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SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 20./16 Item 3 of the Agenda for the 103rd Meeting of USCIB, held on 14 May 1954.

Subject: Principles for Use in Intercept and Jamming Operations. (USCIB 20./13)

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited comment by Captain Taylor.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR stated that most of his comments were set forth in USCIB 20./13. He reviewed those comments and stated that if the Board approves the substance of the paper it will have expressed its views as originally requested. He added that the Navy Member has requested that these views not be issued as a directive at this time.

ADMIRAL ESPE confirmed the Navy position, pointing out that the stated views are acceptable; however, it would seem more appropriate that they be issued as guidance to the Director, NSA, and for possible incorporation in his reply to the GENSA Group and to the Secretary of Defense.

As a result of a suggestion by General Erskine there was general agreement that the substance of the draft directive (enclosure with USCIB 20./12) should be prepared in letter form, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and signed by the Board Chairman. The task of preparing this letter was assigned to the Executive Secretary, who was instructed to amend all phraseology of a directive nature, permitting the resultant letter to reflect USCIB views rather than specific direction.

It was further agreed that the letter being discussed would present USCIB views on jamming only, rather than on intercept and jamming.

GENERAL CANINE informed those present that he has been in an awkward position as a result of the length of time it has taken to resolve this matter, and urged the service members of the Board to assure their communicators that he was not guilty of bad faith.

DECISION: (14 May 1954) USCIB agreed that the substance of the draft directive, contained as an enclosure with USCIB 20./12, will be prepared in letter form by the Executive Secretary, addressed to the Secretary of Defense for signature by the Chairman, USCIB. It was agreed, further, that the letter will refer only to jamming and that the phraseology of the directive will be amended to reflect USCIB views, rather than specific direction.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

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USCIB: 20./15

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21 May 1954


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio Communications.

Reference: USCIB 20./13 dated 4 May 1954.

The enclosure is circulated for information regarding action taken pursuant to the decision rendered at the 103rd Meeting of USCIB with regard to subject.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
CIB # 000158 dated 20 May 1954.

USCIB: 20./15

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Washington 25, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

CIB # 000158

20 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio
Communications.

1. In consequence of a question recently raised in the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), with regard to the conduct of communications jamming operations by military commanders, the views set forth below are forwarded for your information.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 7, below, USCIB takes the view that directed jamming of foreign communications should be performed only on circuits approved in advance by USCIB.

3. USCIB approves for jamming, at the discretion of appropriate military commanders, all unenciphered military voice transmissions passing plain-language conversations exclusively.

4. The Director, NSA, should keep COMINT field units informed as to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCIB for jamming.

5. Within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the Director, NSA, should establish procedures which will permit prompt response to any proposals by military commanders to jam communications circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board.

6. The Director, NSA, should provide continuously to COMINT field units the technical circuit information which they require to support any jamming which is performed on communications circuits approved by USCIB or undertaken as provided below.

7. Senior component commanders in affected areas should be permitted to authorize communications jamming without prior USCIB approval when, in their considered judgment, such jamming is essential in the national interest or for the safety of major military forces and time does not permit the obtaining of necessary clearances.

(Signed)
ALLEN W. DULLES
Chairman

Enclosure with USCIB 20./15 dtd 21 May 54.

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FINALSUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 20./14 Item A (Not on Agenda) for the Fourteenth Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 29 April 1954.

Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations.

THE CHAIRMAN (Captain Taylor) introduced this item by explaining that all members except the Navy Member had approved USCIB 20./12 dated 12 April 1954. The Navy Member, he said, recommends that the proposed Directive be issued as a statement to the Director, NSA to guide his answer to the Director, Communications-Electronics rather than as a Directive. The Chairman continued by reading the Navy's proposal that "The statements contained in subject paper are acceptable as guidance for Director, NSA upon which to base his response to the CENSA panel; however it is felt that a USCIB Directive on jamming principles is premature at this time."

MR. ZANDER pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in some planning which concerns jamming and he therefore felt that there was some urgency in getting USCIB's view. He concluded by asking if the guidance in the Navy proposal would be the same as USCIB's view.

