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REF ID: A61152*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO AFSA-00
AFSA-00B

DATE 1 May 1950

FROM AFSA-12

SUBJECT Establishment of CONSIDO

Attached hereto is a copy of "Draft of Principles for Establishment of CONSIDO" for your information and file.

A. C. PETERSON
Lt. Colonel, CAO
Chief, AFSA-12

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-22-2014
pursuant to E.O. 13526

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13 January 1950

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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRAFSA

SUBJECT: Comments on Latest Draft Directive for COMSIDO.

Reference: (a) UCCIB 26/2 (Establishment of COMSIDO).

1. Inclosure 1, which I have previously discussed with you, is forwarded along with my comments, as requested by you.

2. There is much to be said for Mr. Friedman's point of view, but I believe some of his statements of fact and conclusions warrant examination. Upon the basis of my own experience, I am afraid that I must take issue with some of the points he makes. Nevertheless, his comments deserve careful consideration, especially in view of his long and outstanding record of accomplishment in the CO. INF field.

3. I agree that reference (a) is of exceptional importance and that it is long overdue. I do not believe, however, that it is entirely correct to say, as stated in paragraph 3 of his memo to me, that "still, as of this date, we have ----- not even a single, effective, unified agency for the evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of strategic, non-operational intelligence to protect us against the possibility of another Pearl Harbor." Whether they are effective or not, the fact remains that there are actually three agencies charged with making national or joint strategic estimates and interpretations. The Central Intelligence Agency has been established largely as a result of the Pearl Harbor Investigation to provide authoritative national intelligence, especially for the National Security Council. In addition, two agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are specifically charged with the preparation of joint intelligence estimates. The official statement of the functions of the Joint Intelligence Committee includes the following:

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"The Joint Intelligence Committee, assisted by the Joint Intelligence Group and subcommittees, is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to:

"a. Integrate intelligence received from all sources and prepare joint intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting agencies.

- (1) As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
- (2) As requested by the Director of the Joint Staff,
- (3) As requested by other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or
- (4) On its own initiative."

In support of this, the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff is charged with the following functions:

"The Joint Intelligence Group, under the direction of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, who is also a member of the JIC and acts as the steering member in presenting the group studies to the Committee:

"a. Procures intelligence for the Joint Staff.

"b. Integrates intelligence received from all sources and prepares joint intelligence estimates:

- (1) As initiated and assigned by the Director of the Joint Staff,
- (2) As directed by the Joint Intelligence Committee,
- (3) As requested by other Joint Staff groups, or
- (4) On its own initiative, and
- (5) In accord with the priorities that may be established by the Director of the Joint Staff."

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4. As for the question of division of responsibility in the matter of intelligence estimates and interpretations, the National Security Law specifically provides that "the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence." In support of this, the statement of "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," approved by the President on April 21, 1948, stipulates explicitly that each Service shall "provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence" for that Service. This is in recognition of a basic principle of long standing that intelligence is a function of command.

5. In view of the foregoing facts, the aim of the drafters of the CONSIDO paper has been to establish an agency within the framework of existing law and executive decrees that would assist already established agencies in the performance of their legitimate functions, rather than to replace such agencies or assume their responsibilities. This, I believe, has been the basic concept behind CONSIDO and is borne out by the presentation of the draft CONSIDO paper made at the 47th Meeting of USCIB. The diagram attached to this draft (see inclosure 2) is particularly illustrative of this principle.

6. Inclosure 1 dwells at some length upon division of responsibility with respect to the four principle intelligence functions and deplors the fact that a separation or segregation of certain of these functions is contemplated. I think it is important to draw distinctions. Physical separation is one thing, and separation of control quite another. As we discovered during the war, the essential thing was to have close physical relationships between COMINT producers and the Intelligence people who process the product. COMINT, regardless of how important it is, does not stand alone, and must be collected with other forms of intelligence. It would appear that either all other intelligence must be collated under COMINT authority, or all COMINT must be collated under Intelligence authority. The ideal arrangement, as we discovered in the Navy, and under which we have carried on operations with unqualified success, is to have the collation file maintained jointly

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SUBJECT: Comments on Latest Draft Directive for COMSISO.

by the COMINT people and the Intelligence people. Under this system the Intelligence people supply all the general intelligence to the file, and the COMINT people supply COMINT. Thus but a single file is required and duplication of effort is avoided. This, I understand, is the arrangement contemplated for COMSISO.

7. Inclosure 1 examines in detail certain intelligence functions which must be performed. To begin with, I believe that it is erroneous to say that virtually no evaluation of COMINT is required. Mr. Friedman has failed to make a distinction between the source of intercepted messages and their content. It is true that the evaluation of the source of COMINT is normally performed by the COMINT agencies, and is largely automatic. The evaluation of the contents of messages is quite another problem and it is far from automatic. In the case of diplomatic communications in particular, as CDR Taylor once aptly stated, "the authenticity of the information ranges from the horse's mouth aft--mostly aft." Information obtained from plain text messages, as we have learned, requires a vast amount of evaluation and correlation from the intelligence point of view before it becomes useful as intelligence.

