



~~TOP SECRET~~ REF ID: A71767  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO  
**SERIAL 00058**

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTAIN CODE WORD-MATERIAL

OGA

**4 MAR 1952**

MEMORANDUM FOR

**SUBJECT: CONSIDO, History of**

1. In accordance with your request, there is enclosed herewith a brief history of the CONSIDO concept and of the various actions which followed its official presentation for consideration.

2. The history, as set forth in the enclosure, begins with a paper prepared in March 1949. That is because it deals with a concept of evaluation and dissemination to which the name CONSIDO was applied. However, the idea of a joint evaluation and dissemination center for military and naval COMINT antedates the CONSIDO concept. Therefore, a brief history of events prior to March 1949, dealing with this phase of COMINT integration will probably be of interest, and will be summarized in the next paragraph.

3. a. Beginning on 18 August 1945 and extending through the end of the year, correspondence was exchanged between the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, relative to the merging and integration of the COMINT activities of the two Services. Pertinent to that correspondence is a memorandum dated 22 August 1945 from the Chairman of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board to General Marshall and Admiral King, in which it is stated that the Board reached unanimous conclusion:

\* \* \*

"(h) That...after merger of Army and Navy Signal intelligence activities are effectuated all results be disseminated as joint Army-Navy product."

\* \* \*

b. In a memorandum dated 18 September 1945 to General Marshall, Admiral King set forth three basic principles inherent in his approval of the memorandum referred to under subparagraph a. above:

"(a) That there should be ... joint evaluation and dissemination of strategic, non-operational intelligence."

"(b) The Navy must maintain complete and independent control of the production, evaluation and dissemination of naval operational intelligence."

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

OGA

SERIAL 00058

Memorandum for [REDACTED]

Subject: CONSIDO, History of  
4 MAR 1952

"(c) The Navy's physical facilities for the production of communication intelligence cannot be consolidated into a single physical unit with Army Signal intelligence facilities."

c. In his reply, 25 September 1945, General Marshall accepted the first of these three principles but stated that the second and third "appear to me to remove the practical basis essential to achieve effective coordination."

d. It is unnecessary here to go further into the foregoing correspondence and the long discussions terminating in the creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency. That is a different story. But I wish to continue a bit in this memorandum with the rest of the Marshall-King correspondence having a bearing on the first of the three principles cited in subparagraph b. above, since that one certainly forms a part of the background history of the concept of a CONSIDO.

e. On 2 October 1945 Admiral King:

"noted that we agree that the control and dissemination of Navy and Army operational signal intelligence should be exercised by the service concerned. In addition, I believe the following principles have already been implemented or agreed upon:

\* \* \*

"(d) Strategic non-operational signal intelligence should be evaluated and disseminated as a joint product."

Admiral King went on to say:

"I feel that the Navy's complete and independent control of its production, evaluation, and dissemination of naval operational intelligence is essential to naval command."

f. On 10 October 1945 General Marshall replied:

"1. After reading your memorandum of 2 October .... I am convinced that a joint /COMINT/ evaluation center would be ineffective unless in the same center there were combined all other types of Army and Navy intelligence."

"2. It seems to me that the best solution for improving not only the effectiveness of /COMINT/ but to resolve the entire question of Army and Navy intelligence organization would be for us to combine in one location, under joint control, all Army and Navy intelligence effort, personnel and direction including all of the product of the /COMINT/...."

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

OGA

SERIAL 00058

4 MAR 1952

Memorandum for 

Subject: CONSIDO, History of

g. On 8 November 1945, in his reply to General Marshall, Adm. King stated:

"3. I concur in your proposal ... insofar as it is practicable to do so and still retain to each service control of those matters essential to the effective employment of its forces. For this reason it is necessary that the Navy retain those functions which relate to Naval operational intelligence required for the exercise of naval command. This includes cryptography, which for the Navy's purposes, must be integrated into the communications service rather than into the intelligence service.

