

FINAL  
REMITTANCE

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

EO 3.3(h) (2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.20/4      Item 4 of the Agenda for the 113th Meeting of USCIB, held on 11 March 1955.

Subject:              Continuation of CISD Activities (USCIB 29.20/1; 29.20/2).

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) commented briefly on the proposal contained in USCIB 29.20/1, and the vote sheet replies thereto (USCIB 29.20/2), and asked if the Army member had anything to add.

GENERAL SCHOW said that he had nothing to add, but said that the Army is unable to understand why the proposal is considered premature by State and CIA.

GENERAL CANINE said that he did not consider the proposal premature. He said that if the Board has taken jurisdiction the problem must involve COMINT, and, if the latter is true, then operational control of the project must be under the Director, NSA - which it is not. He pointed out that operational control is now under G-2, USAREUR and, this being the case, the Army is obliged to place it under NSA control. He added that if this were done he would, of necessity, have to delegate such control to ASA.

GENERAL REICHELDERFER stated that this project is budgeted for by ASA. He noted that about 90% of the personnel involved are [redacted] nationals, and said that he had not brought up the question of operational control because everyone appeared to be getting what they wanted from the operation. He added that the station involved is a very valuable one.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN, after stating his belief that all were agreed that (1) the project should continue, and (2) that it should continue to be run by the Army, said that the only remaining question is that of negotiation between the U.S. and [redacted], and the ancillary questions of timing and procedure. He suggested that the members address themselves to this aspect of the problem.

GENERAL CANINE agreed. He added that he would be willing to legalize the existing operation if it is believed that it is now being run properly. He recommended that the Board decide to take jurisdiction in the matter.

GENERAL LEWIS said that if jurisdiction were to be discussed it might be well to consider putting this problem to the IAC.

GENERAL SCHOW explained that what we are really after now is some sort of approval on how an approach to the [redacted] should be made, and when. He informed the members that [redacted] organization, which the [redacted] know about, is what was left of the [redacted] after the war, adding that it has turned into a very fruitful source of information.

USCIB: 29.20/4

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

USCIB: 29.20/4

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

He said that the main idea is to be in a position, when the right time arrives, to go to the [redacted] on the basis of the productivity of this operation, thereby forestalling an independent, similar effort by the [redacted]

GENERAL CANINE said that he agreed with this concept, and would be willing to assist the Army in any way possible.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN asked if the Army considered this the appropriate time to make an approach.

GENERAL SCHOW replied that the exact time of approach has not been determined, adding that the important thing is to be prepared to act without delay when the right time does arrive.

MR. ARMSTRONG noted that this is in fact a proposal for a limited [redacted] arrangement, and said that in view of the delicate arrangement under which this activity is conducted, a new approach should not be made until ratification of the Paris agreements.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN said that General Truscott's views on this subject have been received and he recommends against an approach prior to the treaty ratification because it would: (1) weaken the future U.S. bargaining position in [redacted] as well as in other fields, (2) confront the [redacted] with an embarrassing situation, since they are in no legal position to accept the material nor to enter into an agreement, and (3) adversely affect the sensitive balance of present arrangements.

GENERAL CANINE suggested that [redacted] would have little difficulty in agreeing on timing, and asked if the members would be willing for Mr. Armstrong to have the authority to proceed with negotiations, with the understanding that the problem would be worked out with the [redacted]. He said that he thought this Board was attempting to get too much into the details of the problem.

GENERAL SCHOW expressed his personal opinion that we stand a good chance of losing out if we are not in a position to negotiate with the [redacted] at the right time.

GENERAL CANINE agreed, stating his belief that it would be inadvisable for this Board to have to do any further voting once the right time for an approach has arrived. He said that he thought the Board should assign responsibility for making an approach.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN said that it would be appropriate to grant this authority to [redacted]

USCIB: 29.20/4

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.20/4

MR. ARMSTRONG commented that this would satisfy the requirements of his Department.

GENERAL REICHELDERFER pointed out that we are considering the release of certain [redacted], and said that the Ambassador probably would not be too familiar with the details of the problem.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN, restating his belief that the Ambassador could handle the matter properly, noted the importance of having the subject introduced in the proper form, at the proper level, at the proper time, and by the proper person.

GENERAL CANINE reminded the members that the Army is now the Executive Agent, and said that the suggested action by the Ambassador would have the effect of changing the Army's responsibility.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN stated that there is no intent to change the Executive Agent.

GENERAL SCHOW said that he would like to have the Army continue with its responsibility, particularly since the Army will have to decide what [redacted] is to be turned over.

