

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

24 July 1951

Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Portuguese Communication Security

HELD: Pentagon, 23 July 1951 at 1030 hours

PRESENT:

Mr. William F. FRIEDMAN, AFSA, Chairman
 Colonel Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, ID
 Mr. Winston SCOTT, CIA
 CDR Mark T. LITTLE, USN, NATO
 Mr. Robert PACKARD, State

Review of Minutes of Fourth Meeting: Mr. FRIEDMAN opened the meeting by asking members of the committee for their comments on the minutes of the fourth meeting of the ad hoc committee. CDR LITTLE noted that the penultimate paragraph on the last page contained the sentence:

"...it was also agreed that the first step should be the promulgation of a document setting forth minimum security standards for NATO countries..."

CDR LITTLE said he presumed that this referred specifically to communication security matters, since the document dealing with security matters in general had long since been published. Mr. FRIEDMAN agreed that this reference was specifically to communication security and that this word should be inserted between minimum and security. There were no further comments from the committee on the minutes.

Correction to Minutes of Fourth Meeting: Mr. FRIEDMAN then remarked that the minutes of this meeting should contain a correction regarding the compilation by NATO countries of their own national books of TYPEX settings. Further investigation following the last meeting had revealed that the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Standing Group had approved the recommendation of the Communications-Electronics Coordinating Section (CECS) that Signatory Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be permitted, in addition to constructing their own plugboard setting keys, to prepare National Books of Settings in order still further to preserve the discreet nature of the channels provided for National use. This approval had been transmitted to all member NATO nations on 25 April 1951 as SGM-616-51. Mr. FRIEDMAN also noted that SG 7/39, the report of CECS to the Standing Group had added that the U.K. had prepared a memorandum describing a secure method for compilation of simplex settings for TYPEX and that a copy of this memorandum would be made available to member Nations if desired. Mr. FRIEDMAN asked whether his impression that no member Nation had availed itself of this privilege was correct, and CDR LITTLE confirmed this impression. In reply to Mr. FRIEDMAN's query why this was so, CDR LITTLE stated that no reason ^{information} ~~had been voiced by the nations~~ *in this regard had been received!* they simply had made no effort to compile their own National Settings. Col. DAWSON remarked that perhaps this matter should be followed up, and Mr. FRIEDMAN agreed that it might be made a part of a program to be elaborated step by step for the improvement of the communication security of member Nations. He suggested that the ad hoc committee consider this matter among the recommendations for remedial measures to be undertaken in the case of Portugal.

Program for improvement of Portuguese physical and personnel security:

The subject of a program for the improvement of physical and personnel security was then introduced by the CHAIRMAN. Mr. SCOTT referred to the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

discussed with AFSA,

~~memorandum~~ mentioned in the previous meeting, ~~which had been sent to the~~
~~Director, AFSA by CIA~~ with regard to the request of the Portuguese Inter-
national and State Security Police (PIDE) that it be allowed to send
personnel to the United States for training in cryptographic security. He
pointed out that this might be a stepping stone to further action at this
time, although the request had been turned down by AFSA at the time of its
proposal, approximately one year ago. In reply to Mr. FRIEDMAN's inquiry
as to measures which might be taken to improve laxity in physical security,



confirmed by CDR LITTLE from personal experience with the Portuguese. Mr.
FRIEDMAN asked whether an approach should be made on a Tripartite Level
as was the method in regard to France. It was the general view of the
committee that the Portuguese approach should be kept, if possible, on a
bipartite level, excluding the British. CDR LITTLE reiterated the sugges-
tion which he had made at the fourth meeting that an American team be sent
to Portugal to take up matters of physical and personnel security, and Mr.



