

~~TOP SECRET SUGGEST~~

22 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT PACKARD, CHIRMAN US/IB SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Portuguese Communication Security

Enclosure: Copy of Par. 85(b) of Instructions for Using TYPEX System




2. a. The new element consists in the fact that the Portuguese are evidently encountering technical difficulties in the use of their TYPEX machines, which were provided by the British to all NATO governments for the transmission of COSMIC or other classified NATO information.

b. These difficulties may come from: (1) malfunctioning of the machines, which are old and require more or less continuous maintenance to keep them in proper working order; or from (2) errors made by operating personnel in setting up the keys at either or both ends of the circuit.

3. a. It is not possible to state to which source either or both of the two instances mentioned in Par. 1 above belong.



c. Neither case involves serious damage to security but the pattern for possibly serious violations has been set.

4. Repetitions  represent definite violations of the instructions for operating the TYPEX system, as set forth in Par. 85(b) of "Instructions for the Use and Safe Custody of the TYPEX Machine Mark II with Simplex Settings", a copy of which paragraph is attached. This brings up the question of training in the use of TYPEX and in the maintenance of the machine itself.

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5. The situation as regards training in TYPEX operation and maintenance, as stated by CDR Mark LITTLE, USN, the U.S. member and chairman of the Security Coordinating Committee, NATO, is as follows: (1) the maintenance is performed by the nations which hold the machines, the British providing the necessary spare parts; (2) technicians of the respective nations are trained either in London or in Washington (whichever is closer) and are given a 2-weeks' course in operation techniques and a 6-weeks' course in maintenance. These instructional courses should be adequate for the purpose.

6. Just how the attention of the Portuguese can be directed to security violations of this type and their elimination cannot clearly be seen at this moment. It is suggested that we discuss the problem at an early date with a view to ascertaining whether the proposed approach to the Portuguese, to be made soon by the U.S. Ambassador, can be expanded to include information which might lead to the elimination of this source of insecurity as well as of the others thus far encountered.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
EO 3.3(h) (2)WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN  
AFSA Member, USCIB Security Committee

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~CHAPTER 6CHECKS AND REPETITIONS.

85. Requests for checks and repetitions and replies thereto may be made in plain language if only external details of the original cypher message are quoted but must be in cypher if internal details are referred to.

Examples:

(b) In cypher

"Cancel my 2AB237 Repetition follows herewith".  
(This must be sent as an entirely fresh message with an unused indicator. The indicator of the message being repeated must not be used again.)

"My 2AB237. Insert order used was C 'R I R F D'".

"Your 2AB237. Repeat words between "Atlantic" and "immediately".

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INCL. 1

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