

Hendriek is absolutely wrong when he says (p. 25, 1st column) ". . . how little this

prohibition interfered with the Germans is shown by the use they made of

the Long Island station for this, the most fateful message sent to America

during the war." I have very carefully searched every available record and

have found not the slightest evidence that this channel was actually used,

for the Zimmermann Telegram

by me *the* *accounts of your*
The German accounts have been examined as well as American.

in learning just how the
I suggest you study his brochure on the Zimmermann
supervision was exercised, *Eng. Chiffre 9072* *Read from p. 7 and 8 of*
Telegram (pages 7 and 8). I think you'd agree that great care
brochure, paras checked
was taken by the authorities who had the responsibility of seeing
to it that ~~we~~ lived up to our international obligations *which should neutralize*
No, the Zimmermann Telegram wasn't sent via that route, although

Hendrik's account makes it plausible by saying:

Hendrik p. 25, col 2 beginning

col 25, col 2 "On the 16th of January, 1917 . . . etc. whole

column to 1st 2 lines p. 26). *II*. Does Hendrik want to imply Berystorff

this lure which the Mexican President Carranza was to swallow?
added this precious bit of enticement. No, Hendrik's explanation is quite

wrong; it is, in fact, misleading and perhaps intentionally
flat and disingenuous. We shall soon learn the real explanation for the

gaps and doubtful points in the text of the message as first intercepted.
It will go a long way to explaining the 6-weeks' delay we've been trying
to explain.

We come now to the second communication channel used by the German

Government etc. . . . bottom p. 8 of brochure *to end of line at top p. 9*

see me

out the way, I want to know how the German Government would have known about this circuitous route. I have a note in my file on this point. It says that this disguise was used "no doubt" to protect the Swedish intermediary, as it might otherwise have been noticed that the message was sent to Buenos Aires as a Swedish message. I believe it was sent further as a German one.

There is plenty of evidence that the British knew of this circuitous route a few days after it was instituted; it happened to be decoded messages that passed over this route. Later appeared among the hundreds in the affidavit by Admiral Hall in the records of the Mixed Claims Commission set up after the war. Many passed over the Berlin-Stockholm-B.A.-Wash. route. What the Germans did was to hand their coded telegrams over to their Swedish Minister in Germany; his friends in Washington and in Berlin; the Swedish Ambassador in Stockholm addressed to his home office; from Stockholm it went to the Swedish Ambassador in Buenos Aires who turned it over to his German colleague in that city. The German Minister in Buenos Aires then forwards the message to Bernstorff in Washington, but before doing so he applied a process of systematic alteration to the code groups, hoping that the differences between Swedish and German code groups would not be noted. But I think the British noted the disguise even before the message left Europe - remember that the cable from Stockholm to Buenos Aires occurred to either the Swedes or the Germans that the cables touched. By the way, the disguise was a pretty thin one as only the three central letters of the 5-digit code groups were changed and systematically. It didn't dawn on the Germans that their code could be unravelled and read by anybody not possessing a copy of the code-book - certainly not by stupid Englishmen. And also, by the way, the disguise procedure began as early as in the summer of 1915. The Hendrik account would make it appear as if the Zimmerman Telegram only received special routing to insure its delivery receipt but it is clear from the German records alone that the transmission of important messages by

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in the German Foreign Office Communications, more than one route was routine procedure with ⁿBerystorff. But Hendrik

says:

indent quote

see me. → Hendrik. (p. 26, Col. 1) two ^{two} mark marked

Read from p. 26 of Hendrik, Column 1. ^THendrik's statement "In many

capitals German messages were frequently put in Swedish cipher and sent to Swedish Ministers...

implies that the British read Swedish codes, too. Now it would be easy to believe

etc. p. 10 of brochure - 4 paras. + to point on p. 11 marked ^{stop} at end of pop

~~Read from p. 18 of brochure - Now it would be easy to believe~~

over with the ^{one of these two pieces of evidence in going to speak} major statement that it involved the publication by our State Department on 3 September 1917 of certain messages ^{of certain messages given to} history now as the German "Sturles" version or "sent without these messages."