8. As for the matter of dissemination, it is obvious that a centralized intelligence agency such as COMSISO can only go so far in the distribution of its product. It is clear from inclosure 2 that the direct and rapid service of operational commands is contemplated, very much as Mr. Friedman recommends. Dissemination within commands must be a function of command. Only a commander of an operation is in a position to determine what forces within his command should and should not receive certain information. I think that we must never lose sight of the fact that intelligence is the servant of command, and not vice versa.

9. I believe that COMSISO will be no better, nor worse, than its direction. The directive, it seems to me, leaves ample room for development in any direction that circumstances may require. Like all documents of this type, it is at best a compromise and it is bound to be a compromise because different interests must be served. COMSISO may not be ideal from any one point of view, but

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I believe it is a definite step in the right direction, and until the legal responsibilities of the several departments and agencies of the Government involved are resolved, it is probably as far as we can go at this time.

10. As with any law, it is important to read the document in the light of the studies and discussions that led up to it in order that a proper interpretation of its various parts may be arrived at. There are some passages which could undoubtedly be clarified; however, as you will recall we were not parties to the drafting, but were merely permitted to comment from the point of view of AFSA's responsibilities. Responsibility for the establishment of CONSIDO properly lies with the Intelligence Directors. It may be well to pass these comments on to them as representing the views of an individual with a long and outstanding record in the field of COMINT. Undoubtedly some of the points which Mr. Friedman makes are well taken, but I believe that the basic objectives of CONSIDO must be thoroughly clarified before any radical change is made in its organization or functions. In other words, it must be clearly understood whether the aim is to facilitate the operations of agencies already established and legally charged with the responsibility of making intelligence estimates, or whether it is to set up a new agency for this purpose.

J. N. WENGER
AFSA-OOB

2 Inclosures

- 1 - ~~Top Secret~~ memo from W.F. Friedman
dtd 3 Jan 50, subject as above.
- 2 - Presentation of Draft CONSIDO
Paper (USCIB 26/1).

cc: AFSA-14 

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REF ID: A61156
 WAR DEPARTMENT
 MEMO ROUTING SLIP

1	NAME OR TITLE <i>Capt Wenger, OOB</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	CONCURRENCE
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <p><i>I hope you won't think me too much out of line in sending you the attached I feel pretty keenly about the subject and do hope you will give my comments earnest consideration I'd like DIRAFSA to see them too & to have both your reactions, if you see fit to communicate them</i></p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <i>3 Jan 50</i>	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>AFSA-14</i>		TELEPHONE	

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AFSA - 14, Returned
and not forwarded,
in accordance with
your request
Gruel*

3 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR. Capt Wenger, AFSA-OOB

Subject Comments on latest draft directive for CONSIDO

Reference (a) USCIB 26/2 7 Dec 49, Establishment of CONSIDO

1. Although comments on reference (a), the latest draft directive setting up a CONSIDO, were not requested, I am taking the liberty of submitting herewith some personal views thereon for such consideration or action as you deem appropriate.

2. a In my opinion, reference (a) overlooks one of the most important recommendations of the Final Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. It is possible that the draft is intentionally general in certain places, or that I fail to read it correctly, or miss certain implications therein which I should grasp. But I would be derelict in my duty if I let fear of a possible failure to read correctly, or a possible obtuseness in seeing supposedly plainly present implications interfere with setting forth my own comments, basing the latter upon an earnest desire to be constructive.

b Reference (a) is of exceptional importance and I feel that its wording should leave no room for anything to be understood by implication, background information, or expressed or unexpressed intention of its sponsors. I have, therefore, studied it with these desiderata in mind and submit my comments on the basis only of what the document actually says--not on what may have been intended to be implied.


3. It is noted that reference (a) bears the date 7 December 1949, the month and day of which are symbolic. Eight years have passed since the disaster at Pearl Harbor, almost five years have gone by since the Joint Congressional Investigation was launched, and four years have passed since Admiral King suggested to General Marshall (letter 2 Oct 45) that a centralized unit be established at least for joint evaluation and dissemination of strategic non-operational intelligence. Still, as of this date, we have no such unit -- not even a single, effective, unified agency for the evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of strategic, non-operational intelligence to protect us against the possibility of another Pearl Harbor. And the agency which is now proposed would, I feel, be weak and ineffective because it would be hampered by restrictions, complications, conflicts, and ambiguities which are the inevitable results of divided

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responsibility Such a unit might fail us in an emergency

4 The foregoing remarks and the attached comments all fall under the category of destructive criticism I feel that I should offer some constructive criticism, too, and by way of such criticism would say that a few significant changes in the draft directive could be made which would eliminate its present weaknesses Principally, the elimination of divided responsibility would improve it immeasurably and enable the Department of Defense to forge in its Comint operations a powerful weapon for national security.