"4. Subject to the above, I agree that intelligence should be a joint matter. I suggest that an ad hoc committee be appointed to work out a program on the above basis for our further consideration.

"5. I share your view that our program should be worked out in a manner to permit the armed services to cooperate fully with the State Department in the formation and operation of a central intelligence agency, should one be established."

h. On 8 December 1945 General Eisenhower, General Marshall's successor as Chief of Staff, wrote to Admiral King:

"1. It appears from your memorandum of 8 November that you agree that certain phases of Army and Navy intelligence should be a joint matter but that you feel it necessary for the Navy to impose certain limitations upon the functions of any joint intelligence agency. General Marshall's proposal was based upon the promise that there should be no such limitations, and that there should be complete integration of all intelligence activities, including cryptanalytic activities.

"2. As you know, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy recently appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the advisability of the formation of a central intelligence agency. Any action which this committee may take will naturally have a substantial effect upon the proposal for merging Army and Navy intelligence activities. It therefore seems appropriate to defer action upon the mutual problems of the two services until the result of the committee study has been announced."

i. On 28 December 1945 Admiral Nimitz, Admiral King's successor as Chief of Naval Operations, in reply to General Eisenhower, stated:

~~TOP SECRET~~

OGA

S E R I A L 00058

4 MAR 1952

Memorandum for



- Subject: CONSIDO, History of

"1. I regret that you feel it appropriate to defer further action upon mutual problems of the Army and Navy communication intelligence activities pending result of a study by the State-War-Navy Committee as to the advisability of the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency.

"2. You are correct that reference (b) imposes limitation upon joint effort in the field of communication intelligence, but only to the limited extent therein stated. It is essential for the Navy to retain under its control those communication intelligence functions paramountly related to naval operational requirements and the exercise of naval command. This is true regardless of the extent of joint effort by the two services and, likewise, regardless of the extent of control which may otherwise be exercised over the field of intelligence generally by any interdepartmental joint intelligence agency which may be created.

"3. It has been the consistent hope of the Chief of Naval Operations, as expressed in reference (b) and in former memoranda on this same subject, that joint discussions continue with due regard for the above mentioned limited restriction. I still feel that this should be done. Should you, however, as stated in reference (a) still wish to defer further action upon our mutual intelligence problems until the final result of the study by the State-War-Navy Committee, I reluctantly concur."

j. The entire problem was thereupon taken up again by the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board and then by a special board. For our purposes it is unnecessary to go into those discussions, and merely say that when AFSA was finally established, and with State, CIA, and FBI as members of USCIB, the concept of a central evaluation and dissemination unit for all COMINT was eliminated. It is doubtful that the unanimous conclusion of ANCIB, quoted in subparagraph a. above, was overlooked by mere inadvertence. Consequently, early in 1949 I took up the question with Col. Carter W. Clarke, then Chief, Army Security Agency.

4. a. One of the factors which motivated me in bringing up the question and which is briefly referred to in paragraph 3c of Section I of the enclosure, was my growing concern over the large number of copies of decrypts being produced to meet the stated requirements of the consumers. I felt that the situation would soon get out of hand and present serious risk of loss of copies, only one of which might jeopardize our most important sources. The situation has indeed become serious.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

OGA

SERIAL 00058

4 MAR 1952

Memorandum for 

Subject: CONSIDO, History of

b. The gravity of the security hazards coincident with the enormous number of copies of code-word material being produced and disseminated currently can be gauged by considering the following sample statistics:

	1951				1952
	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN
(1)	12,888	15,424	14,192	9,968	12,588
(2)	6,963	7,893	7,087	5,919	9,968
(3)	1,545,293	1,842,150	1,822,364	1,379,287	1,719,093

Line (1) No. of translations of plain-text intercepts.

Line (2) No. of translations of decrypted intercepts.

Line (3) Total No. of copies of translations of both categories.

(NOTE: The appreciable decrease from November to December was the result of the Christmas Holidays.)

c. The total number of copies produced is staggering - even greater than the figure I gave the Board at the meeting on 22 February 1952. Some of these copies consist of several sheets of paper, each bearing the code word designator.

