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19 July 1951

## Minutes of Fourth Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Portuguese Communication Security

HELD : Pentagon, 18 July 1951 at 1030 hours

## PRESENT:

Mr. William F. FRIEDMAN, AFSA, Chairman  
 Colonel Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, ID  
 Mr. Winston SCOTT, CIA  
 CDR Mark T. LITTLE, USN, NATO

## ABSENT :

Mr. Robert PACKARD, State

Mr. FRIEDMAN opened the meeting by stating that Lt. General SMITH, Chairman of USCIB, had asked him at the last USCIB Meeting (13 July) how soon the Ad Hoc Committee could effect the recommendation contained in paragraph 4.b. of the Report of the USCIB Coordinator to the USCIB on Portuguese Communication Security, viz., that the ad hoc body ascertain the exact extent to which present NATO practices may provide secure ways and means, within the framework of these practices, to solve the Portuguese problem. Mr. FRIEDMAN had estimated one month as a feasible period of time needed for this task, and had therefore called this meeting of the ad hoc body to consider the problem.

CDR LITTLE remarked that at the present time the Council of Deputies of NATO is considering a revision of the basic security regulations. In regard to electrical transmission, he read from D.C.2/7 "Proposed Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security System", paragraph 17:

1  
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Declassified and approved for release  
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The special cryptographic arrangements which have been provided will enable national delegates or their national diplomatic representatives at the seat of all NATO bodies to communicate with their Governments and will allow inter-communication between all NATO Secretariats. Similar arrangements will be made to allow supreme Commanders to communicate with Naval, Military, and Air Commanders and Service Ministries. The only cryptographic system to be used for the present time at these levels for COSMIC communications of all security classifications and NATO communications classified TOP SECRET or SECRET is Typex Mark II with simplex settings."

CDR LITTLE pointed out that copies of these security regulations had been distributed to all NATO countries, although it had become clear that not all were observing them.

Mr. FRIEDMAN said that in regard to Portuguese communications it had been definitely ascertained that the Portuguese were wary of using Typex for certain communications because of their fear that the British, who were preparing the key lists, were keeping copies of them. CDR LITTLE concurred in this observation and said that it had been stated to him personally that there were compunctions among the Portuguese concerning the honesty of the London Cypher Board in promulgating the settings for use by NATO countries, since it was feared that the British had kept duplicate sets.

Mr. FRIEDMAN then raised the question why, since he understood that permission had been given the NATO countries to compile their own settings for Typex, the NATO countries did not avail themselves of this opportunity to make their own national books of settings. CDR LITTLE pointed out that, to the best of his knowledge, such permission had never been given the NATO countries, the Security Coordinating Committee's recommendation for such a measure having been rejected by the Standing Group. Inasmuch as

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this statement was quite contrary to the impression of Mr. FRIEDMAN and other members of the ad hoc body, CDR LITTLE offered to obtain the paper in which the measure was recommended by the Security Coordinating Committee and that in which the recommendation was rejected by the Standing Group. The ad hoc committee expressed interest in both papers, and it was pointed out by Mr. FRIEDMAN that this refusal by the Standing Group to allow NATO countries to compile their own settings threw an entirely different light upon NATO COMSEC problems. Mr. SCOTT noted that this refusal offered some justification for the Portuguese distrust of Typex. CDR LITTLE, in reply to a query from Mr. FRIEDMAN, said that he believed that U.S. and U.K. members of the Standing Group had made this decision on the grounds that the machine itself offered sufficient security for the present time, and that permission to compile their own settings should be given to the various nations only when they had shown that their practices conformed with the security requirements of NATO.

Colonel DAWSON suggested to CDR LITTLE that he discuss this matter with the British member of the Group with a view to having the rejected proposal revived. He also suggested that the Security Coordinating Committee, accompanied by technical personnel, visit the various nations and convince them of the security of Typex for national communications when used properly with nationally-prepared settings. Members of the ad hoc committee agreed that such an approach should be made from a NATO level and through NATO channels.

3  
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Mr. FRIEDMAN then directed the attention of the committee to paragraph 3.h. of the report of the USCIB Coordinator, and particularly to that portion (2) concerning the practices which apply "to the various types of categories of NATO or national classified information which may be encrypted by Typex". Mr. FRIEDMAN asked whether there was clarity in regard to what sort of communications should be encrypted by Typex. CDR LITTLE replied that he believed the regulations were clear on this subject, although they were, of course, subject to interpretation by the various countries. Generally speaking, Typex was to be used for NATO matters and for national comment on NATO matters, but not for purely national matters. Mr. FRIEDMAN pointed out that if the nations were permitted to make their own settings they would not hesitate to encrypt in Typex the fringe COSMIC traffic which is now carried on the national systems, thereby endangering NATO communications and the Typex traffic of other NATO countries. Members of the committee agreed with this observation.