WILLIAM F FRIEDMAN
Chief, Technical Division

Inclosure - 1

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Comments on Proposed Consido Directive of 7 Dec 49
(USCIB 26/2)

1. a The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, after months of hearing and study of millions of words of testimony, brought out a report embodying in Part V thereof certain "Conclusions and Recommendations" (p 251).

b. Under "Conclusions" (p 252) there appears the following.

"11 The Intelligence and War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments failed

(a) to give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages . and to raise a question as to their significance Since /the messages/ indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.

(b) to be properly on the qui vive to receive the .. intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7 If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately on seeing it."

c. Both foregoing subparagraphs deal with and point up the importance of proper interpretation and dissemination of intelligence.

d. The Committee made but five "Recommendations" (p 252-3), the second of which begins with the following significant sentence.

"That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent " (Emphasis supplied)

e. The serious consequences of divided responsibility in any field of military operations needs little comment Divided responsibility in the interpretation and dissemination of COMINT may be especially serious

2. a The proposed directive purports to establish a "Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, Department of

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Defense " But the sort of CONSIDO that would be established under it would neither be a consolidated unit nor would it have authority to disseminate to the users of Comint any final product, except as a purely mechanical act dictated by other agencies. It is true that the draft directive appears to give CONSIDO certain dissemination functions but, as these comments will show, the dissemination authority of CONSIDO is quite limited.

b There are four final steps in the Comint operation which are usually regarded as intelligence functions and which are of such a nature that they are most efficiently conducted "under the same roof " They are (1) evaluation, (2) collation, (3) interpretation, and (4) dissemination - But in the draft directive CONSIDO is assigned only the first two functions, the last two remain the responsibilities of the Directors of Intelligence The separation of evaluation and collation from interpretation and dissemination is an artificial one from a technical point of view, it represents a serious division of responsibility in performing functions which technically belong together This primary division in responsibility is bad enough, but on examining it further, it is found that there is an even more serious division of responsibility in respect to the interpretation and dissemination functions The function of interpretation remains divided among the Directors of Intelligence in the three Services, with the attendant risk of having different and conflicting interpretations reach field commands. The function of dissemination is also split three ways among the Directors of Intelligence in the three Services, with the attendant risk that dissemination to those field commanders who should have the Comint will not be expeditious and efficient. Many persons whose long experience in this field has given opportunity to observe the different methods which have been tried feel that the separation of the various steps involved in cryptanalytic processing from the last four steps of evaluation, collation, interpretation and dissemination has been an artificial and technically unwise segregation And now not only is that original separation maintained but an additional splitting is proposed in what should be a streamlined operation embracing at least the last four steps All in all, the arrangements proposed for performing the four inter-related functions are alarmingly reminiscent of the defective arrangements that were at least in part responsible for the disaster of 7 Dec. 1941 at Pearl Harbor. The draft directive will now be taken up paragraph by paragraph. This will involve a certain amount of unavoidable repetition in these comments.

3 a. Par 1 of the draft directive states that the purpose of establishing CONSIDO is two-fold. It is to provide for (a) placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the AFSA product and (b) the maintenance of liaison between AFSA

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and the consumer agencies "in connection with the functions and responsibilities outlined in paragraph 3 below." The specific and rather pointed omission of any reference whatsoever to interpretation and dissemination in this paragraph makes it clear that the draft directive contemplates that CONSIDO is not to do any interpreting or disseminating. It is true that the draft directive (Par 3e (5)) authorizes CONSIDO "to prepare and disseminate information summaries, studies, and reports based on the product of AFSA," and "to prepare and disseminate such other summaries, studies and reports as the JIC may authorize and direct." Although the preparation of such summaries, etc., is very important, such a function is not a primary one for a CONSIDO and it is not deemed necessary to establish a special unit for this purpose. It can and has been done to a limited extent in the past by the Comint processing people, and with the establishment of AFSA this sort of work will be facilitated. Also, while the paragraph in question authorizes dissemination, Par 3g(4) insures that dissemination by CONSIDO itself stops at the doors leading to the precincts of the Directors of Intelligence

b Let us consider the stated first purpose, namely, that of providing for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the AFSA product. In the document itself evaluation is defined as "the process of determining the credibility and accuracy of information and of eliminating irrelevant and unreliable matter from further consideration." First, as to "credibility," it may be said that the AFSA product requires very little or no evaluation to determine credibility with respect to whether the encrypted message contains what the cryptanalyst says it contains. The AFSA product does not represent the fruits of guess work, nor is it comparable to the alleged "decipherments" certain amateur cryptanalysts put forth in support of their enthusiasm for Baconian authorship of Shakespeare's works. The word "credibility," as used in the definition, must therefore refer to a question as to whether what the message says is believable or not. It is obvious that to a large degree the AFSA product requires little evaluation to determine this sort of credibility, because as a general rule the information comes "right out of the horse's mouth" and carries its own stamp of authenticity. Of course, the exceptional diplomatic message that is reporting something that somebody else said, saw, did, heard, etc., undoubtedly requires some sort of weighing to determine credibility of the report. And there are plenty of cases in strictly military Comint which may require similar evaluation. This sort of evaluation can only be fruitful by comparing the specific message with other messages. Further, the cryptanalyst is the only person who can realistically weigh the difference between the "probable" and the "sure" meaning when any such a case arises. Since the Comint processing people have