THE CHAIRMAN said that it would answer the original problem and read as follows: "2a. The Director, NSA obtain the views of USCIB on this subject and forward those views to the Director, Communications-Electronics. b. The Director Communications-Electronics forward a committee report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporating the views of USCIB. 3. Pending receipt of USCIB views the Chairman CENSA proposes that the report to the JCS be as presented in inclosure." Procedurally, he concluded, the Navy position is correct even though it may not be what the Committee wants.

CAPTAIN McCORMICK pointed out that the Board might, in a few days, have cognizance of both ELINT and COMINT.

MR. PATTON suggested that if the Committee were in agreement with the principles contained in the proposed Directive, it should be approved. Anything else, he continued, would be a hollow gesture.

After a brief discussion in which the other members failed to agree with the Navy's view, THE CHAIRMAN stated that he intended to place the subject on the agenda for the May meeting of USCIB for resolution as it had been in Committee long enough.

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USCIB: 20./14

DECISION: (29 April 1954) USCIBEC took note of the Chairman's intention to place the subject of Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations contained in USCIB 20./12 dated 12 April 1954 on the agenda for decision at the May meeting of USCIB.

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USCIB: 20./13

4 May 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations.

References: (a) USCIB 20./6 dated 12 November 1953.
(b) USCIB 20./12 dated 12 April 1954.

1. Reference (a) included a request by the Director, NSA for USCIB's views on subject principles for the purpose of permitting him to forward those views to the Director, Communications-Electronics in commenting upon recommendations of the Steering Committee for Communications-Electronics - National Security Agency matters (CENSA). The CENSA recommendations were attached to the enclosure to reference (a).

2. In acting on the above-mentioned request of the Director, NSA, USCIB at its 93rd Meeting on 13 November 1953 referred the matter to the USCIB Intelligence Committee for study and recommendations to the Board, through the Executive Committee, as to proper Board action.

3. Vote sheet action completed on 21 December 1953 revealed a divergence of opinion amongst the members of USCIBEC with regard to recommendations in the premises submitted to USCIBEC by the Intelligence Committee.

4. The divergent views of USCIBEC were reconciled at its subsequent (tenth) regular meeting on 27 January 1954, at which time it was agreed that the CENSA paper attached to reference (a) could stand as USCIB's views in this matter if revised by the NSA Member in the light of the discussion of this topic at the meeting.

5. Accordingly, the views expressed in the proposed directive attached to reference (b) were circulated to the members of USCIBEC for vote sheet action. The vote was completed on 28 April 1954 and resulted in approval by all members in substance, and by all but one in form, the Navy member dissenting as follows:

"The statements contained in subject paper are acceptable as guidance for Director, National Security Agency, upon which to base his response to the CENSA Panel; however, it is felt that a USCIB Directive on jamming principles is premature at this time."

USCIB: 20./13

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USCIB: 20./13

4 May 1954

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
Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations.

6. At its Fourteenth Meeting on 29 April 1954 the members of USCIBEC were asked by their Chairman if they could agree with the Navy member to withhold issue in directive form of the substance proposed by reference (b) and instead issue it as a statement to the Director, NSA of USCIB's views, as was indicated to be the original objective. The other members were unable to agree with this procedure on the grounds that the mere expression of USCIB's views to the NSA Member might not be taken to be sufficiently binding.

7. Paragraph 7 of USCIB Directive Number 2 requires that "those matters upon which the Executive Committee is unable, within a period covering two consecutive regular meetings, to agree unanimously, will automatically be referred by the Executive Secretary to USCIB for consideration."

8. Having failed to reach agreement on subject problem and having stretched the above quoted provision of USCIB Directive Number 2 perhaps farther than it was intended to go, reference (b) will be placed on the agenda for consideration at the next regular meeting of USCIB, the majority view of USCIBEC being that the proposed directive included with reference (b) on subject jamming and intercept policy be approved without change with the minority view of the Navy Member being as stated in paragraph 5 above.

9. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 20./13

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USCIB: 20./12

24

12 April 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:


Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations.

Reference: USCIB 20./6 dated 12 November 1953.

1. In accordance with the decision reached at the Tenth Meeting of USCIBEC on 27 January 1954, the attached revision of the reference is circulated for action as indicated.

2. Please execute the attached vote sheet and return it to this office by 1200, Wednesday, 28 April 1954.

3. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

Copy of NSA Serial 000164-S dtd 6 Apr 1954.