OGA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. FRIEDMAN stated that he thought the British should be consulted in this matter, particularly since he felt that they would be happy not to have to undertake the expense of such a visit and would probably not insist upon participation on a working level. There followed a brief comparison of British and American standards of security, from which it was agreed that if possible an American four-man team consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense, CIA, State Department and the FBI should be sent to Portugal. Col. DAWSON believed that such a team could accomplish its task quickly and easily, since there was in the Portuguese situation nothing of the complexity encountered in the French, and since the Communist Party was illegal in Portugal. Mr. FRIEDMAN then proposed that the following recommendation be considered by the committee:

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AN APPROACH BE MADE TO THE PORTUGUESE ON PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY IN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MANNER AS WAS MADE IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH, WITH THE CONCURRENCE AND POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF THE BRITISH IF THEY INSIST. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A TEAM GO TO PORTUGAL OR THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT SEND A TEAM TO THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THIS TEAM, HAVING ACQUIRED A BACKGROUND IN SECURITY PROCEDURES, RETURN TO LISBON TO SET UP MINIMUM STANDARDS OF SECURITY, AS WAS DONE IN THE CASE OF FRANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Question from State Department representative: Mr. PACKARD posed three questions with regard to the proposed approach:

(1) Whether it should be regarded as an indirect approach toward, and laying a background for, ^{eventual direct efforts to improve} ~~the improvement of~~ the communication security of Portugal;

(2) Why Portugal had been selected ^{alone at this time} from among the various nations for this improvement; and

(3) Was Portugal thought to be receptive to the improvement of its security?

In reply to the first question, Col. DAWSON pointed out that this approach was a supplement to a general approach being made by NATO to improve the over-all security of the member Nations; in reply to the second question, Mr. FRIEDMAN stated that Portugal had been selected upon the insistence of the military members of USCIB who felt that much military information regarding NATO matters was leaking from Portuguese comments on NATO meetings and on military information made available to NATO.

OGA

With regard to the third question, CDR LITTLE pointed out that it was believed that Portuguese insecurity rested more upon ineptness and ignorance than upon indifference. He added that Portugal was believed to have made good progress in security after proper procedures had been pointed out, and particularly in regard to COSMIC matters there was good reason for believing that the Portuguese were eager to comply with Western demands with regard to security.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Possibility of establishing a training school for security under

SHAPE: The possibility of establishing under SHAPE a school or training section for security was then raised by Mr. FRIEDMAN. Col. DAWSON was of the opinion that the scope of the training should be broader, encompassing security methods and procedures in general. CDR LITTLE said he was not sure what the curriculum of the military college to be set up under SHAPE was to be, but that it was possible that a course in security procedures might be included. Col. DAWSON said that in his opinion a course in security procedures should be larger than that contemplated by the college, should include civilians, and should be a short course of perhaps three weeks. Mr. FRIEDMAN suggested that recommendations for a personnel and physical security NATO training course might be undertaken when the document outlining physical, personnel, and industrial security which had been prepared by the Tripartite Group had been accepted by the three Governments concerned. This document could then be distributed NATO-wide - a suggestion with which the Committee concurred. Col. DAWSON remarked that the standardization being carried out in other NATO matters could be extended to security methods and practices. CDR LITTLE reminded the Committee that the responsibility of the Standing Group did not extend to national systems but only to NATO matters within the various NATO countries. Mr. FRIEDMAN then suggested that the Committee consider the following recommendation:

THAT PHYSICAL, PERSONNEL AND INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS OF
SECURITY ELABORATED BY THE TRIPARTITE GROUP BE COMMUNICATED
TO THE STANDING GROUP WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THESE

STANDARDS BE ADOPTED FOR ALL NATO COUNTRIES, AND THAT IN ORDER TO AFFORD INSTRUCTION IN THE APPLICATION OF THOSE STANDARDS THERE BE SET UP UNDER SHAPE A TRAINING COURSE OF APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS FOR INDIVIDUALS TO BE SELECTED BY THE DIFFERENT NATO COUNTRIES; SUCH A COURSE TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY THOSE THREE ELEMENTS OF SECURITY BUT ALSO THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO THE APPLICATION AND USAGE OF THE AUTHORIZED NATO CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS.