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access to all the messages, they can and usually do make this sort of determination of credibility. As for eliminating so-called "irrelevant" and "unreliable" matter, it is not often that military Comint contains "irrelevant matter," unless by this expression is meant the casting aside of messages which are of so little intelligence value as not to warrant their translation in whole or even in part. The processing agencies have usually done this sort of eliminating themselves, with a small amount of assistance by personnel of intelligence staffs. As regards the elimination of "unreliable matters," this has already been disposed of in connection with the determination of credibility. To sum up, Comint requires little evaluation such as other intelligence usually needs, and when required the evaluation generally is part and parcel of the Comint processing.

c. With regard to collation, here again the Comint processing people must do a job on a continuing basis. Their collation usually restricts itself to comparing one message with another from the same or other sources of Comint. But this may be only half of the collation process. The other half consists in comparing Comint with information from non-Comint sources, and this can perhaps best be done by intelligence staffs. But the Comint processing people must of necessity often conduct research relating to this half of collation as an integral part of processing, e.g., the use of information on disposition and operations of our own as well as enemy forces as an aid to solution. In any case, it appears clear that collation belongs with evaluation and that both are often part and parcel of the Comint processing. There appears to be no need to set up a special office particularly for these functions, unless it is also given the interpretation and dissemination functions, which are closely related to evaluation and collation.

d. According to the draft directive, when Consido has finished the evaluation and collation processes connected with strategic or tactical Comint, its work is done. This in my opinion represents a major shortcoming of the directive, because while the ostensible purpose in initially proposing the establishment of a CONSIDO was to streamline all steps in evaluating, collating, interpreting, and disseminating Comint, the sort of CONSIDO the draft directive would establish would fall far short of the goal. For an artificial delay is injected near the terminal stage, since the final CONSIDO product must be filtered more or less slowly through three more separate offices outside CONSIDO for interpretation and decision as to dissemination and then come back to CONSIDO for transmission. Later on, more will be said on this point.

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e. The second stated purpose of CONSIDO is to provide for certain liaison. It is to be inferred from this that the liaison in question is now non-existent, or poorly conducted. This is not the case, for the indicated liaison has been carried on fairly effectively for a number of years between the COMINT producing agencies and the Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the Department of State, the CIA, and the FBI. To establish a special or separate agency for such a purpose is merely to interpose a needless echelon.

4. a. Par. 3, Functions and Responsibilities, combines in one long paragraph the functions and responsibilities of CONSIDO, the JIC, the Services, and AFSA. The successive subparagraphs will be briefly reviewed

b. Pars 3a, 3b and 3c, appear to be satisfactory. Subpar. 3d sets forth the functions and responsibilities of the JIC. Subpar. 3d(1) and (2) appear to be satisfactory. But subpar 3d(3) gives the JIC authority to establish CONSIDO's at the headquarters of unified commands and at such other commands as may be designated by the JCS. Since the draft directive gives CONSIDO only evaluation and collation functions, and since there will in peacetime presumably be very little COMINT processing at such unified commands, to establish CONSIDO's at such commands appears to be superfluous. Even in war time it is doubtful whether there would be a need for CONSIDO's of this type at unified commands. If, however, CONSIDO had specific responsibility for interpretation and dissemination, there would be a real need for branch offices of the Washington CONSIDO at the headquarters of unified commands

c. Par. 3e sets forth the functions and responsibilities of the Chief of CONSIDO. Subpars 3e(1) and 3d(3) give him enormous power and responsibilities which in a real degree would enable him to exercise management control over AFSA Comint processing, without providing definitely stated supervisory checks and balances. Under present arrangements, USCIB establishes certain Comint requirements, specifically, those derivable from the so-called "Joint Field," viz, all systems other than the strictly military, naval, and air systems. And the draft directive (Par 3e(1)) makes the Chief of CONSIDO responsible "to insure equitable treatment in the satisfaction of the Comint requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Department of State, the CIA, and the FBI." But it is the responsibility of DIRAFSA to insure such equitable treatment. How is this conflict in jurisdiction to be resolved? What about the question of divided responsibility?

d. Par 3e(2) deals with liaison "on all matters involving the dissemination of the product of CONSIDO," Par 3e(4) gives CONSIDO responsibility for the dissemination of the product of

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CONSIDO, Par 3e(5) gives it responsibility for the dissemination of certain studies based on the product of AFSA. But the three Service Departments retain the responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for the dissemination of all COMINT (Par 3g(4)) Here are definite conflicts, ambiguities, and divided responsibilities in respect to the fundamental purpose of the whole Comint operation.