5. a. In my opinion, these statistics alone should be a source of worry to all of us. An important reduction in the security risks might result from an arrangement whereby such wholesale reproduction and dissemination of COMINT products would not be necessary. A CONSIDO working within AFSA precincts, or a "Reports Group within AFSA" would certainly help in this respect, leaving out of consideration other advantages which might accrue in the way of producing better and more current pictures of the international scene, as reflected in COMINT.

b. In this connection I call your attention to the current dissemination policy and practice at GCHQ, not because I am convinced that what suits British needs should also suit our requirements but as a matter of information and possibly food for thought. Dissemination of individual COMINT decrypts and translations is on a very strict, extremely limited basis at GCHQ, and, moreover, it is largely determined and controlled by GCHQ itself. The guiding principle is the "need to know," with strict interpretation. For instance, an item relating to atomic energy would be disseminated only to their equivalent of our AEC. At the beginning of each year there are discussions between GCHQ and the consumer agencies, the latter indicating in broad terms their minimum requirements in this respect. From time to time thereafter, by liaison visits by GCHQ personnel to the consumer agencies, these requirements may be clarified or amended. Generally, only one or two copies of a decrypt ever leave GCHQ, the largest number never exceeding half a dozen. Occasionally, in the case of a particularly valuable report based upon decrypts or translations more copies may go out but never more than 8 or 10. It is

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SERIAL 00058

4 MAR 1952

OGA

Memorandum for [redacted] - Subject: CONSIDO, History of  
-----

to be noted that what has been said above applies only to what is done at GCHQ; many reports using COMINT and collateral are produced within the consumer agencies and disseminated by them but I do not know at the moment how many copies are made or disseminated. That is a responsibility of the consumers, not of GCHQ, but I daresay GCHQ has something to say on that score, too.

c. We learned recently that similar very stringent rules are followed by the [redacted]

d. I still believe in the CONSIDO idea but wish to make it clear that I do not think it should be performed by AFSA - only that, for security reasons, it would be best if it could be performed on or within AFSA premises, so that the original bits and pieces never need leave those premises. A unification of COMINT processing without some sort of unification of evaluation and dissemination appears illogical; in fact, it might have been more logical to begin with a unification of evaluation and dissemination along CONSIDO or similar lines, and then follow it with a unification of COMINT processing. In short, maybe we have here an example of a hysteron-proteron, and if you do not know what that is, look it up in Webster. We have an Anglo-Saxon equivalent but it does not sound as nice.

6. It is advisable that I invite your attention to the fact that this history of CONSIDO is not an official document, although it is based upon official sources and is accompanied by certain appendices which are official documents. I will also add that the comments contained in the preceding paragraphs of this covering memorandum represent my personal opinions. They do not necessarily reflect the views of any of my colleagues or superiors.

*William F. Friedman*  
WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN  
Consultant

ENCL-1

~~This document contains information  
History of CONSIDO  
affecting the national defense of  
the United States within the mean-  
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18,  
U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The  
transmission or the revelation of  
its contents in any manner to an  
unauthorized person is prohibited  
by law.~~

See also Public Law 513,  
81 Congress second session

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO

By: William F. Friedman

APPENDED DOCUMENTS  
CONTAIN CODE WORD- M.I.E.I.A.

~~This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~

~~See also Public Law 513,  
81 Congress second session~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

## BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<b>I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPT</b>	
1. Definition of term .....	1
2. First steps in formulation .....	1
3. Disadvantages of situation as it then existed .....	1
4. Advantages of proposed consolidation .....	1
5. Recommendations .....	2
6. Comments of USCIB Co-ordinator .....	2
7. Comments from Operations Division, ASA .....	3
8. Revised first draft .....	3
9. Comments of Col. Clarke .....	4
10. Collaboration with members of Special Research Branch, ID, Army .....	4
11. Details of memorandum as finally revised .....	4
12. Reaction of Director of Intelligence .....	6
13. Counterproposal of Col. Petersen .....	7
14. Decision of Director of Intelligence .....	7
15. Action of Secretary of Defense .....	8
16. Papers referred to Joint Intelligence Committee .....	8
17. First reply of JCS to Secretary of Defense .....	9
18. Reconsideration by JIC .....	10
19. "Reports Group" concept .....	10
20. Submission of modified report on CONSIDO .....	11
21. Comments by General McNarney .....	13
22. Revision not completed .....	14
<b>II. USCIB'S CONSIDERATION OF CONSIDO</b>	
1. Introduction to USCIB .....	14
2. Comments by CIA .....	15
3. Subsequent action by USCIB .....	17
4. Reports of USCIB Ad Hoc Committee .....	18
5. Further USCIB discussion .....	20
6. The demise of the CONSIDO proposal .....	21
7. The COMSIDO proposal .....	22
<b>III. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMSIDO</b>	
1. Definition of term .....	22
2. Origin of concept .....	22
3. Consideration by USCIB .....	23

(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO

TABLE OF CONTENTS  
(Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
4. British reply .....	23
5. Reaction to British view .....	24
6. Views of SACEUR .....	25
7. Reply of USCIB to SACEUR .....	25
8. Reaction of GCHQ .....	26
9. Mission to London .....	26
10. Opposition of JCS .....	29
11. USCIB Ad Hoc Committee appointed .....	29
12. SACEUR and GCHQ informed of decision .....	30
13. Informal arrangements established .....	30

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET

## BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO

LIST OF APPENDICES

- A. Memorandum, subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT, dated 17 May 1949.
- B. Memorandum to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, subject: Proposed Memorandum for Chairman, USCIB, subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT, dated 25 April 1949.
- C. Memorandum for General McNarney, subject: Establishment of a Single Communication Intelligence Evaluation and Dissemination Center.
- D. Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum For: \_\_\_\_\_, subject: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, NME.
- E. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT, dated 19 May 1949.
- F. Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum for: \_\_\_\_\_, subject: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, National Military Establishment.
- G. Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum for: \_\_\_\_\_, subject: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, Department of Defense.
- H. Remarks made by Col. Lovell at Forty-seventh Meeting of USCIB, held 2 December 1949, in explanation of chart accompanying the draft CONSIDO paper, with chart.
- I. Statement of Certain Methods for the Establishment of CONSIDO, dated 4 May 1950.
- J. Statement of Certain Methods for the Establishment of CONSIDO (The Second Report of the Ad Hoc Committee as revised by discussion at the Fifty-first (Special) Meeting of USCIB).

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

## BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO

## I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPT

1. Definition of term: CONSIDO is the abbreviated term for CONSolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, an organization which would be in effect a central office for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communications intelligence.

2. First steps in formulation: The first draft of the paper containing the concept, drafted by me at the request of Col. Carter W. Clarke, then Chief, Army Security Agency, was forwarded on 3 March 1949 to Col. Harold B. Hayes, then USCIB Co-ordinator. Col. Hayes was asked to comment on the advisability of bringing the subject to the attention of USCIB, the manner of its presentation, the adequacy of argument, etc.

3. Disadvantages of situation as it then existed: As was pointed out in this draft, the system of decentralized evaluation and dissemination had three grave disadvantages:

a. The intelligence coverage and the broad picture which might be painted from code-word sources was not and could not be painted;

b. There was serious duplication of effort and product among the Departments of the Army, the Navy, State and the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>;

c. From a security standpoint, the decentralized operations connected with evaluation and dissemination, and the large number of copies of code-word material in circulation presented very serious hazards to the protection of sources.

4. Advantages of proposed consolidation: Consolidation of the research facilities and personnel employed in the separate agencies concerned with the

## 1. There were at that time:

(1) At least three publications which contained the final product of the signal intelligence activities of the Government, prepared and issued by the Department of State; (The Diplomatic Summary, published on a daily basis); The Army (the Military Digest, prepared and issued on a weekly basis), and the Navy (the Soviet Intelligence Summary, prepared and issued on a weekly basis).

