

F

USCIB: 21./18

24

29 September 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~


MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material
(NATO Aspect).

Reference: USCIB 21./7 of 17 December 1953.

1. The enclosure herewith is circulated for information.
It completes implementation of the reference.

2. The enclosure with this memorandum should be handled in
COMINT channels insofar as it is practicable to do so, and its
contents should be revealed only to those persons who are indoc-
trinated for COMINT.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
NSA Serial 000428-S
dtd 24 Sep 1954

USCIB: 21./18

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial: 000428-S

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

24 SEP 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Organization within NATO for Processing Captured Enemy Documents

1. On 17 December 1953, the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) requested the Director, National Security Agency (NSA), to prepare, in coordination with

2. It is noted that, on 13 July 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the designation of the Chairman, Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS), as the U.S. member of the NATO Ad Hoc Committee. In compliance with the USCIB decision, therefore, the inclosed brief is forwarded with the request that it be furnished the Chairman, JTIS, for his information and guidance. In this connection, your attention is invited to the fact that the U.K. member (and the Canadian member, if any) will have received a similar brief.

3. In the event the Chairman, JTIS, should wish to discuss the substance of the brief with a representative of NSA, Mr. Fred Woodrough has been designated for that purpose. He can be reached by telephone on code 147, extension 401, and will be pleased to call on the Chairman, JTIS, at any time.

4. In that the inclosed brief contains information of a COMINT nature, it is requested that it be discussed only with those persons who are indoctrinated for COMINT.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

(Signed)
L. H. FROST
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff

Incl:
a/s

Copy furnished:
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure with USCIB 21./8 dtd 29 Sep 1954.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BRIEF FOR THE U. S. MEMBER

OF THE

STANDING GROUP AD HOC COMMITTEE

ON

ORGANIZATION WITHIN NATO FOR PROCESSING

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

(8 September 1954)

Reference: S.G. 223/1 (Final)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

BACKGROUND

1. At its 73rd Meeting on 29 September 1953, the Military Representatives Committee approved S.G. 223/1 as amended. This paper provides for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee, under the direction of the Standing Group Intelligence Committee (SGIC), that will establish policy, organization, and procedures for a wartime agency within NATO for processing captured enemy documents in time of war.

2. Captured enemy documents may include, among other things, cryptologic material of tactical or strategic value to the U. S. For the purpose of this Brief, cryptologic material is understood to include cryptographic documents (including copies of signals whether in clear or encrypted form, signals logs, etc.) and cryptographic equipment including related communications equipment, as well as cryptanalytic documents and devices.

3. Experience gained in World War II shows that information vital to successful prosecution of the war can be obtained from captured cryptologic material, provided that timely and effective exploitation of the material can be achieved by the responsible Agency of the Government.

4. In the United States, the National Security Agency is responsible for the operational and technical control over the exploitation of captured cryptologic material. (No corresponding paragraph in UK brief.)

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

5. It is anticipated that the Standing Group ad hoc committee will establish NATO policies and procedures for the handling of enemy documents captured by national forces operating under a major NATO command in order to ensure their efficient collection and adequate exploitation, as well as rapid dissemination of any tactical information produced by such exploitation.

6. It is anticipated that NATO policies and procedures will require that national rights to enemy documents captured by forces placed under a major NATO command be waived temporarily, that is, for the time required to exploit the documents for immediate operational needs, and for further expeditious exploitation by a NATO document center or centers designated by the Standing Group.

7. The adequate exploitation of captured cryptologic material is highly technical in nature and requires specially trained and skilled personnel. Such specialists will probably not be available in sufficient numbers as to be assigned to NATO Document Centers. As will be seen from the following paragraphs, however, exploitation of certain tactical documents may be possible within SACEUR's command and, in due course, within SACLANT's command.

TOP SECRET

8. There has been established in SHAPE a structure to provide tactical radio intercept intelligence for SACEUR. (For convenience the phrase "tactical radio intercept" is rendered by the abbreviation "Y".) The responsibility for formulating and implementing SACEUR's "Y" policy lies with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, SHAPE.

9. The SACEUR "Y" structure is composed of the following elements:

a. A senior "Y" officer at SHAPE (SACEUR "Y" officer) assisted by a "Y" staff.

b. "Y" staffs, where required, at headquarters of major subordinate Force Commanders under SACEUR.

c. National armed forces "Y" units provided specifically for direct support of their own national forces operating under SACEUR.

10. Participation in the SACEUR "Y" structure, including "Y" staffs, is open to all nations contributing to SACEUR command, as a normal minimum, combat forces equivalent to a U.S. or British Corps, together with "Y" units adequate for their direct support, subject to acceptance of certain principles and security measures set forth in pertinent directives.

11. The functions of the SHAPE "Y" Staff under ACofS (I) include arranging for material of technical radio intelligence interest, including captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACEUR "Y" structure and to national COMINT authorities.

