

~~TOP SECRET~~NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD 21 FEBRUARY 45**PRESENT**

Colonel Samuel P. Collins  
 Colonel Clinton B. Allsepp  
 Mr. Mark Rhoads  
 Major Lawrence D. Prehn  
 Major R. L. Dewing  
 Captain Herbert M. Maas ,  
 Captain Frank G. Austin

Lt. Colonel Goodrich - ACS G-2

The conference was opened by Colonel Allsepp who introduced the question at hand concerning (1) the detailed organization of liaison between Security Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and (2) determination of the proper channels for dissemination of information. Reference was made to previous arrangements between Captain Raskin and Major Spitzer, it being desired to arrange liaison between Security Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on a more definite basis than heretofore.

Colonel Collins discussed the background of previous arrangements for liaison and dissemination of information pointing out the savings which could reasonably be expected to result from an arrangement for direct contact between Security Division and theater SIS officers in cases (1) where Ultra information was involved and (2) where only routine revision of codes and ciphers was involved.

Colonel Allsepp stated the Security Division plan is to employ Captain Maas as liaison officer with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to coordinate information pertaining to both "A" and "C" Branches and to assure that necessary information was disseminated to both branches. It is desired that a direct liaison channel be authorized between Captain Maas and Major Spitzer, Captain Maas to introduce "A" or "C" Branch representatives into such discussions as necessary.

Lt. Colonel Goodrich then discussed the dissemination of Ultra information emphasizing the necessity for its dissemination in the first instance through normal G-2 channels.

Further discussion was had which resulted in the following conclusions as stated by Lt. Colonel Goodrich:

"The situation in connection with handling information regarding compromises of our own and Allied cryptographic systems is not being handled systematically at the present time nor is the information we have regarding Japanese traffic analysis deductions. To provide for efficient handling we should recommend:

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(1) Major Spitzer should be authorized to converse freely with Captain Mas who will act as contact man for the Security Division. In the event that Major Spitzer finds anything on either the cryptographic or the traffic analysis sides, he should bring this to the attention of Captain Mas. The matter will then be studied by G-2 and Security Division;

(2) If the information concerns cryptographic security from Ultra sources, then it will be passed to special security officers by G-2 initially, with instructions to pass the information through normal channels to the theater SIS officer and that further action is to be taken directly between SBA and the pertinent theater SIS officer. The matter will then be turned over to Security Division for any necessary action, with G-2 being kept informed;

(3) If it develops that enemy traffic analysis is involved, information concerning U. S. insecurity of communications should be communicated by G-2 to those (theater commands, etc.) concerned and then "A" or "C" Branch should initiate necessary corrective action in coordination with G-2;

(4) As regards security of other governmental departments, information relative to it should be communicated through G-2 channels to the departments concerned after consideration of the problem with SBA;

(5) With respect to information concerning insecurity of cryptographic communications of friendly foreign governments, this matter should be studied concurrently by SBA and G-2 and action, if any, should be taken through G-2 channels.

Clinton B. Allsopp  
Colonel, Signal Corps  
Chief, Security Division

*Col. Goodrich had read our staff study prior to the meeting from which he drew the above conclusion.*

*MC.*

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