

Serial: N 0005

3 JAN 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(ATTN: General G. B. Erskine, USMC-Ret,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations)

SUBJECT: Communications Security Assistance to Foreign
Governments (S)

- REFERENCES: (a) NSA Serial: N 3261, Subject: Assistance in
Cryptography for Colombian Armed Forces (S),
dated 24 August 1960
- (b) COMSEC 2-/23, Subject: USCSB Policy Governing
the Disclosure or Release of Communications
Security Information or Material to Friendly
Foreign Governments, dated 12 August 1957
- (c) COMSEC 2-/24, Subject: Procedures for
Handling Requests for the Provision of
Communications Security Assistance to Foreign
Governments, dated 12 September 1960

1. There have been numerous instances of action on the part of U.S. military personnel who deal with representatives of foreign governments or international organizations, which indicate a general unawareness of the national policies and procedures for handling COMSEC assistance requests. Reference (a) is one of the more recent examples. In addition, a review of the Military Assistance Summary Delivery Schedule for the five year period FY 1962-1966 disclosed that some of the country programs include COMSEC equipment which has not been authorized for release. These and other examples have led to the conclusion that there is a need to provide guidance to the Unified and Specified Commanders, their Component Commanders, MAAG's, and any other U.S. military personnel who may have occasion to receive inquiries on the subject.

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
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2. It is considered that an Instruction, implementing Department of Defense Directive C-5200.5, along the lines suggested in the inclosure should be published for distribution to those personnel mentioned in the paragraph above. The inclosure is a modified version of the national policies and procedures set forth in references (b) and (c). The inclusion of Unified and Specified Commanders in paragraph 5 of Section II represents a recognition of the current military structure and a delegation of the responsibilities by the Defense Department Member of the USCSB.

/s/ L. H. FROST

L. H. FROST
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

Incl:
a/s (dup)

cc: DIR 
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M/R ATTACHED

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Serial:

M/R: There is a general unawareness within the military departments of the national policies and procedures governing COMSEC assistance. The proposed DOD Instruction is intended to provide guidance to those personnel who may receive inquiries on the subject. This correspondence has been discussed with Mr. Rich of OSO/OSD, who tentatively agrees with the proposed instruction and agrees that it should be forwarded to OSO in the present form. OSO will complete the necessary intra-DOD co-ordination. The USCSB procedures for processing requests for COMSEC assistance were developed while the Defense Department was functioning under the "executive agent system." These procedures provide that only USCSB members may reject requests for COMSEC assistance. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 discontinued the "executive agent system" and has taken the military departments out of the chain of command between the President and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The DOD Instruction suggested by this letter recognizes the operational and command aspects of the current military structure and gives Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands authority to reject COMSEC assistance requests which do not meet national policy. This proposal is consistent with USCSB policy and does represent a delegation of responsibility by the Defense Department member of the USCSB.

Maj J.H.Hightower/CSEC-04/2129/mk/22 Dec 60

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Reference: Department of Defense Directive C-5200.5, Subject:
Communications Security (COMSEC), dated 27 October 1958

This Instruction implements the reference and establishes the procedures to be followed in handling requests from foreign governments for communications security assistance.

I GENERAL

1. Foreign governments are becoming increasingly interested in U.S. communications security (COMSEC) equipment and material. In some cases, this interest is stimulated by a natural desire to advance their country's COMSEC posture; other cases can be attributed to unclassified information, usually a short title reference, appearing in U.S. military publications which have been made available to them. Regardless of cause, there has been a noticeable rise in requests for more detailed information about U.S. COMSEC equipment and material, queries about the availability of such items, requests for military assistance planners to include COMSEC equipment in the country program, and requests for assistance in training in COMSEC techniques.

II POLICY

1. The provision of COMSEC assistance to foreign governments is an extremely sensitive matter and may only be undertaken after approval by national communications security authorities.

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2. Foreign liaison on COMSEC matters will be conducted in accordance with paragraph D, Section V of above reference.
3. Communications security information or material may be considered for release to foreign governments or international military activities only if required to:
 - a. Protect U.S. classified information which must be communicated to a foreign government and which will later be transmitted electrically by that government.
 - b. Further the military effectiveness and objectives of mutual defense arrangements by providing a secure means of intercommunication on military planning or operational matters between the Armed Forces of a foreign government or international activity and one or more of the U.S. military services.
4. COMSEC assistance will not be authorized when it is for the sole purpose of improving the security of a country's internal communications.
5. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Unified and Specified Commanders receiving requests for COMSEC assistance which do not satisfy one of the criteria outlined in paragraph 2 above may deny the request as not meeting U.S. policy.

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1. When a request for communications security assistance is received from an international organization or foreign government, it will be reviewed and a determination made as to whether or not it meets the policy.

a. If the request meets the policy:

(1) The requesting official will be informed that the matter is being referred to the appropriate U.S. authority for action, and

(2) The request with appropriate recommendations will be forwarded through channels

to the Director, National Security Agency,

Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, for action.
~~Washington 25, D. C., for action.~~

b. If the request does not meet the policy:

(1) The requesting official will be informed that U.S. policy does not permit granting the request, and

(2) The Director, National Security Agency will be notified of the nature of the request and the action taken.

c. If doubt exists as to whether or not the request meets the policy, the procedure outlined in subparagraph 1.a., Section III, should be followed.

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2. Requests generated by a U.S. element to release COMSEC material to a foreign nation or international organization, in support of U.S. operational plans, will be forwarded through channels with supporting justification to the Director, National Security Agency, ^{Fort George G. Meade, Maryland} ~~Washington 25, D. C.~~, for action.

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