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24 February 1953

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Release of COM to the Turkish Government.

Reference: USCIB 2/25 dated 21 January 1953.

1. Vote sheet replies to the reference recommended changes in wording in paragraphs 2 and 5, the insertion of a new paragraph (paragraph 8), and the addition of explanatory statements at the end of the final paragraph.
2. The reference, reworded to overcome the objections set forth in vote sheet replies is enclosed for your consideration.
3. It is requested that the attached vote sheet be returned to the Secretariat at the earliest practicable date, in any event not later than 4 March 1953.

*H. D. Jones*  
H. D. JONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

Reworded version of Draft  
Memo to Chron, LSIB, sub-  
ject as above.

USCIB: 2/26

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-02-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, LONDON SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Release of CCM to Turkish Government

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 8 December 1952 respecting the release to the Turkish Government of CCM equipments for diplomatic communications (LSIB/317/52).

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


2. USCIB is pleased to learn that LSIB concurs in USCIB's decision to release the CCM to the Turkish Government. It is regretted, however, that LSIB finds cause for surprise and concern in that a decision seems to have been made by USCIB without consideration of LSIB's interest in the matter. USCIB desires to assure LSIB that its accession to the Turkish request, without prior consultation with LSIB [redacted] was not a conscious omission but resulted rather from an uncertainty as to the need for such consultation. This uncertainty arose from a combination of circumstances. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that USCIB would not have taken this decision as it did but for the knowledge that LSIB had received adequate notice of the Turkish intentions. Despite this, however, it is regretted that LSIB was not directly informed of this matter before the USCIB decision was made. It is believed that the combination of circumstances attending these negotiations, as described below, may be informative and helpful in understanding the lack of official prior notice to LSIB.

3. On 25 April 1952, informal notification was received from the Director, GCHQ, via the British Liaison Officer in Washington, that "the

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
EO 3.3(h)(2)

Foreign Office have been informed by a member of the Turkish diplomatic staff that 50 cypher machines are being bought from the U.S.A." The British Liaison Officer advised that the Director, GDMQ, "would like to know, if possible, whether the Turkish statement is correct and if so what type of machine it is intended to supply."



5. The matter was placed before USCIB in July 1952. In weighing the advisability of aiding the Turks,



After prolonged U.S.-U.K. discussions, British views as to the paramount importance of security of communications of NATO Powers had been accepted. USCIB believed that a basic and general agreement in principle had been reached on the necessity of improving the over-all communication security of these Powers, so that USCIB felt that the release of the GCM, under certain conditions for that purpose, was warranted. It was felt, moreover, that the situation differed materially from that involved in the [redacted] since the initiative had been taken by the Turks, and it was, therefore, presumed the principle was established that the security of the communications of

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
EO 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

In this respect, USCIB does not feel that any steps should be taken to improve the communications of these Powers, [Redacted] without prior discussions with LSIB [Redacted]

[Redacted] This requirement, how-

ever, was not applicable to the Turkish negotiations, in contrast to

[Redacted] , since the initiative had been taken by the Turks. It

[Redacted]

Additional factors were the advent of certain significant improvements in the Hagelin machine which were likely to be available to the Turks and an intimation by the Turkish representative in Washington that the Turkish Government might seek other means of fulfilling their needs if U.S. assistance were not forthcoming.

6. Based upon these considerations, a decision was finally made by USCIB in favor of assisting the Turks, and LSIB was advised of U.S. intentions in advance of any definite commitment to the Turks. In fact, the machines requested by them have not yet been provided nor has any other technical assistance been supplied.

7. With respect to your inquiry concerning "technical assistance as an alternate or supplement," the latter refers to changeable elements, instructions for operation, security regulations, etc., and even the possibility of providing keys and of wiring rotors. The former refers in particular to a paper and pencil cryptographic system as a substitute for a cipher machine. However, a suggestion that such a system might be used met with no interest on the part of the Turkish representative.

8. It is believed that neither the Turkish request nor the limited amount of crypto-equipment that we have offered will be sufficient to ensure safeguards against the use of other insecure Turkish systems. USCIB recommends, therefore, that this be considered as a separate problem which will have to be discussed between USCIB and LSIB once the effects of the provision of the GCM can be assessed.

9. Although there is no explicit provision in the U.S.-U.K. COMINT Agreement governing cryptographic assistance to third parties, USCIB desires to assure LSIB of its belief that consultation prior to action is desirable when questions arise concerning such assistance which may

It must be understood, however, that the decision to commit the U.S. Government to provide cryptographic assistance to third parties does not rest in USCIB. For this reason, USCIB cannot ensure that recommendations either for or against the provision of cryptographic assistance would prevail even though bilaterally-agreed to by USCIB and LSIB.

EO 3.3(h) (2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(Draft)  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Acting Chairman  
United States Communications Intelligence Board