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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR

I believe it would be worthwhile for me to clarify at this time certain questions which have arisen regarding technical collaboration with [redacted]. I first raised the possibility of COMINT technical collaboration with [redacted] when it became apparent that there was no possibility of obtaining base rights for U.S. or U.K. COMINT activities in [redacted] and little likelihood for [redacted]. Accordingly, I urged the Board to consider entering into an arrangement with [redacted] which would satisfy to the maximum possible degree the U.S. requirements for vital COMINT material, information, and reports obtainable only from that particular piece of geography. I believe that our operations with the [redacted] should parallel as closely as possible our present operations with U.S. field units. Through such an operation we could greatly improve and speed-up the capabilities of the [redacted] to satisfy to the maximum our requirements. For this reason, and this reason only, I believe technical collaboration to be desirable.

To elaborate on this point, I strongly believe our approach to the [redacted] must be as honest and open as is possible. In discussing technical collaboration we should point out to the [redacted] that we intend, on certain problems, to assist them to the limit of our abilities. We must tell them that we expect similar treatment on their part. If the [redacted] do not feel such an arrangement is possible or to their best interests, I would then state to the [redacted] that we would exit this part of the arrangement in toto.

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It appears to me, and this is borne out by our experience with Canada, that we cannot afford to engage in a piece-meal technical exchange with [redacted]. It would become apparent immediately that the U.S. has technical materials and information pertaining to the problems worked by [redacted] which it is not providing. The immediate reaction of the [redacted] would be one of distrust, followed by a withholding of [redacted] COMINT from the U.S. If, on the other hand, we deliver to the [redacted] additional COMINT technical data as their existence is revealed through items previously exchanged, we will gradually provide them with all the data we intended originally to reserve. They will then have obtained our COMINT but we will have no assurance of equitable reciprocation. Further, without close technical collaboration, we will not even have assurance that our materials are being properly utilized in order to meet the U.S. requirements.

In implementing any program for technical collaboration with the [redacted], I consider it a prerequisite that an experienced NSA officer be available in [redacted] for the purpose of conducting the actual liaison with the [redacted], preparing current estimates of the competence of their organization, providing guidance and technical assistance, and handling the technical exchange. The ideal situation would be for this officer to have free access to the [redacted] COMINT shop - failing this, he must have the freedom to consult on a frequent basis with his opposite numbers, and to visit at least occasionally their intercept and processing activities.

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Without such access, such an officer could not accomplish the actions described above, and I could not reasonably be expected to discharge my responsibilities to the Board for the over-all conduct of this arrangement. I should like to emphasize that this sort of liaison arrangement is prompted by no other consideration than that it will give us the only effective technical control which will satisfy pressing U.S. needs for information. There is no intention that this officer should get into the covert intelligence business.

I recognize that the U.K. intends at this time to operate in a different manner with regard to [redacted]. [redacted]

[redacted] Further, the U.K. has a selling job to do in [redacted] in view of the highly unofficial nature of their arrangements to date. I seriously doubt that the U.K. will be able to meet the U.S. requirements for COMINT from [redacted], but we are bound by our agreement to wait for two years to evaluate their success. In addition, the need to assist the [redacted] in COMINT matters is not nearly as acute as in the case of [redacted]. The two organizations vary greatly both in size and in experience.

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