USCIB: 20./12



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 000164-S
6 April 54

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC

SUBJECT: Communications Jamming

References: (a) USCIB 20./6, 12 Nov 53

(b) USCIB 20./9, 14 Dec 53

(c) USCIB 20./11 (Item 5, 10th USCIBEC Mtg.), 27 Jan 54

1. Pursuant to the USCIBEC decision outlined in reference (c), NSA prepared a revision of reference (a) to reflect procedures similar to those outlined in reference (b). During informal coordination of this revision with the USCIBEC members most concerned, it became clear that agreement could not be reached thereon.

2. Agreement, however, was reached on the consideration set forth in Inclosure 1, and on a draft USCIB Directive in implementation thereof, Inclosure 2.

3. It is recommended that USCIBEC submit to USCIB for approval, as a matter of major policy, the attached Draft USCIB Directive. If USCIB approves this statement of policy, it is further recommended that the Executive Secretary forward the approved directive to the Secretary of Defense with a request that he inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff of USCIB policy in the premises.

4. The Director, NSA, will then inform the Director, Communications-Electronics, of the action taken by USCIB on the basis of the study inclosed with reference (a).

JOHN B ACKERMAN
Brigadier General, US Air Force
Acting Director

2 Incls:

- 1. Agreement reached by ad hoc group
- 2. Draft USCIB Directive

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CONSIDERATION CONCERNING A DRAFT USCIB DIRECTIVE OUTLINING
POLICY IN JAMMING OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS

1. The jamming of foreign radio communications to exploit an immediate situation may seriously damage the national intelligence effort. One such damage is the possible permanent loss of sources of communications intelligence. Such losses can occur as the result of greater safeguards which the enemy may provide for his communications. The enemy may provide these greater safeguards as a result of his awareness of our exploitation of his communications which he obtains as a result of our jamming.
2. Some sources of communications intelligence are of vital importance to the nation. Their value can be assessed accurately only at the national level. USCIB is the national board concerned with the formulation of communications intelligence policy.
3. There are certain foreign communications which are recognized as being readily susceptible of COMINT exploitation and/or for which the enemy cannot provide adequate safeguards. All unenciphered military voice transmissions passing plain-language conversations exclusively, for example, fall in this category. Included are nearly all known air-ground, tank-tank, and similar low-level communications circuits of immediate concern in a tactical situation. Field commanders authorized to initiate jamming are primary recipients of the communications intelligence derived from these circuits. As such, they are fully qualified to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of jamming, and to render an accurate decision. In recognition of the above, USCIB should approve for jamming, at the discretion of appropriate military commanders, all such circuits.
4. All communication circuits which are found upon implementation of UKUSA Appendix B to be fully exploitable and which pass no traffic producing COMINT of Category II or higher classification should be included in the circuits approved for jamming as described in paragraph 3, above.
5. The Director, NSA, should provide the COMINT support which will be essential to effective communications jamming undertaken in accordance with USCIB policies.
6. The Director, NSA, should keep COMINT field units informed as to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCIB for jamming.
7. Within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the Director, NSA, should establish procedures which will permit prompt response to any proposals by military commanders to jam communications circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board.

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Incl # 1

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8. In a military situation involving communication jamming, time is often a vital factor. Full use should be made by USCIB of NSA and COMINT field units resources to expedite performance of its communication jamming policy function.

9. An adequate escape clause is necessary to permit senior military commanders to jam communications circuits in an emergency situation without prior USCIB approval.

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UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD

DIRECTIVE NO. _____

USCIB POLICY ON JAMMING

OF FOREIGN RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

1. Except as provided in paragraph 6, below, directed jamming of foreign communications shall be performed only on circuits approved in advance by USCIB.

2. USCIB approves for jamming, at the discretion of appropriate military commanders, all unenciphered military voice transmissions passing plain-language conversations exclusively.

3. The Director, NSA, shall keep COMINT field units informed as to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCIB for jamming.

4. Within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the Director, NSA, shall establish procedures which will permit prompt response to any proposals by military commanders to jam communications circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board.

5. The Director, NSA, is to provide continuously to COMINT field units the technical circuit information which they require to support any jamming which is performed on communications circuits approved by USCIB or undertaken as provided below.

6. Senior component commanders in affected areas may authorize communications jamming without prior USCIB approval when, in their considered judgment, such jamming is essential in the national interest or for the safety of major military forces and time does not permit the obtaining of necessary clearances.