We come now to the third and most interesting of the Zimmermann

that the Cronkite story reported so dramatically as the

Telegram routings--the one used with cooperation of the State Department. I quote from the Hendrik narrative:

see me - Page 11 of Brochure, this small type indicates matter beg. "The German... and continue on p. 12+13 to point marked stop ^{line}

~~Hendrik makes it appear that obtaining permission to use State Department~~

facilities was a rather simple matter ^{etc} p. 12 brochure--all the page to

end place p. 13 marked "stop here".

I am in a position to say categorically that the State Department was indeed careful in placing its communication

facilities at the disposal of the Germans. Mr. Lansing not only realized etc.

see me - Continue with matter in 2^d para on p. 14

(Read from p. 14 brochure - one para only.)

That story, too, for now interesting bit of cryptology... history... are quite... into world... the... of... German... not Swedish... called... messages... by the... found... Swedish... that we have... etc.

... or codes

We come now to a study of the code used for the Zimmermann Telegram. Note the plural - "Codes" - that's very important in this case, as you shall see. and, first, its passage from Berlin to Washington: there can be no question that the message, ^{as the code used for} which carried the Zimmermann Telegram (it bore the No. 158) was the one which had

been appended to Berlin-Washington ^{message} No. 157, and which ^{was} had been sent via

State Department channels. As I've already said, the British Government

has officially never published any account of the interception and solution

of the Zimmermann Telegram by its ^{cryptanalysts in Room 40} cryptologic agency commonly referred to as

~~Room 40~~ ^{the} But when we study very intently telegrams that passed between

the British and American Governments dealing with the Zimmermann Telegram

as related in the Hendrik account - and more especially now, the account

The Author's Foreword to Admiral James' book

contained in ~~the book published only three years ago~~ by a close

~~associate and war-time colleague of Admiral Hall~~ ^{we can see certain things} This is the book, Eyes that illuminate the dark or dubious points in the story of the Navy, by Admiral Sir William James.

Admiral James in his forward says:

Read from p. xi and xii to point marked

But Admiral James was careful. Even though, as he says, he had no

access to unreleased official papers and there ^{fore} ~~as he says~~, it wasn't

I'm fortunate to be able to show you what Mr. de Grey looked like. In my many talks with him not once did he mention the role he played in the reading of the Zimmerman Telegram - not did anyone else in the organization (over)

in which he was ~~the~~ Deputy ~~Chief~~
to Sir Edward Travis, the Chief.
I have no photograph of the
Reverend Montgomery to show you.
But Nigel de Grey was and looked
the part of a character in Dickens or in
a spine-chilling mystery ~~encountered~~
in book or on stage.

necessary for him to obtain official approval for publishing his book, he

did submit it for some sort of blessing, if not approval, ~~as this memo to~~

report *1955* *This I learned in a*
~~dated~~ 15 December from our ~~then Deputy Senior~~ Liaison Officer ~~to GCHQ~~ *in London,*
who said: " : : :"
~~clearly shows.~~

~~Read from~~ Larkin memo.

"A" attached

~~And perhaps it's not strange to say~~ *PP* *Apparently* Admiral James himself *didn't* ~~doesn't~~

know the delicate and interesting technical points about the Zimmermann

Telegram which ~~remained~~ *in my own mind at least, if not, in the* ~~remained~~ obscure or in doubt until he published his book. *minds of others -*

the same *said of +*
And ~~it is~~ can be ~~about~~ his clarification, --unintentional, I'm sure *of*

other dubious points about the history and operations of Room 40. ~~But we~~ *But we*
~~can't go into these except as they deal with or impinge upon~~ *can't go into these except as they deal with or impinge upon*
~~But we shall have to confine ourselves to the verifiable facts about~~

would be
the cryptology ~~of~~ the Zimmermann Telegram.

Let's begin by quoting from Admiral James' account. (James, p. 136 --

See me.