e Par. 3e(6) gives CONSIDO the function of providing and exercising supervision over the means of dissemination (SSO system ?) but apparently CONSIDO's part in this complicated arrangement for dissemination is to be purely mechanical, since the Service Departments retain responsibility for decision and for the actual material to be disseminated. In essence, the effect of the arrangement would be to interpose a needless additional delay in getting the final Comint product to the user.

f. Pars 3g(3) and (4) give the three Service Departments responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for interpretation and dissemination of the CONSIDO product But no mechanism is provided to insure that a single interpretation is made, from which either strategic or operational intelligence could be disseminated in time to affect operations or, in exceptional cases, even to avoid disaster Especially in the case of tactical COMINT is speed in interpretation and dissemination of paramount importance Interpretation and dissemination should be a responsibility of a single, constantly operative unit -- not of three separate units with no mechanism for almost instantaneously reconciling differences of interpretation and expeditiously disseminating the intelligence. Of course, it might be claimed that JIC could reconcile differences in interpretation--but it certainly could not do so expeditiously. Moreover, since there is a distinct possibility of three different interpretations being made of the same material, there is also a possibility of disseminating three different interpretations to the same or to different commands, with danger of disaster to all concerned. Here are the very pitfalls of divided responsibility which Congress has charged us to eliminate. To sum up this comment, I feel that the divided responsibility herein pointed out represents the fatal and outstanding weakness in the draft directive

g It is possible that this weakness can be eliminated by having representatives from the intelligence staffs of the three Service Departments sit around the same table with the key people of CONSIDO If these representatives were given the necessary authority to interpret and to disseminate for their respective Agencies, and if management control as well as technical control of the SSO system were made a responsibility of CONSIDO, then the needs of the three Services might be taken care of in an expeditious manner Commanders in the field would get a final product that

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represented the unified collaboration of all people concerned in preparing the Comint, evaluating, collating, interpreting and getting it to where it will do the most good in the fastest time possible. It is possible that the sponsors of the draft directive had exactly this sort of an arrangement in mind. But the directive itself is completely silent on these points. If such an arrangement is contemplated, then the document should spell it out in clear and unmistakable language. But such an arrangement would still not be very satisfactory because the authority and responsibility would not be centralized in one individual. The arrangement would merely place within CONSIDO at least three individuals, each with equal authority and each merely representing his Service. Even if they would jointly interpret and disseminate for the three Services, this would be only on a more or less ad hoc or voluntary basis. There is nothing whatever in the draft directive which requires or insures that a single, joint interpretation will be made available simultaneously and expeditiously to several commands. Responsibility is not fixed and no mechanism is provided for this purpose. Since CONSIDO will in large part be staffed by representatives of these very Services, it would seem far better to make the Chief of CONSIDO responsible also for joint interpretation and dissemination for the three Services rather than have the functions performed within his shop by people not under his authority, or empowered only with authority to do so independently for each of the three Services.

5. Reference has already been made to Par 3e(5) of the draft directive, which gives CONSIDO authority to prepare information summaries, studies and reports based on the product of AFSA. This would be a useful function, of course, and would result in the production of jointly elaborated documents containing information of high strategic value. The production of such studies on a joint basis has hitherto not been practicable under a situation involving decentralization and division of responsibility. Here is a good example of the advantages of centralizing authority and eliminating divided responsibility in the Comint field. If all the other functions connected with the handling of the AFSA product were similarly treated, that is, if evaluation, collation, interpretation and dissemination were also treated so as to centralize authority and eliminate divided responsibility, the results would be even more important.

6. a. I think that some of the unsatisfactory aspects of the draft directive arise from the definition it gives of communication intelligence. It is noted that Par 5e of the draft directive defines communication intelligence as "the intelligence information which is derived from the study of foreign communications." This is followed by a parenthetical explanation "It is to be noted that this definition is inconsistent with the normal differentiation between information and intelligence, but is adopted because of long usage."

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b No authority is cited for the foregoing definition. As a matter of fact there is but one authoritative and governing definition of the term communication intelligence. It is the one contained in NSCID No. 9 dated 1 July 1948, Par 12b of which reads as follows.

"Communications intelligence is intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Board."

c. According to the foregoing and only authoritative definition, communications intelligence is intelligence--not "information," nor even "intelligence information," as the draft directive would have it.

d. However, there may be excellent reasons for regarding AFSA's job in connection with Comint to stop with the production of "information" in the form of the decrypts and translations It is quite possible that the remaining steps in the Comint operation, viz, the evaluation, collation and interpretation of that "information" to produce "intelligence," and the final step of dissemination, had best be conducted by intelligence staffs But then all four of these should be integrated and conducted as a joint intelligence operation, with responsibility centralized and definitely fixed. I think that in this way and only in this way can the Comint operation as a whole be conducted effectively and in a manner that will best meet the urgent needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Comint that will be of highest importance to the national security can, in my opinion, be evaluated, collated, interpreted, and disseminated expeditiously only as a fully streamlined, unified, centralized, and joint operation.