(2) At least seven types of special reports and studies containing code-word material which were prepared and issued on a non-periodic basis (Special Reports, Order of Battle Studies, and Communication Intelligence Briefs prepared by Special Research Branch, Intelligence Division, U.S. Army; Special Reports and CSAW Handbooks prepared by the U.S. Navy; Order of Battle Studies and Special Studies prepared by the Army Security Agency); and

(3) Periodic publications using code-word material as collateral sources of information prepared and issued by the Central Intelligence Agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Brief History of CONSIDO)

evaluation and publication of the COMINT product into a single, central organization for the evaluation and dissemination of the final code-word product would, it was believed:

- a. Bring about economies in facilities, space and personnel,
- b. Demonstrate the efficiency and economy of unification of operations within and among the responsible agencies,
- c. Give a better overall picture of the international situation;  
and
- d. Effect a more efficient control over the security of all operations, particularly through the limitations on dissemination of COMINT products which would naturally result.

5. Recommendations: As a result of these considerations, the draft memorandum prepared recommended that:

- a. A single unit be established under USCIB direction for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the fruits of COMINT activities of the Armed Forces.
- b. The foregoing central unit be located at the cryptanalytic center having the most effective collateral information center.
- c. A single COMINT Summary be published on a weekly basis, supplemented by more detailed monthly, and quarterly publications with cumulative indices.
- d. Such special code-word publications as were elaborated by the various cryptanalytic processing centers or intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, or the Central Intelligence Agency also be published and disseminated by the central unit.

6. Comments of USCIB Co-ordinator: The USCIB Co-ordinator, Col. Hayes, returned the draft on 7 March 1949. He stated that for the following reasons the proposal seemed to him inadvisable:

- a. Such a proposal would result in the complete isolation of code-word material, while continuing in each department the normal intelligence duties without benefit of code-word source material;
- b. A single, evaluating unit would probably be taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency;

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

c. A single evaluation agency would have difficulty in meeting military, air, naval, political, economic and other intelligence requirements.

d. No provision was made in the proposal for the dissemination of urgent spot items which was characterized as the "most effective use made" and principal value of code-word material;

e. Arguments advanced tended to support the closer integration of processing and evaluation rather than the integration of evaluation and dissemination.

7. Comments from Operations Division, ASA:

a. The Chief, Operations Division, ASA also commented on the draft memorandum, noting<sup>2</sup> that a single evaluation and publication unit, to be effective, presupposed a single processing unit, an organization not at that time established although it had been the subject of study by a special board<sup>3</sup>. The Chief, Operations Division noted further that the concept of integration of the processing, evaluation, and publication of COMINT had not yet been tested in practice within the framework of American signal intelligence organizations, and that the transition from the procedures then in practice to centralized evaluation and publication would require considerable time and adjustment among the consumer and processing agencies.

b. He therefore recommended that within the framework of the Army an integration of processing with evaluation and publication of COMINT be effected, an integration which would (1) prove the validity of the integration of the three phases, (2) be acceptable under either a unified or co-ordinated concept of processing, (3) be effected with a minimum of time and administrative adjustment, and (4) serve as a model to be followed, if at a later date it was desired to embrace all major processing, evaluation, and publication in a centralized activity.

8. Revised first draft: Following the comments by the USCIB Co-ordinator and the Chief, Operations Division, a second draft for the proposed consolidation was prepared by me, with two noteworthy changes. In the light of Col. Hayes' comment that the recommendation that the "central unit be located at the

---

2. Memorandum, subject: Central Evaluation, Publication, and Dissemination of SIGINT, dated 15 March 1949.

3. This Board, the so-called "Stone Board" had rendered its report but a decision on its recommendation had not been issued. The report entitled "Department of the Army Study of Joint Organization for the Production of Communication Intelligence" had been submitted 30 December 1948.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

cryptanalytic center having the most effective collateral information center" was an ill-disguised attempt to locate the unit at Arlington Hall Station, and that even if the idea were good, it would be opposed by other USCIB members, a more general recommendation was made that the central unit be located at "one of the existing U.S. cryptanalytic processing centers." In response to the comment of the USCIB Co-ordinator on the vital need for the dissemination of urgent "spot items," a recommendation was added to continue the policy of spot dissemination of important or urgent items, but with a more limited distribution.