GENERAL LEWIS, agreeing that timing is all-important, said that he is not convinced that an approach should be made after ratification of the treaty, suggesting that just before ratification might be more advantageous. He recommended that authority for decision be given to the Ambassador, [redacted] and the Army representative, backed up by the [redacted]

The ACTING CHAIRMAN said that he could not see how we could avoid giving authority to the Ambassador, leaving him free to call upon such others for advice as he may choose.

GENERAL CANINE said that he thought the Army should continue to have the initiative.

GENERAL LEWIS noted again that the [redacted] will be concerned with the problem.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN pointed out that the main problem is to get an effective instrument of notification. He suggested that a letter to [redacted] charge him with the problem and request that he advise with CG, USAREUR and the CIA representative, and act in concert with the [redacted]

USCIB: 29.20/4

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY~~

USCIB: 29.20/4

EO 3.3(h) (2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

GENERAL REICHELDERFER informed the members that the Department of State has already written to the Ambassador on the subject, indicating that he has the problem at his fingertips and that there is no need to duplicate the advice given.

ADMIRAL DANIEL suggested that the Army be told to go ahead with the problem.

MR. ARMSTRONG recommended that the Board reach a decision as to whether or not this will be a [ ] arrangement.

[ ]

The members discussed further the mechanics of notification through diplomatic and military channels. Following the discussion the Acting Chairman asked if all were agreed that the Executive Secretary should prepare draft letters, for USCIB approval, (1) to the Secretary of State for passage to [ ] (2) to the Secretary of Defense for passage to appropriate military authorities in Europe, and (3) to LSIB, informing them of U.S. action.

GENERAL CANINE pointed out that the Board would be attacking the problem at a very high level by going directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense. He asked, for example, how much leeway would be given the Secretary of Defense; and would he be asked to issue an order or directive?

The ACTING CHAIRMAN replied that the letter would be phrased to present a suggested course of action, indicating, for example, that the [ ] be used as a coordinating medium, and pointing out the interest and responsibility of the Ambassador in the matter.

GENERAL CANINE said that he could not agree with passing the problem to the Secretary of Defense because, among other reasons, it did not represent completed staff action.

After further discussion an alternative course of action was proposed, resulting in agreement that, instead of letters to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the State and Army members would take independent action to inform their representatives in [ ] of the problem in general, of the fact that the Senior Army Representative should consult in advance with [ ] as to the institution of negotiations with the [ ] of [ ] familiarity with the problem, and of General Truscott's awareness of the situation.

USCIB: 29.20/4

- 17 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

USCIB: 29.20/4

It was agreed further (1) that the Department of Defense member should take such action within the Department of Defense as is required to support the action of the Army member, (2) that the CIA member should bring pertinent factors to the attention of [redacted], and (3) that the Executive Secretary would send appropriate notification to U.K. authorities after notification by the Army member that a decision to [redacted] has in fact been taken.

DECISION: (11 March 1955) As a result of a thorough discussion of the subject problem USCIB, acting as a forum of best available advice on the matter, agreed that [redacted] effort in [redacted] is valuable, should be continued, and that cognizance over this activity, including negotiations with the [redacted] as approved by [redacted] should continue to be exercised by the Department of the Army. USCIB agreed that it can perceive no objection to the [redacted] described by the Army member as agreed by this decision and in accordance with the procedure outlined below.

Toward the resolution of specific problems relating to timing, coordination, and procedure for [redacted], USCIB agreed, further, to recommend that the following actions be taken by the member organizations indicated:

(1) That the Department of the Army (a) advise the Senior Army Representative in [redacted] to consult in advance with Ambassador Conant as to the institution of negotiations with the [redacted] on this subject; and, (b) suggest to the Senior Army Representative in [redacted] that it might be desirable to have actions in this matter coordinated by the [redacted] as a group familiar with the problem.

(2) That the Department of State member undertake to inform Ambassador Conant of USCIB's decision pointing out (a) that the Army is desirous of [redacted] at the earliest possible time to avoid possible action by the [redacted] independently, and (b) that [redacted] is aware of the situation.

(3) That the Defense member take such action as is appropriate within the Department of Defense to support the action of the Army member.

(4) That the CIA member, concurrently, apprise [redacted] of pertinent factors.

(5) That, at the time the decision is taken to [redacted] the Army member inform the Executive Secretary, USCIB who, in turn, will send appropriate notification to U.K. authorities in keeping with the terms of Appendix "P" to the UKUSA Agreement.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

USCIB: 29.20/4

- 18 -