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USCIB 26/2

7 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USCIB

Subject Presentation of Draft CONSIDO Paper.

1. For purpose of record it is requested that this sheet be attached as a cover to "Appendix A - Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" which was distributed at the Forty-seventh Meeting of USCIB, 2 December 1949 and considered under Item 7 of the agenda.

2. The attached receipt covers copies of the Enclosure (Appendix A) distributed at the above meeting.

/s/ H. D. Jones
H. D. JONES
for P. J. KARL
Secretariat, USCIB

USCIB: 26/2

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COPY

Comments on D Memo

1. a. Referring to Par. a of the D Memo, the first sentence thereof is a categorical statement that there would be a "decrease rather than an increase in efficiency and economy of Communication Intelligence activities of the National Military Establishment". To support the statement the only reasons cited are:

(1) "Considerable duplication of the work of other U.S. intelligence agencies would be necessary if COMSIDO-WASHINGTON were to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it."

(2) "In addition, the draft directive states that COMSIDO-WASHINGTON will disseminate intelligence direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but makes no provision for the integration of such intelligence with intelligence provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the intelligence staffs of the Services."

3. Referring to the first of the foregoing two reasons, the implication of the statement made can only be the following: that there are now "other U.S. intelligence agencies" which have the functions currently planned for assignment to COMSIDO-WASHINGTON and which would continue to have those functions. This implication is not valid. It is only necessary to point to Par. 10 of the draft directive, wherein it is made perfectly clear that after the establishment of COMSIDO-WASHINGTON there would be no other units of the NSG in the Washington area which would conduct activities assigned to COMSIDO-WASHINGTON. Furthermore, an examination of the draft directive will show that COMSIDO-WASHINGTON would not have any responsibilities or functions other than such as are now mentioned and duplicated among the present five COMINT evaluation and dissemination units. For the reasons set forth in the staff study accompanying the draft directive, COMSIDO-WASHINGTON would not only do everything that these five units now do but also it would do it more efficiently and more economically and, therefore, with the same number of people or even with fewer people, a greater output of a better product could be expected to result from the consolidation.

4. (1) Referring to the second of the two reasons, cited in Par. 1a(2) above, the contention is not valid. The following is quoted from Par. 7a(1) of the draft directive:

"4. The specific responsibilities of COMSIDO-WASHINGTON are as follows:

(1) To produce communication intelligence from COMINT raw material and to fuse such intelligence with pertinent collateral information received from other sources." (Emphasis supplied)

(2) The expression "to fuse such intelligence with pertinent collateral information received from other sources" is only another, and possibly better, way of saying "to integrate such intelligence with intelligence provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the intelligence staffs of the Services."

(3) Therefore, the draft directive not only makes provision for the operation which the D memo asserts has not been provided for, but even broadens the scope of that operation by imposing no limitation upon the "other sources" of information.

(4) The contention completely overlooks not only the paragraph quoted in Par. 1c(1) above but also the following:

(a) Par. 3b(1)(b)(ii) of the Staff Study:

"(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The processing agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the processing agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources, now separately held by each of the five USCIB members."

(b) Par. 7a(5) of the Draft Directives:

"(5) To maintain close liaison with the JCS and the Intelligence Divisions of the respective Services in all matters involving the dissemination of such intelligence and the establishment of priorities therein, as well as those involving procurement of collateral information from U. S. sources."

d. The foregoing is sufficient to indicate that the reasons cited in Par. a of the D Memo are not valid. That paragraph also completely disregards the contents of Pars. 3b(1) and 3b(4) of the Staff Study accompanying the draft directive. Not only is integration of COMINT with other sources of intelligence provided for, but efficiency and economy would be greatly improved for the detailed reasons pointed out in the Staff Study paragraphs mentioned.

2. a. Referring to Par. b of the D Memo, the first clause of the first sentence thereof is also a categorical statement unwarranted by the facts, as will be shown at once.

b. At present, there are intelligence staffs in each of the Services as well as in the Department of State and the CIA, but there are two types of units in each of these staffs as regards COMINT: (1) those which handle COMINT raw material, evaluate, and disseminate it, and, in certain cases, whose members thereof have access to the cryptanalytic processing agencies; (2) those which do not have any contact with COMINT raw material. Members of the first type of unit are authorized and cleared for handling certain material in a 3-way traffic; that going into, or belonging within, or coming out of the COMINT realm. But members of the second type of unit are permitted to engage in only a 1-way traffic; feeding material into the COMINT realm.

c. The draft directive makes no change whatever in the foregoing respect. The intent of the directive is merely to bring the separate units of first type mentioned above together under one roof, preferably under the same roof that shelters the cryptanalytic processing activities. This would place them close to the source of the COMINT raw material, and make them work harmoniously as a single team, under unified direction.