"Then early in the New Year (read p. 136 and 137 to point indicated and comment

re the truth of what James says about the source of the DeGrey-Montgomery

message. ~~(Incidentally, describe DeGrey).~~ *#space*

Doesn't interested There are reasons to believe that the version *of the Zimmermann Telegram you've* ~~that we have~~ just seen

came from the ~~British~~ copy of the State Department message containing Berlin's

Nos. 157 and 158 to Washington--but I don't think it would ~~have~~^{be} been polite

~~at the time~~ or even now to ~~say~~^{imply} intimate ~~was~~ that the British were also

intercepting and studying messages of the U.S. Government! I wouldn't ~~even~~^{had to} mention such an idea were it not a fact that soon after we came into the war our ally Britain ~~officially~~^{officially} told us that our codes weren't safe!
(Then go on with last paragraph p. 137 and continue with p. 138 and 139)

to point indicated, ~~at~~ⁱⁿ middle of p. 137.

Berjstorff tried desperately to have Berlin change its decision about unrestricted sub^{marine} warfare--to no avail.

On 1 February, Berjstorff ~~presented~~^{officially handed in his government's announcement} the declaration re sub-warfare which that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin that day. President Wilson broke off relations two days later, on 3 Feb.
As we have already noted, sets continue with the story as Admiral James tells it:
Resume reading James, p. 140, middle paragraph only.
See me

Hall then took steps to obtain the additional evidence that he required ~~in~~^{event of an exposure} the circumstances and telegraphed to his secret agent in Mexico City, to

get all copies of Berjstorff's telegrams to Eckhardt since 18 January. These ~~were~~^{to be} the British military in were sent to Washington and forwarded by cable to London in British cipher. No hitch developed in ~~his~~^{his nice arrangement} were then to be

James goes on: "So much progress with the reconstruction of the code had

been made that by February 19 Hall had in his hands an almost perfect trans-

cript, and James then gives the text of the Zimmermann Telegram as ^{generally} published in the

history books.

At this point I want to tell you about the "Mr. T" referred to in what I've just said. [Continue with what's attached]

Mr. "T" was a British operative or secret agent in Mexico City. In a rather old way ^{and quite by accident} he turned out to be a most useful character in the drama of the Zimmermann Telegram.

Copy portions marked on p. 134-135

When "H" was replaced by secret agent "T" ^{of James} the good work went on, and that's how Hall in London was able to get a copy of the Zimmermann Telegram in the form ^{in which} it was sent ^{Bernstorff in} from Washington to Eckhardt in Mexico City. ^{possession of that version of the message} He turned out to be of crucial importance! As Admiral James says (p. 141):

one-part code known as Code 13040
newly new 10,000

But James is throwing a little dust in our eyes. The version of the Zimmermann Telegram that was finally published was not the version that

was in the telegram from Zimmermann to Berystorff, [^] *The latter was in a comparison* which ~~was~~ *in code 7500.*

~~whereas~~ but the equivalent version that was in the telegram from Berystorff to

although quite similar in content, Eckhardt, ~~and that~~ *a much* [^] *one-part code known as Code 13040* that was in the older and much simpler ~~13040 code~~

Here's the message in its 13040 clothing:

Read the message entire as given on p. 141 James.
message as on p. 141 if omitted continue

Continue with p. 142 down to stop. Omit next paragraph and continue

as follows:

But by this time Hall had information that the German-Americans in the U.S. [^] were extremely active in their endeavors to stay the President's

hand. He felt that the time had come for immediate action and formally *as regards bringing the Zimmermann Telegram to the attention of President Wilson* pressed for a decision. On 20 February he received Balfour's authority

to handle the whole matter as he saw fit. *James continues the story:*

"Prolonged discussion with De Page etc."

Continue with p. 143 James--whole page, and top lines on pp. 144, then

and 145 to end of 3rd para. on p. 145
continuer

We've already heard ^{and seen} the contents of the message from Page, the American Ambassador, in London, to the President and Secretary of State, so I won't repeat it now. You'll recall that in that telegram Page stated:

P. 144 215

that "early in the war the British Government etc. read extracted and marked paragraphs on p. 144, James.