9. Comments of Col. Clarke

a. When this draft was submitted to Col. Clarke, he criticized what, in his opinion, were two chief weaknesses of the paper. (1) that the center, although to be established under USCIB direction, was to confine itself to the fruits of COMINT of the Armed Forces - Col. Clarke suggested that CIA and State Department might be included, and (2) that the concept had been limited to the integration of the various COMINT publications, whereas they should be extended into the more elaborate problems of integration.

b. Col. Clarke concluded his criticism with the following paragraph:

"My general comment on the whole thing is that we should shoot for record in this paper, dealing in detail with the specific problems of the Services and the difficulty of separating lower and higher level intelligence. I also feel that we might well here take an indirect crack at the Stone Board report by pointing up those areas in which they avoided making responsible decisions."

10. Collaboration with members of Special Research Branch, ID, Army: To carry out Col. Clarke's suggestion that the draft be revised to include the more elaborate problems of integration, I asked the assistance of two members of the Special Research Branch (SRB) of the Intelligence Division, GSUSA, Miss Caroline Fox and Mr. John O'Gara. With their aid a memorandum revised along the lines indicated by Col. Clarke was drafted for submission by the latter to the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA. As the accompanying note to the Director of Intelligence pointed out, the memorandum proposed to do for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT what the proposed Joint Intelligence Bureau would do for other intelligence. A final step would be the real integration of COMINT processing, by unifying the operations of the processing agencies under a single head, along the lines proposed by the Army in the Stone Report or along similar lines.

11. Details of memorandum as finally revised: In the memorandum as finally revised the basic reason for the establishment of a central COMINT evaluating

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

(Brief History of CONSIDO)

unit was repeated, viz., the fact that under the decentralized organization of COMINT the Government was not provided with total intelligence derivable from COMINT source material. The point was made that radical changes must be made if USCIB was to fulfill its responsibilities. The revised memorandum continued, however, with more specific recommendations for remedying this situation than had been previously outlined, i.e.,

- (1) That a central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the USCIB technical agencies;
- (2) That this unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. Government personnel authorized to receive it.
- (3) That each USCIB member contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments and operationally subordinate to the Chief of the technical agency, and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.
- (4) That upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.

b. In the staff study accompanying the memorandum an analysis of the current situation was made and certain supporting arguments were marshalled. The United States, it was indicated, was then spending annually approximately thirty-five million dollars for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It had, in addition, an investment of roughly forty-eight million dollars in the Army and Navy facilities for the production of the raw material. For the evaluation and dissemination of this COMINT raw material, there existed five separate USCIB agencies, whose work was for the most part not co-ordinated and from which was produced no integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. The discussion which followed these facts showed in some detail how the arrangements then in effect of COMINT evaluation and dissemination were not efficient, not secure, not economical, and how they failed to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

c. This memorandum was signed by Col. Clarke on 20 April 1949 and forwarded to the Director of Intelligence. A copy is attached, Appendix A. For the sake of easy reference, it will hereafter be referred to as the "Clarke Memorandum."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)12. Reaction of Director of Intelligence:

a. The Clarke Memorandum was reviewed for the Director of Intelligence by Col. Arthur C. Petersen, then Chief of Special Research Branch. In his review Col. Petersen commented that, while it was obvious that the recommendations of the Clarke Memorandum would provide a means of achieving full exploitation of COMINT, nevertheless if the recommendations were submitted to USCIB, two alternative reactions could be expected:

- (1) The recommendations would be rejected, with Navy and Air Force opposed on the ground that such a proposal would preclude the operational control necessary to satisfy their intelligence requirements; or
- (2) The recommendations would be accepted in principle by USCIB. In this case, the ultimate recommendation which USCIB would forward to the National Security Council (NSC) might be:
  - (a) That a central evaluating and disseminating unit be established under the authority and direction of CIA;
  - (b) That, since a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was already in operation at the Communication Supplementary Activity, Washington (CSAW) this central unit would be located at CSAW.

b. It was implied that neither of these last recommendations was agreeable to the Army. The Chief, SRB then proceeded to enumerate the reasons why the recommendations of the Clarke Memorandum appeared objectionable to the Army and to the National Military Establishment (NME):

- (1) A single department within the NME would have operational control of all COMINT evaluation and dissemination at the Washington level, and ultimate control would be in the hands of a board which would include non-military members and would be responsible to the National Security Council.
- (2) Although the memorandum stated that personnel of the central evaluating and disseminating unit would be responsible for producing intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments, no provision was made for direction or control by these departments of the production and dissemination of such intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- (3) No provision was made in the memorandum for the intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor were the JCS given any means of controlling the production and dissemination of such intelligence.
- (4) If, as the memorandum assumed, two or more cryptanalytic processing agencies would continue to exist, the location of a central unit at one of the technical agencies would only partially satisfy the requirements for the maximum exploitation of COMINT.

c. Col. Petersen recommended, therefore, that the Director of Intelligence hold the study in abeyance until such time as the Armed Forces Security Agency, which was about to be established, could be set up.

13. Counterproposal of Col. Petersen.

a. In his review of the Clarke Memorandum, however, Col. Petersen noted that the reasons which led to the recommendations for a consolidated evaluation and disseminating center led also to the conclusion that a unified cryptanalytic processing center, i.e., an Armed Forces Security Agency, should be established. With the establishment of such an organization, a central COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit could be formed at that Agency, composed of personnel contributed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA. This personnel would have the dual responsibility of providing intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intelligence of primary interest to their respective services. Upon the establishment of such a unit, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency could be invited to contribute personnel to the unit, thus providing for the integration of intelligence in the fields of intelligence allocated to those organizations.

b. Col. Petersen suggested, therefore, that, if it was decided to submit a memorandum, it should be revised on the lines indicated above, he further suggested that this memorandum be submitted not to the Chairman, USCIB, but to the Army Chief of Staff, with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration with the "Stone Report"<sup>4</sup>, which considered the COMINT problem through the stage of cryptanalytic processing. A copy of the memorandum drawn by Col. Petersen is attached as Appendix B.

14. Decision of Director of Intelligence. According to the verbal statement of Col. Petersen<sup>5</sup>, Major General Bolling, then Director of Intelligence,

---

4. See Note 3 above.

5. 1951/1952

7  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

decided in conference with Col. Clarke and Col. Petersen to follow Col. Petersen's first recommendation and to do nothing about the Clarke Memorandum, pending further developments and particularly the establishment of AFSA.

15. Action of Secretary of Defense.

a. When Col. Clarke found this avenue of approach closed by the Director of Intelligence, he prepared a memorandum for General McNarney, Chairman Management Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, which called attention to (1) the proposed integration of all cryptologic activities of the Armed Forces and (2) the disadvantages of decentralized evaluation and dissemination of COMINT. A copy of this memorandum is attached as Appendix C.

b. Attached to the memorandum were (1) the staff study on the maximum exploitation of COMINT as submitted to General Bolling, (See Appendix A) and (2) a proposed Consolidation Directive establishing a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office within the National Military Establishment and providing for the voluntary participation of the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence. A copy of the Consolidation Directive is attached as Appendix D.

c. With the assistance of General McNarney, Col. Clarke was able to present his proposal to the then Secretary of Defense (Louis A. Johnson). On 19 May 1949, the Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that he was considering the establishment of a consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office as a "further step to increase the efficiency and economy of NME communications intelligence activities" and asking their comments and recommendations with respect to the staff study and directive by June 15, 1949. A copy of this memorandum is attached as Appendix E.