3. a. Referring to Par. c of the D Memo, the draft directive provides for the establishment of a CONSIDO in Washington. It also provides for the establishment of similar offices in Joint Commands. Therefore, to say that "the draft directive fails to provide for the expeditious use of COMINT in support of the command functions of the Service Departments and for the satisfaction of vital operational requirements of commanders in theaters of combat" is not only unwarranted but also the statement overlooks Pars. 3b(1) and (2) of the Staff Study, dealing with Efficiency and Timeliness, as well as Par. 7a(7) and Par. 7b of the draft directive. The latter two are worth quoting:

(1) Par. 7a(7) of the draft directive:

"(7) To exercise general supervision over the special system for the electrical transmission of such intelligence to Theater Commanders and to furnish the texts of such material for transmission, according to priorities determined by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON."

(2) Par. 7b of the draft directive:

"b. The responsibilities of a CONSIDO serving a Joint Command will in general be similar to those outlined in subparagraph a above. Its principal responsibility is (1) to evaluate, publish, and disseminate communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the local cryptanalytic processing agency, and (2) to disseminate to appropriate agencies within the Theater, as authorized by the JCS, such communication intelligence as is forwarded by CONSIDO-WASHINGTON."

b. As to the draft directive "making COMSIDO-WASHINGTON subordinate to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, and thereby removing it from the intelligence chain of the National Military Establishment" the following may be said:

(1) There is now no such entity as an "intelligence chain of the National Military Establishment." At present there are at least three separate chains, corresponding to the three separate Services. The establishment of a single "intelligence chain of the National Military Establishment" is one of the important aims of the draft directive.

(2) It is not understood why the fulfillment of the COMINT needs of commanders in theaters of combat would be jeopardized by making COMSIDO-WASHINGTON subordinate to the Director, AFSA since not only is the latter to be assisted by a deputy from each of the Services but also the draft directive in Par. 2b provides that "For the purposes of assisting him (the Chief, COMSIDO-WASHINGTON) in executing his functions in producing communication intelligence he will have a deputy from each of the Services."

(3) However, if it is deemed inadvisable to make COMSIDO-WASHINGTON subordinate to the Director, AFSA, the substitution of the present Para. 2a and 2b of the draft directive by the alternative paragraphs embodied in the memo to Gen. McNarney would meet the objection. These would place COMSIDO-WASHINGTON under the Joint Intelligence Group of the JCS organization.

4. a. Referring to Par. d of the D Memo, it is granted that just as JCS 2010 will require certain adjustments in NSCID #9 so certain adjustments may have to be made in the same document if the draft directive were approved, but these adjustments will be of a minor nature just as the adjustments, if any, resulting from the creation of AFSA are likewise minor in nature.

b. (1) The specific functions of USCIB, as set forth in USCIB directive No. 1, 16 November 1948, stemming from NSCID #9 are as follows:

- (a) Formulating national Communications Intelligence policy and objectives.
- (b) Allocating among the member departments and agency specific responsibility for the conduct of Communications Intelligence tasks in order to insure a comprehensive coordinated program and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. (Tasks in those fields of responsibility or interest that are severally and specifically assigned to the member departments and agency

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by law or by competent authority, shall be recognized as the primary responsibility of the cognizant department or agency).

- (c) Prescribing basic security standards and dissemination policies to protect all Communications Intelligence activities and sources.
- (d) Exercising supervision over the establishment and maintenance of all liaison with foreign and non-member domestic agencies in the field of Communications Intelligence.
- (e) Assessing the national Communications Intelligence requirements, and establishing general policies concerning emphasis and priorities of effort accordingly.
- (f) Coordinating Communications Intelligence research and development in conformity with pertinent Research and Development Board policies.

It is difficult to see how the establishment of the CONSIDO concept would interfere with any of these functions. Moreover, the list does not contain a single mention of the words "evaluation," or "publication," and the word "dissemination" is used only in connection with the prescribing of policies to protect COMINT activities and sources, not with dissemination as it is connected with the actual exploitation or use of the final product of all the COMINT effort.

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b. (2) Par. d of the D memo fails to point out specifically in what respects the draft directive is not in consonance with the provisions of NSCID #9, unless the statement that NSCID #9 "established the U.S. Communication Intelligence Board to effect authoritative coordination of COMINT activities of the government" is what the D memo means to point out as the element with which the CONSIDO directive is in conflict. If that is indeed the element deemed to be in conflict, then just how the adoption of the CONSIDO concept would interfere with the purpose for which USCIB was established, viz., "to effect the authoritative coordination of COMINT activities of the Government" is difficult to see. In point of fact, by accepting and supporting the CONSIDO concept, USCIB would be enabled to execute its intended function in a far more effective manner than is now the case, as will become clear in a moment.

(3) Referring to NSCID #9 and to the portion of it just quoted, the directive itself defines "communication intelligence activities" as follows:

"Communication intelligence activities' comprise all processes involved in the collection for intelligence purposes, of foreign communications, the production of information from such communications, the dissemination of that information, and the control of the protection of that information and the security of its sources."