12. The intelligence produced by "Y" units is of a highly technical nature and necessitates, for purposes of coordination, direction, and liaison, the existence of specialist "Y" staffs, forming part of the Intelligence Staffs at appropriate command levels. Their functions include: "the passing to 'Y' units of material likely to be of assistance to them, such as intelligence obtained from prisoner of war interrogation, captured enemy documents and equipment." They also are competent to act as clearing centers for cryptologic documents which cannot properly be utilized by Field "Y" units. The foregoing information regarding the SACEUR "Y" structure is provided as background only and must not be mentioned in ad hoc committee discussions if nations other than those participating in the SACEUR "Y" program are represented. For your guidance in this matter, the following is a list of nations which are participating in SACEUR "Y" or which are officially aware of its existence and will participate in the near future:

- a. United Kingdom
- b. United States

TOP SECRET

- c. France
- d. The Netherlands
- e. Belgium

Canada, although not a participant, is cognizant of the SACEUR "Y" program through UK-US COMINT sources. However, some of the nations listed above are not aware of Canada's knowledge of "Y" and, accordingly, the subject should not be discussed if Canada is represented on the ad hoc committee.

13. From the foregoing it will be seen that it is highly desirable to separate captured cryptologic material from other captured material as quickly as possible, and to handle it in accordance with the following procedures:

- a. Enemy cryptologic material captured by NATO national forces of nations participating in the "Y" program should be placed directly in "Y" channels as soon as possible.
- b. Enemy cryptologic material captured by NATO national forces of nations not participating in the "Y" program will be passed to a NATO Document Center.
- c. Captured enemy cryptologic material which is received in a NATO Document Center from whatever source should be passed immediately to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, SHAPE (SHAPE "Y" Staff), for all subsequent handling.

14. Enemy cryptologic material captured by U.S. forces as a result of a special operation planned with the capture of such material as a primary (or secondary) objective will initially be handled on a U.S. EYES ONLY basis, in accordance with provisions of the order directing the operation. National rights cannot be waived prior to an examination of this material by cognizant U.S. intelligence representatives. Any attempt to place this category of cryptologic material within the purview of NATO directives must be vigorously opposed. However, in those instances where the specific planning of such an operation is done under NATO auspices, the captured material will be handled in accordance with paragraph 13, above, even though the capture has been effected solely by US forces.

15. These procedures have been coordinated with cognizant U.K. and Canadian cryptologic authorities and the U.K. and Canadian members of the Ad Hoc Committee will have received a similar brief.

RECOMMENDATION

16. It is recommended that the provisions of paragraph 13, above, be included in the procedures established within NATO for processing captured enemy documents in time of war.


USCIB: 21./17

9 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Approval of USCIB 21./14 dated 29 March 1954.

There having been no objection during the required interregnum, the policy set forth in paragraphs la. and lb. of the subject document stands approved by USCIB as of 7 April 1954.



RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 21./17

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

TENTATIVE

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 21./16 Item 5 of the Agenda for the Thirteenth Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 26 March 1954.

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material (USCIB 21./12).

The CHAIRMAN explained that the paper under consideration had been submitted by the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee as the action of his Committee on subject problem. The Chairman went on to explain that one Member had asked that final USCIB approval on USCIB 21./10 be held in abeyance pending consideration of the instant proposal with a view to including it in the draft directive approved with the above mentioned USCIB 21./10.

[redacted] suggested that the last clause of subparagraph 1a. of subject paper be amended to read "involves no undue risk to, and will be in the best interests of, the U.S. COMINT effort."


It was so agreed.

MR. KEAY suggested the insertion of the word "specifically" between "operation" and "for" in the first line of subparagraph 1a.

It was so agreed.



CAPTAIN AGNEW offered the opinion that perhaps we would have done better to use the word "cryptologic" instead of "cryptographic" in USCIB 21./12.



USCIB: 21./16

OGA

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

USCIB 21./16

DECISION: (26 March 1954) USCIBEC accepted the INTCOM recommendation submitted with USCIB 21./12 modified to read as set forth below and agreed that it should be issued as a policy statement of USCIB as follows:

OGA



"The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential for planning and conduct of these operations as required."

USCIB: 21./16

USCIB: 21./15

29 March 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material.


Reference: (a) USCIB 21./8 dated 9 February 1954.
(b) USCIB 21./9 dated 24 February 1954.
(c) USCIB 21./10 dated 8 March 1954.
(d) USCIB 21./12 dated 22 March 1954.

1. USCIBEC, at its Twelfth Meeting, agreed to recommend approval of the draft USCIB directive proposed in reference (a), as modified by reference (b). This decision was forwarded to USCIB members on 7-day approval as reference (c).

2. During the 7-day interregnum the Army Member of USCIB requested that approval be withheld pending consideration and approval of reference (d), on covert aspects of the problem for possible inclusion in the Board directive.

3. At the Thirteenth Meeting of USCIBEC, reference (d) was considered. The Committee agreed that the recommendations therein should be issued as a separate policy statement, and should not be included in the Board directive. The Army objection to reference (c) was thereupon withdrawn, resulting in USCIB approval of the USCIBEC decision contained therein.