Mr. PACKARD recommended that the recommendation be amended by prefixing "FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES" inasmuch as SHAPE would be used by the Council of Deputies as an executive agent for providing location, facilities, and faculty. He also pointed out that this phase would follow the approval of Tripartite Standards. Col. DAWSON remarked that since prompt action in regard to Portuguese insecurity was desirable, it was advisable to proceed bilaterally with the Portuguese first. In the first place the tripartite standards in regard to France had taken a long time to evolve, and in addition the recommendations were largely the result of situations peculiar to France. Each country provided its own peculiar problems and should be treated individually. He thought that in the long-range plan for the improvement of security a school should be considered, but that meanwhile a direct approach to Portugal on a bipartite basis was indicated. Mr. SCOTT agreed with this point of view. Mr. PACKARD said that he believed the gamut of COSMIC was


~~TOP SECRET~~

broad enough to include representatives from all levels of government in physical, personnel, and industrial security which found their way into COSMIC channels; COSMIC therefore gave the basis for education in security. Col. DAWSON replied that COSMIC procedures were broader; the present issue was whether the physical and personnel security was adequate.

Possibility of establishing a training school for security under U.S. auspices: Mr. FRIEDMAN raised the question whether the United States might not set up a school prior to that set up by SHAPE, and if so, under what auspices. Mr. PACKARD was of the opinion that it might not be advisable to start such a course until NATO had adopted the Tripartite Standards of Security. Mr. FRIEDMAN then returned to the original proposition whether it was advisable to reconsider the request of the Portuguese to send personnel to the United States to study security methods. Mr. PACKARD replied that he thought SHAPE was a good place to start a school for training in security methods if it was not limited to military personnel. CDR LITTLE indicated, however, that SHAPE is almost entirely military, the only civilian representative being the Political Advisor of the State Department. Mr. FRIEDMAN then broached the question whether the United States should set up an interim school to which NATO authorities could send representatives, either military or civilian. Col. DAWSON remarked that under the ~~NSA~~ ^{NSA} program it was possible to send foreign military men to U.S. service schools and that this was frequently done. He questioned, however, whether a similar procedure could be used in regard to civilians. OGA

~~TOP SECRET~~

OGA



CDR LITTLE added that the United States would have to defray the expenses of those trained.

In reply to Mr. PACKARD's query how long it would take to put through the Tripartite Standards of Security, Col. DAWSON estimated one year and said that the standards finally evolved were likely to be much modified. Mr. PACKARD said he believed that the security people must be dealt with directly; CDR LITTLE agreed and added that the fact that security personnel and the political personnel in the various countries were often the same made it advisable to treat directly with them. Some discussion followed concerning the security practices and procedures of the various Western nations; Norway was pointed out as a country in which security was directly under Defense. There was, however, much diversity in this regard among the various nations. ~~Mr. FREEDMAN's question whether the school might be placed under the State Department met with negative response from Mr. PACKARD, for reasons of security and politics.~~

Recommendation for approach to Portugal: Col. DAWSON suggested that specifically in regard to Portugal the bilateral approach should be pursued, and that at the same time the Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group explore the possibilities and methods for the extension of the Tripartite security standards of all NATO countries, up to the Council of Deputies level. Mr. PACKARD suggested that the school might be

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

placed under the authority of the NATO Council of Deputies; Col. DAWSON added that this body could then designate SHAPE as the administrator. This was the long-range solution to the problem; meanwhile a recommendation could be made that the Security ~~Committee~~ Coordinating Committee, with a technical assistant, go to Lisbon and give practical instruction with regard to proper use and security of TYPEX. Such an approach could include general instruction on the method of compiling plug settings and national books of settings for TYPEX.

Discussion of use of TYPEX: Mr. SCOTT raised the question whether this solved the real problem of security, inasmuch as the use of TYPEX was presently confined almost entirely to the various Departments of Defense. It was his opinion that more TYPEX machines should be distributed on a diplomatic level so that more use could be made of this method of handling NATO information. CDR LITTLE pointed out that it had been the policy to try to keep the distribution of TYPEX to a minimum, largely because of the inadequate number of machines available. He indicated that in his opinion it was not so much the cryptographic clerks who should be educated as the Ministers who ordered the use of national systems for matters for which they thought TYPEX should not be used because the British might read the traffic. Mr. FRIEDMAN asked that the minutes show that the committee was in favor of giving a sufficient number of machines to NATO nations and particularly to the various Foreign Offices so that this means of encipherment might be used on a broader basis. CDR LITTLE interposed that he thought this might be extending the problem; Mr. FRIEDMAN replied that the distribution of more TYPEX machines should be

~~TOP SECRET~~

coupled with proper indoctrination of their use in connection with nationally-prepared settings. Mr. PACKARD pointed out that the approach must be made through the National Security Authority in each country, who would in turn instruct its Ministers.

