

~~TOP SECRET FROTH - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

FINAL

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.1/20

Item 2 of the Agenda for the 100th Meeting of USCIB, held on 11 February 1954.

Subject:

Program to Improve the Communication Security of NATO Countries (USCIB 29.1/6, 29.1/17, 29.3/19).

The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Armstrong if he would like to have Mr. Polyzoides, Chairman of the Combined Working Group, report on this item.

MR. ARMSTRONG agreed that this would be the best procedure.

MR. POLYZOIDES said that there is not much to add to the papers now before the Board. He explained that the Combined Working Group and the U. S. element thereof had met frequently since last October, and that their deliberations had resulted in what he considers to be the only possible plan which could be devised to provide maximum assurance that the technical aspects of the approach to the French could be controlled. He stated his belief that his committee had operated well within its terms of reference, and expressed the hope that the Board would see fit to give its approval to the plan as presented in package form.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR informed the members that word of LSIB and Cypher Policy Board approval of the instant plan had been received subsequent to distribution of these papers to the Board. He went on to explain that there are seven closely-related enclosures with USCIB 29.1/6, the first of which is an aide memoire designed to initiate action by means of an approach at the highest diplomatic level, and that the remaining enclosures pertain to implementation of that approach.

GENERAL ERSKINE asked if this plan provided for the supply of machines and equipment to the French.

It was pointed out by Mr. Armstrong that such is not a part of this plan as projected, but that the question of machines and equipment might arise in the subsequent technical discussions.

On the question of available machines GENERAL CANINE said that the only type presently available is the ASAM 2-1, which he considered to be "error prone" and inferior to the STURGEON (which the French now use) if the STURGEON is used properly. He added that no other machine will be available for possibly 2 years; however, he said he sees no objection to giving the French the 2-1, informing them of this fact and its limitations at the same time.

USCIB: 29.1/20

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET FROTH - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

USCIB: 29.1/20

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Board consider the proposed approach plan first and then discuss the question of supply of equipments. On the subject of timing of the approach referred to in the papers before the Board Mr. Armstrong stated that it will be several weeks before the approach can be made, noting, for instance, that our Ambassador who will handle the initial approach will not return to Paris until the end of February or first of March. He suggested that the Ambassadorial approach might well be made in the middle or latter part of March, sufficiently in advance of the separate Tripartite Security Working Group discussions, unrelated to this approach, which are expected to be held at the request of the French, the second week in April. He explained that the plan is intended to give the negotiators some latitude in their method of approach to the French so long as no substantive changes in the over-all plan are made.

The CHAIRMAN directed that the minutes reflect general accord with the procedural methods outlined by Mr. Armstrong.

The CHAIRMAN, referring to the de Vosjoli discussions, deplored the fact that we have led the French to believe that we could help them out and then told them we have nothing. He said that he thought it imperative that we take some positive action in their behalf.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR reviewed the history of the de Vosjoli discussions and noted the change from an original non-urgent French requirement for some 200 on-line teletype, and 500 off-line literal machines to the existing urgent request for 5 machines. He suggested that there might be some advantage to the technical discussions in giving the French even a weak machine, telling them we know it is weak, why it is weak and how to correct the weaknesses, but that it's the only thing available.

This idea was discussed and was generally agreed to, the consideration of details being deferred momentarily while an NSA representative checked the availability of 2-1 machines.

The CHAIRMAN then asked that the individual enclosures with USCIB 29.1/6 now be considered. Each enclosure was considered in turn, and approved by the Board.

Returning to the French request for machines, GENERAL GANINE said he thought 5 equipments could be provided and that if this were done he would advise the use of Crypto-system DAPHNE.

USCIB: 29.1/20

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET FROTH - U. S. EYES ONLY~~

USCIB: 29.1/20

Having agreed to offer "up to 5" ASAM 2-1 machines to the French the members considered what procedure should be employed, and agreed that the following actions should be taken in the order indicated:

- (1) The Director, NSA, will determine that five of the equipments in question are, in fact, available.
- (2) The Chairman, Combined Working Group, will seek U.K. approval for the delivery of these machines to the French.
- (3) The Department of State member will make the necessary contact with SD-MIGC to clear this action.
- (4) Upon accomplishment of the above, the CIA member will contact M. de Vosjoli.

DECISION: (11 February 1954) USCIB:

(1) Approved the recommendations of the Combined Working Group as contained in USCIB 29.1/6 as modified by 29.1/17.

(2) Agreed that a real effort should be made to accede to the French request for "up to 5" machines, and determined that the only equipments which would be suitable under the circumstances, and which might be made available are the ASAM 2-1 operating with the 131-B2 table.

(3) Agreed that the following actions would be taken, in the order shown, toward the implementation of the decision in subparagraph (2), above:

- (a) The Director, NSA, will determine that five of the equipments in question are, in fact, available.
- (b) The Chairman, Combined Working Group, will seek U.K. approval for the delivery of these machines to the French.
- (c) The Department of State member will make the necessary contact with SD-MIGC to clear this action.
- (d) Upon accomplishment of the above, the CIA member will contact M. de Vosjoli.

(NOTE: With regard to action (c), above, it was subsequently agreed between the Department of State and the National Security Agency that the latter would initiate action to obtain SD-MIGC approval, with such assistance as the Department of State may be able to give.)

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

USCIB: 29.1/20