4. Accordingly action is being taken to issue reference (a), as modified by reference (b), as USCIB Directive Number 13.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 21./15

~~TOP SECRET~~

X

USCIB: 21./14

P&D DIV FILE 801W

29 March 1954

TOP SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material.

Reference: USCIB 21./12 dated 22 March 1954.


1. USCIBEC considered the reference at its Thirteenth Meeting, 26 March 1954, and agreed to recommend that the proposal therein, amended to read as follows, be issued separately as a statement of USCIB policy:

"a. No operation specifically for covert procurement of foreign cryptographic and associated materials will be implemented without prior assurance from the Director, NSA, that acquisition of the specific categories of materials involves no undue risk to, and will be in the best interests of, the U.S. COMINT effort.

"b. The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential for planning and conduct of these operations as required."

2. The foregoing decision of USCIBEC is forwarded for USCIB consideration in accordance with paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive Number 1. If there is no objection by any member prior to 1500 on 7 April 1954, this decision will be considered approved.

} Approved
by
USCIB
7 Apr 54
21/17
agn


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 21./14

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

TENTATIVE

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 21./13 Item 3 Considered at the Twelfth Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 4 March 1954 (Item 5 of Agenda for Eleventh Meeting).

Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material. (USCIB 21./8, 21./9)

THE CHAIRMAN stated that a proposed USCIB directive on this subject had been circulated for vote sheet action (USCIB 21./8), and that all members had concurred with the exception of those representing Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, all of whom submitted identical changes which are contained in USCIB 21./9. He noted that the recommended changes involve, primarily, the insertion of the word "guidance" in place of "instructions" at several points in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the paper. He invited comments.

CAPTAIN AGNEW said that NSA, the originator of the draft directive is willing to accept the recommended change in wording as contained in USCIB 21./9.

There were no objections.

DECISION: (4 March 1954) USCIBEC agreed to recommend that the proposed directive contained as an enclosure with USCIB 21./8, as amended by USCIB 21./9, be approved.

USCIB: 21./13

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~

USCIB: 21./12

22 March 1954

TOP SECRET


MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material.

Reference: (a) USCIB 21./10, dtd 8 March 1954.
(b) USCIB 21./11, dtd 10 March 1954.

1. As indicated in reference (b), an Intelligence Committee report on the above subject was in preparation, and, at the request of the Army Member, decision on the proposal referred to in reference (a) was deferred until such report was issued.

2. The Intelligence Committee Report is enclosed. It has been placed on the agenda for the Thirteenth Meeting of USCIBEC and should be considered in light of, and with a view to possible inclusion in the over-all policy statement on capture of enemy cryptologic material.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

USCIB: 21./12

~~TOP SECRET~~

19 March 1954

~~TOP SECRET U. S. EYES ONLY~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY USCIB:

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Materials.

Reference: USCIB 21./6 dated 27 November 1953.

1. The USCIB Intelligence Committee studied the covert aspect of procurement of foreign cryptographic materials and in accordance with instructions contained in the above reference forwards the following policy proposal:

a. No operation for covert procurement of foreign cryptographic and associated materials will be implemented without prior assurance from the Director, NSA, that acquisition of the specific categories of material involved will be in the best interests of the U. S. COMINT effort.

b. The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential for planning and conduct of these operations as required.

2. INTCOM recommends USCIB approval of, and issuance of a statement concerning, the above policy.

(Signed)

H. C. SIMMONS
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chairman, INTCOM

Enclosure with USCIB 21./12 dtd 22 Mar 1954.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31

USCIB: 21./11

10 March 1954


~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material.

Reference: USCIB 21./10 dtd 8 March 1954.

1. The Department of the Army Member of USCIB has requested that action on the reference be deferred and that it be reconsidered by USCIBEC in the light of an anticipated Intelligence Committee report on the covert aspects of this subject.

2. Accordingly, USCIB 21./8 of 9 February 1954 as modified by USCIB 21./9 of 24 February will be again considered by USCIBEC at its next regular meeting with a view to determining what changes, if any, need be made in the light of the anticipated Intelligence Committee report on this subject.



RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 21./11

~~SECRET~~

USCIB: 21./10

8 March 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:


Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material.

Reference: (a) USCIB 21./8 of 9 February 1954.
(b) USCIB 21./9 of 24 February 1954.

1. Vote sheet action by the Executive Committee on reference (a) disclosed the divergence of opinion indicated in reference (b).

2. At its Twelfth Meeting on Thursday, 4 March 1954, USCIBEC again considered this matter and approved reference (a) as modified by reference (b).

3. In accordance with paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive Number 1, if there is no objection by any member prior to 1700, Wednesday, 17 March 1954, the action indicated in paragraph 2 above will be considered approved and the Executive Secretary will issue reference (a), as modified by reference (b), in the form of a USCIB Directive.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

USCIB: 21./10