

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-07-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

USCIB: 23/68

3 July 1953

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communications Security.

Pursuant to USCIB decision reached at the Eighty-sixth (Special) Meeting, 28 May 1953, (see USCIB 23/64) the enclosure was forwarded to the Special Committee of NSC to apprise its members, and The President, of "the present state of the communications security and 'leakage' problem and the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee Report".



H. D. JONES
Deputy Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure

1 copy of MEMO
OF INFO for NSC
dated 9 June 1953.

USCIB: 23/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 June 1953

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL FOR COMINT:

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communication Security

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h) (2)

1. During the spring and summer of 1948 as a result of [redacted]

[redacted] UK authorities proposed that steps be taken to improve the communications security of our allies. As a first step it was proposed that the French be informed [redacted]

[redacted] USCIB reported this matter to the NSC and it was decided by NSC action on 2 September 1948 that the proposed action should not be taken.

2. The matter was again raised by the British in the summer of 1950. USCIB again considered the problem and on 3 November 1950 concluded that any steps involving [redacted] or other actions to improve French communication security [redacted] must await a satisfactory improvement in over-all French security.

3. In December 1950, the London Signal Intelligence Board (LSIB) proposed a US/UK conference early in 1951 to prepare a Combined policy in this matter. USCIB agreed and the conference was held in May 1951. The report of this conference, in which UK authorities concurred, was approved by USCIB on 24 May 1951 and by the President on 11 January 1952, on the recommendation of a special committee of the NSC. This decision provided, in essence, as follows:

a. An effort should be made to improve the security of French diplomatic communications.

[redacted]

c. Specific prior US/UK agreement as to the nature and phasing of an approach to the French would be a requirement.

d. Over-all security conditions satisfactory to both the USCIB and the LSIB would be a prerequisite to taking action.

Enclosure with USCIB 23/68 dated 3 July 1953.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h) (2)

4. Since the above-mentioned conference, two specific proposals for an approach to the French have been received from UK authorities. In both instances USCIB has stated that the prerequisite security conditions did not yet exist and that, therefore, the U.S. could not yet agree to any steps [redacted]

5. In February of this year LSIB proposed another US/UK Conference to consider the tactics to be employed in a direct approach to the French and to consider in addition the entire problem of the security of the diplomatic and military communications of other NATO nations. Such a conference opened in Washington on 5 June.

6. While these events have been transpiring USCIB has continued to study the entire problem of allied communications security [redacted]

[redacted] A study [redacted] involving a six months' period indicates that [redacted] information about U.S. policies and plans which it is assumed is thereby available to the Russians. The extent of the damage to the U.S. caused by this leakage is difficult to determine. However, serious damage has occurred in the past and may occur again in the future.

7. The entire matter is being reviewed in collaboration with representatives of the LSIB and a report of facts, conclusions and recommendations in the premises will be presented to the Special Committee of the National Security Council as soon as possible after the termination of the conference.

8. USCIB has instructed its delegation to this conference to undertake jointly with the British to recommend means of improving the national cryptographic and communications practices of the NATO countries by a demonstration of proper techniques, explanation of sources of weakness and other means [redacted] at this time. Such demonstrations and explanations must be considerably detailed even to a point that might be expected to permit reasonable [redacted] Further, USCIB has instructed its delegation to achieve a Combined recommendation for machinery to continue examination of the traffic of NATO countries and for the analysis of their communications practices in order to supplement this survey, to judge the effect of the efforts to improve their security and to provide a basis for future action.

Allen W. Dulles
Chairman, United States
Communications Intelligence Board

Enclosure with USCIB 23/68 dated 3 July 1953.