The question was then raised by the CHAIRMAN concerning the regulations in regard to the use by the NATO-countries of courier service, and particularly whether the suggestion made in a recent USCIB meeting could be effected, viz., that specially sensitive material not be handed over to these countries unless a promise was obtained that it would be handled only by courier service. In regard to this, Colonel DAWSON referred to paragraph 14 of D.C.2/7 in which courier service is expressly required for the transmission of all COSMIC information and documents, unless time

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does not permit the use of accompanied bag. Only then is electrical transmission authorized, Typex being the only system authorized for transmission of such material. Since there are definite indications that the Portuguese, at least, are violating this regulation, the question was raised by Mr. FRIEDMAN how such violation could be brought to their attention

[REDACTED] The suggestion was made by CDR LITTLE that an approach be made through the NATO Standing Group, and specifically through General LINDSAY, the international representative and liaison officer in London between the Standing Group and the NATO Council of Deputies. In reply to Mr. FRIEDMAN's question whether the United States and United Kingdom could do anything to facilitate the use of the courier service by the NATO countries, Colonel DAWSON pointed out that the availability of the U.S. Air Force, Army, and State Department courier service had been reiterated to the NATO countries during the past month. CDR LITTLE confirmed Colonel DAWSON's remark and also stated that a memorandum had been put out by NATO outlining the courier service available to NATO nations. Mr. FRIEDMAN offered the suggestion that a study of the frequency with which NATO countries made use of the courier service would be of interest, and Colonel DAWSON stated that it would not be difficult to compile a report comparing the percentage of volume of traffic by courier and by electrical transmission. CDR LITTLE pointed out that it was his belief that most of the violations of security were to be found in transmissions of representatives in London and Washington, rather than from the capitals of the countries themselves,

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a view somewhat confirmed by Mr. FRIEDMAN after a brief survey of the cryptographic violations in Portuguese communications. Mr. FRIEDMAN suggested that the ad hoc committee recommend that additional instruction in the use of security procedures be given to the NATO countries, and pointed out that this could be done easily [redacted]

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DAWSON noted that essentially the same basic arrangements must be made with Portugal as had been made with NATO countries with regard to security outside the COSMIC and NATO spheres. He pointed out that very few NATO countries had security regulations for their Armed Forces, and that even Norway had no standardized security document or procedure. CDR LITTLE remarked that in regard to security consciousness and morale, however, Norway stood relatively high, whereas Portugal was outstandingly insecure at every level. Mr. FRIEDMAN indicated that consideration should be given to the mechanics of an approach to the Portuguese in regard to internal security, [redacted]

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In addition, the

Portuguese had appeared very agreeable to dismissing undesirable persons

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from the Government, a matter entailing less effort than in France, for in Portugal the Communist Party was illegal, whereas in France it was not. Mr. FRIEDMAN's suggestion that the ad hoc committee recommend that a team be sent from the Security Coordinating Committee of NATO to inspect the security arrangements of Portugal on a non-reciprocal basis was favorably received. CDR LITTLE pointed out that a British team had already visited Lisbon before Portugal had been permitted access to COSMIC information and that certain agreements had been effected at that time in regard to security. He believed that more could be gained from a visit by a U.S. team from the services rather than from the Treaty advisors.

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question was raised by the CHAIRMAN whether such training could best be carried out in the United States or in Europe under the auspices of SHAPE; from the point of view of expense and feasibility it was agreed that such a school could well be set up under SHAPE. It was pointed out by Mr. SCOTT that an approach must be made at the top level in order to gain results, and that once top level approval has been gained, training on a working level is effective. Without top level cooperation, however, the training of the workers is ineffective, as has been recently experienced in the Dutch Army where the Chief of Staff is opposed to the tightening of security measures and therefore the Army Chief of Intelligence is virtually powerless to bring about a tightening of security within the Army.

7  
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Colonel DAWSON remarked that the standardization of security was but another facet of the general trend within SHAPE to standardize, and that there therefore should be no trouble in effecting such a standardization of security regulations. Such regulations were also necessary to protect classified information presently being given to NATO countries outside the realms of COSMIC, as in the field of ordnance, supply, etc. CDR LITTLE stated that a NATO War College was being established under SHAPE, and Mr. FRIEDMAN remarked that this would constitute a good precedent or basis for setting up a training school in Paris or its vicinity, for students from the various NATO countries, such a school to conduct courses in security, including cryptography and communication security. CDR LITTLE pointed out that even now plans were being drawn for a working group within SHAPE to report on clandestine and subversive activity. He indicated that, in his opinion, U.S. standards of security and U.S. instructors rather than U.K. should be used since U.S. standards were higher than those of the U.K. Members of the committee agreed, and it was also agreed that the first step should be the promulgation of a document setting forth minimum communication security standards for NATO countries, the second step being the setting up of a school for training in security methods and practices.

Mr. FRIEDMAN closed the meeting by stating that these thoughts might form the basis for the next meeting of the ad hoc committee, and asked CDR LITTLE to obtain for him as soon as possible the documents pertaining to the compilation by the various NATO nations of their own settings for Typex and the rejection of this by the Standing Group. These CDR LITTLE promised to secure, as well as the reasons of the Standing Group for this rejection. The CHAIRMAN then adjourned the meeting, until such time as the status of these matters could be definitely determined.