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5 November 1953

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Interview with M. de Vosjoli and M. Bousseau

1. In accordance with your instructions, we met with the above-named individuals on 3 November 1953 at CIA for the purpose of finding out the nature of French requirements for U.S. COMSEC equipments for use by the Foreign Office. The essential elements of their requirements are contained in the inclosure. In addition to this information, additional information gained during the interview is described below.

2. Teletype Equipment - Standard U.S. teletype equipment would be used by the French without modifications. In some instances power sources might require change but this is a local problem. Duplex operation is desirable.

Spare Parts - The French would expect provision to be made for supply spare parts for any U.S. machines which might be sold to them.

Training - Training of a very few maintenance technicians would be desired. This could be done in Washington if desired. The technicians trained would act as instructors for other maintenance personnel.

Rotor Wiring - When asked if they planned to wire "drums" (British equivalent of rotors as used in the Typex which the French Foreign Office uses) if these should be a part of the equipments, M. de Vosjoli stated that it would be well for their technicians to know how to do the wiring. This could be interpreted to mean that initially U.S. wired rotors would be accepted.

Clearance - M. de Vosjoli stated that all their cryptographic technicians are thoroughly cleared. He added that the military services effected the clearances. However, M. Bousseau had stated to the French that it was the SMOCS that cleared the technicians.

Communications Facilities - In reply to queries on use of teletype facilities at various minor posts, M. de Vosjoli indicated that in a number of locations more powerful radio transmitters were needed.

System Machine - The machine now used was stated as having been manufactured by Siemens. This information confirms the assumption in NSA that the machine used currently is "SPURKON."

Literal Machine - No specifications were stated as to the nature of the machine desired other than that it be quite secure and should be keyboard operated.

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3. The conversations between the two Frenchmen in their own language were limited strictly to the subjects under discussion and added little to our understanding of their situation. However, two remarks worth mentioning were made:

a. When the subject of wiring the rotors was being discussed, M. Bousseau said to M. de Vesjeli that in considering this problem, attention must be given to protecting both French and American security.

b. M. Bousseau stated that if equipment were available, his Chief, whom he described as a "minister plenipotentiary" would come here to close the deal.

4. The Executive Secretary of USCIB attended the discussions as an observer for the Chairman, USCIB. Such notes as he prepares for the Chairman will be made available to the Director, NSA.

5. G/NSC is now compiling a list of teletype encryption equipment including U.S. owned, U.S. commercial, and foreign commercial, together with statements concerning availability of equipment.

6. It is recommended that the inclosure be forwarded to Members of USCIB for their information.

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Incl:

Memo for Members of USCIB,  
 Subj: French Communications  
 Security

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB

SUBJECT: French Communications Security

1. As agreed by USCIB in its 93rd Meeting, representatives of the Director, NSA, met with M. de Vosjoli (Washington representative of the SDECE) and M. Bousseau, cryptographic expert assigned to the French Embassy, for the purpose of determining the type and number of COMSEC equipments France desires to purchase from the U.S. for use by the Foreign Office.
2. M. de Vosjoli stated that it is the desire of the French Foreign Office to modernize its communication security techniques, and to increase the number of posts which can use teletype encryption equipment. The French believe that the U.S. might have COMSEC equipments produced in quantity, which, if made available to France, could be purchased at a considerable savings to them as compared to the cost of producing a limited number of equipments for their own use.
3. As had been mentioned earlier (USCIB: 29.3/9), M. de Vosjoli again pointed out that the German machines now being used for teletype encryption were wearing out, that no spare parts are available except by cannibalization, and that new machines are not obtainable. Anticipating a need for replacing these machines, the Foreign Office hopes to obtain teletype encryption equipments of high security that can be used among their main Foreign Office posts.
4. The quantity desired is 200, but 150 machines would be sufficient. If the total quantity of machines could not be made available simultaneously, about 50 machines would be needed for instituting the replacement program at 10 major posts.
5. In addition to the foregoing requirement, M. de Vosjoli stated that an off-line (literal) cipher machine was also desired. This machine would generally be used at posts not served by the teletype cipher machine and in locations where teletype (commercial or French National) facilities are not available, or where on-line operation is not practicable.
6. To meet the latter requirement, up to approximately 500 machines are needed.
7. In order of priority, on-line equipment is wanted first, primarily for replacement of the German machines now used, and to provide the capability for handling large volumes of traffic. M. de Vosjoli stated that this requirement was not urgent but they hoped to establish firm plans in the near future. The literal machines are of lesser priority and would be used to replace encrypted codes now generally used.

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8. M. de Vesjoli mentioned in passing that in some remote posts of the Foreign Office more powerful radio transmitters were needed. Present equipments were considered not to have sufficient power for working regularly under poor conditions.

9. The Director, NSA, will examine the availability of equipments, including U.S. owned, commercial and foreign machines, which might be suitable for the French requirements and will inform USCIB of his findings.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

D. M. A. S. H.

Special Agent in Charge

Deputy

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