Definition of COSMIC material: Mr. PACKARD raised the problem whether what constitutes COSMIC information had been clearly enough stipulated, that is, whether the regulations clearly defined COSMIC, NATO, and purely national information. As an example, he cited the transmission, by national systems, of messages which referred to COSMIC papers by number but which did not themselves contain COSMIC information; he raised the question whether this was a breach of security. CDR LITTLE read from D.C. 2/7 the definitions of "COSMIC" and "NATO":

"4. Definitions

a. "COSMIC". The word COSMIC has been designed as a security warning only. This designation shall, in addition to the appropriate security classification, be placed on all joint and national papers tabled at meetings of any body or committee set up under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which contain and reveal:

(1) Strategic or operational military appreciations, plans or decisions.

(2) Political-military appreciations, plans or decisions.

(3) Economic planning based on strategic military plans and decisions which could lead to disclosure of such plans and decisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4) Classified information of one country tabled or circulated by another country, unless the "owner" country agrees otherwise.

b. "NATO". On all other joint or national documents tabled or circulated within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the word "NATO" shall appear, together with the appropriate security classification. This "NATO" marking, however, does not require the special handling or accounting provided for "COSMIC" documents, other than as warranted by the security classification, and no special screening (as required for "COSMIC" personnel) is necessary for access to NATO documents."

Mr. PACKARD still questioned the clarity of the definition in relation to what may be termed "COSMIC fringe traffic", and asked whether it was made clear at NATO meetings exactly what material was COSMIC. He thought that much of the confusion of classification might arise from a lack of clear definition. Mr. FRIEDMAN agreed that it might be wise to look into the definitions and rules regarding COSMIC fringe traffic. Col. DAWSON pointed out that national comment on COSMIC documents had been specifically excluded from the definition of COSMIC at the request of the State Department, which did not wish its own representatives hampered in regard to this matter, and at the same time did not wish to "cheat" by having its diplomatic representatives use U.S. systems contrary to agreement, for national comment on NATO matters. Mr. FRIEDMAN pointed out that if members had

~~TOP SECRET~~

their own National books of settings for TYPEX, they would feel free to use that method of encipherment for national comment whereas they now pass such information on national systems which are known to the U.S. to be insecure.

Possibility of a NATO courier service: Mr. PACKARD then raised the question of the establishment of a separate courier service for NATO, indicating that it was unlikely that member Nations would use to any great extent U.S. courier service for national comment on COSMIC matters. GDR LITTLE estimated the cost at \$100,000 a month, a fairly sizable amount with a far-flung system which was becoming larger with each additional NATO country. Mr. PACKARD thought this amount not too great in view of the importance of keeping certain matters secure. Mr. FRIEDMAN remarked that in his opinion a better answer might be to furnish more TYPEX machines with indoctrination in their proper use. This would be far cheaper than a NATO courier system which member Nations might not trust any more than they did the U.S. courier system.

Time and place of next meeting: Mr. FRIEDMAN adjourned the meeting after it had been decided that the committee would reconvene Thursday, 26 July, at 1400 hours. Col. DAWSON agreed to arrange a conference room in the Pentagon, the committee assemble at his office, 2E479. Mr. FRIEDMAN urged the members to consider before the next meeting (a) the question whether the definition of COSMIC as contained in D.C. 2/7 was detailed enough for use by member NATO nations; the problem of the definition and transmission of COSMIC fringe traffic; and (b) the possibility of a more extended use of TYPEX with instructions as to its use and the compilation of National settings.