But now listen to James: (p. 145) "It was not the case etc -- just that

p. 18 of brochure beginning "When Ambassador Page paragraph and the next one and then continue from p. 16 of F-M brochure and

read all the way to bottom of page 16 of brochure]

place around the cryptanalytic feet every security safeguard he could devise. If necessary Nobody can blame Hall for trying to put everyone including Page, the he would put off on the wrong trail anybody ~~that~~ he thought might jeopardize security so as President, the Secretary of State, off on the wrong trail and to cover the

tracks of Room 40. At the time this brochure [hold up F-M brochure] was

written we didn't know all the facts -- we were ^{using} making inferences and ^{making} deductions.

We said:

2 marked paras of brochure

Read two marked paragraphs on p. 17 of brochure.

We felt that "cipher book" cryptographic The statement that a codebook -- or at least some sort of code document --

or captured must have contained but we didn't know just how was found must contain an element of truth, because here is what the Ewing ^{turned over to us} ^{copy of them} ^{13040 code} ^{didn't pay anything about it} ^{having} ^{been constructed upon the basis of} ^{caused the code that they'd} ^{But that's exactly what they'd done, as I have since then established.} ^{For instance, in Ewing (p. 18) we read the following:}

Note the illuminating statement ~~Ewing says~~ that the captured material enabled the workers in Room 40 to

read much enemy dip correspondence, "thus providing a starting-point from

which to penetrate, one after another, the German Foreign Office Ciphers."

all the Ewing p. 18 of brochure when the p. 18 of brochure "psychology"

2nd page

reference

~~On the other hand,~~ ^{Admiral} James ^{too,} gives us much more specific and valuable

information on this point. ~~add I think it is accurate.~~ (James, pp. 69-70)

James pp. 69-70 In April etc

~~Read James p. 69 to top p. 70. In April (1915) something~~

With the aid of our able archivists I've been able to dig out of the old files of World War I. ~~If I'd had more time to prepare for these talks before coming out~~

files of World War I.

here it is.

~~I would have sent~~ German Code 13040; ~~put with my slides, etc.~~ It's

an interesting document. ~~as also is~~ Englecher Chiffre 9972 and Code 7500--

~~these are all in our archives now.~~

But to get back to the Zimmermann Telegram itself again, you will recall

that I said it was published in all the important newspapers of the world

In pro-German circles the telegram was immediately denounced as a forgery on March 1st, 1917. After acrimonious debate a resolution was passed by

the Congress that the President be asked to state the source of the informa-

tion. He replied the same evening through his Secretary of State as follows:

~~Read James, p. 147 -- Lansing and next paragraph: marked beginning of sentence~~
~~on p. 148 to end~~

Zimmermann in a statement before the Reichstag made a long, involved

and foolish apology for his inept conduct, ~~making up with this~~ ^{made} ~~and he~~
In short, Herr Zimmermann brazenly admitted he'd sent the telegram.

gave error because if he'd [insert matter on next page]

~~Read James p. 148, marked paragraph.~~

~~How naive!~~ How could such a naive man, ^{as Herr Zimmermann was} rise to be head of the Foreign

Office of a great and powerful state? It will hardly astonish you that Zimmermann continued to use Code 13040 -- and that he soon lost his job as Foreign Minister.

Continue with James, p. 149 and 150 to end of quoted matter at top of

p. 150.

** insert to preceding page*

If ~~Zimmermann~~ had been really smart he would have denounced the telegram as a forgery, ^a fraud, ^{the} and product of British duplicity and chicanery-- even if only to smoke the British out and make them prove the authenticity of the telegram by disclosing exactly how the message and the information contained ^{had been} in it ~~was~~ obtained.

(Quote from James, p. 148 "American reaction..." and p. 154...)

That is what Hall greatly feared would happen--but his fears turned out to be groundless. Zimmermann was too dumb, too slow, too inept, ^{It was hardly actual you know. It} and he soon... ~~lost his job.~~

Now go back to F-M brochure, p. 17 to end of 2d para.