It will be noted that if the foregoing definition is taken into account in connection with Par. 1 of NSCID #9, USCIB has had, since its creation, the authority to coordinate not only the production of the COMINT raw material but also the evaluation of this material to produce communication intelligence, and the publication and dissemination of the final product. But as regards the latter steps, USCIB has as a practical matter exercised very little of the authority it was given. Certainly there has been no attempt to coordinate evaluation processes in the COMINT field, or to coordinate the production of detailed studies involving the use of COMINT. As regards the coordination of publication, USCIB has restricted itself to the establishment of formats for the publication of non-military and non-naval material; and as regards dissemination, the attention of USCIB has been for the most part directed toward establishing measures for the protection of the sources of COMINT against the hazards of its dissemination. There has been no attempt whatever to coordinate internal dissemination within the Departments and Agency involved.

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(4) Up until now USCIB has had five independent agencies to coordinate. With the establishment of AFSA the coordinating authority of USCIB will be facilitated by the reduction to only three independent organizations, viz., AFSA, the Department of State, and the CIA. It would seem that if USCIB were to exercise the authority given it by its charter and were to give its full support to the CONSIDO concept, there would be an increase in the overall efficiency and economy of the "Communications Intelligence activities of the Government" because USCIB would then be in a better position to coordinate the principal terminal activities in the COMINT realm, viz., evaluation, publication, and dissemination. And it would still have jurisdiction over all of the functions listed under par. b (1) with the possible exception of functions (b) and (f).

(5) If the CONSIDO concept were adopted, USCIB could very well add to the list of functions in paragraph b(1) above those relating to evaluation, publication, and dissemination. The coordination of the activities of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON so far as they are of interest to or involve AFSA, the Department of State, and the CIA would leave plenty of work for USCIB. Far from being out of harmony with the provisions of ASCID #9, the draft directive, if adopted, would be of assistance to USCIB by facilitating their exercise of certain authority it has always had but has failed to use hitherto.

5. The CONSIDO concept is in reality nothing new. All through the war the U. S. Navy followed it and is still following it. The British had adopted it before the U.S. Navy and had found it to be vital to the efficient exploitation of COMINT successes. The first official suggestion that it should be adopted by both the U.S. Army and the U. S. Navy is embodied in a letter dated 18 September 1945, from Admiral King to General Marshall. In fact, this is a good point at which to refer to the various letters and memoranda exchanged between Admiral King and General Marshall, and (later) between Admiral Nimitz and General Eisenhower, on the subject of integration of COMINT activities. They contain many references to the desirability and necessity for the establishment of such a concept as the draft directive contemplates. The D Memo completely reverses the position then taken by both the Navy and the Army (including the Air Force) in respect to the consolidation of evaluation, publication, and dissemination activities. There is no reason to feel that conditions have changed so that such a reversal is warranted. If anything JCS 2010 makes the consolidation of these activities more logical, more desirable, and more urgent than ever before. To fail to consolidate them will in fact jeopardize all that JCS 2010 is intended to

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accomplish, because the security of COMINT operations as a whole will be vitiated unless proper precautions to safeguard the end product are also taken. In connection with the foregoing thought, it is to be noted that the D Memo has failed utterly to take cognizance of the facts pointed out in Par. 3a(3) of the Staff Study. It is my considered opinion that the failure of the D Memo to take into consideration the extremely dangerous security hazards which now exist in respect to our whole COMINT effort demonstrates a lack of appreciation of the gravity of the situation. The serious responsibility which the JCS is undertaking when it continues to accept those risks after the latter have been pointed out should be understood by all concerned.

6. In closing these comments a final thought will be presented. Without saying it in so many words the first reason cited in Par. a of the D Memo implies that the intent of the draft directive is to establish a sixth and large evaluation, publication, and dissemination unit in addition to the five existing ones. That such an implication was drawn or was intended to be conveyed to the reader of the D Memo is established by the use of the phrase "in addition" as the introductory words to the third sentence of Par. a of the D Memo, indicating that the second sentence of that paragraph constitutes a first reason and the third sentence constitutes a second reason. Were it not for that preliminary phrase, one would be warranted in thinking that the contention of a decrease rather than an increase in efficiency and economy is supported by only a single reason, viz., that work which is now done by other intelligence agencies operating in the non-COMINT field and the product of which CONSIDO-WASHINGTON would have to have in order to do its job properly, would have to be done also by CONSIDO-WASHINGTON. From this it would follow that CONSIDO-WASHINGTON would have to operate in the non-COMINT field as well as in that field. It being impossible to conceive that the writer of the D Memo entertained such a thought, one can only be driven to the conclusion that the contention is indeed supported by two separate reasons, as indicated in Par. 1a(1) and (2) of these comments. If, now, reason (1) is indeed intended to stand by itself and to convey the thought that a sixth evaluation, publication, and dissemination office is contemplated by the CONSIDO directive, the only conclusion to which one is driven is that the D Memo not only manifests little knowledge of the technical aspects of the activities involved but also gives indications that the draft directive and the Staff Study which accompanied it were subjected to only a most casual scrutiny.

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