16. Papers referred to Joint Intelligence Committee:

a. The JCS referred the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Intelligence Committee for preparation of comments and recommendations, and the JIC, in turn, referred the memorandum to the Director of Intelligence for comments.

b. An Ad Hoc Committee was then appointed by the JIC to study the problem, and to prepare the required comments and recommendations. On 14 June 1949 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a report in which it was concluded.

"a. That the provisions of the proposed consolidation directive would decrease rather than increase the efficiency and economy of COMINT activities of the NME.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- "b. That the evaluation of COMINT should not be divorced from the evaluation of all other intelligence.
- "c. That the proposed directive failed to provide (1) for the expeditious use of COMINT in support of the command functions of the service departments, and (11) for the satisfaction of vital operational requirements of commanders in theaters of combat.
- "d. That the proposed consolidation directive was not in consonance with the provisions of the Charter of USCIB (NSCID No. 9)."

c. In view of these conclusions the Ad Hoc Committee reported that it had originally considered recommending that the JCS oppose adoption of the proposed directive and recommend to the Secretary of Defense that, if the organization of intelligence within the NME was to receive further consideration, such consideration should be given to NME intelligence as a whole and not be limited to one specific intelligence activity. The Ad Hoc Committee had also considered advising that any reorganization pertaining to COMINT be deferred until such time as the organization of the newly-created processing agency (AFSA) had been determined and was functioning satisfactory.

d. Since it was feared, however, that such direct rejection of the proposal, without a constructive alternate recommendation might result in the promulgation by the Secretary of Defense of the Consolidated Directive, a revised Consolidation Directive had been prepared which retained the advantages of the original directive and eliminated the more serious disadvantages. A copy of this revised directive is attached as Appendix F. This revision (1) allowed the services to retain the necessary control of certain aspects of COMINT, the loss of which, it was felt, would seriously hamper command responsibilities, and (2) provided for integration of COMINT with other intelligence from all sources. The revised directive did not, however, eliminate the provisions which affected the Department of State and the CIA since it was felt that this would necessitate referring the proposed directive to the NSC where the non-service members of USCIB would oppose the establishment of CONSIDO.

17. First reply of JCS to Secretary of Defense:

a. On 15 June 1949 the JCS sent the required comments and recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In their reply the JCS stated that they had considered the staff study on maximum exploitation of COMINT and the draft of the consolidated directive, and that they made the following comments:

- "a. The provisions of the draft consolidation directive would decrease rather than increase the efficiency and economy of

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

communication intelligence activities of the National Military Establishment. Considerable duplication of the work of other U.S. intelligence agencies would be necessary, if CONSIDO-WASHINGTON were to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it. In addition, the draft directive states that CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will disseminate intelligence direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but makes no provision for the integration of such intelligence with intelligence provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the intelligence staffs of the services.

"b. The draft directive would divorce evaluation of COMINT from evaluation of all other intelligence, a situation which would militate against accurate evaluation of both COMINT and non-COMINT intelligence. Since COMINT, as intelligence, is not essentially different from other types of intelligence, any organization which isolates its evaluation from that of other sources is unrealistic."

b. In view of what they regarded as serious disadvantages, the JCS recommended that the action contemplated, i.e., the promulgation of the consolidation Directive, not be taken. This memorandum was signed for the JCS by Admiral Louis Denfeld and was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

c. Following a conference, however, with General McNarney, the memorandum was withdrawn and the paper returned for reconsideration.

18. Reconsideration by JIC: Because of the complications which were obviously involved in this problem, a new date, 15 October 1949, was set by the Secretary of Defense for submission of an alternative proposal. The JIC Ad Hoc Committee immediately began its reconsideration, with further papers and studies being prepared by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which agencies had now come into the picture.

19. "Reports Group" concept:

a. At this point in the argument, there was devised within the Intelligence Division, Army, a plan for a "Reports Group" within AFSA, a group which would have the following functions and responsibilities:

- (1) Determination of COMINT priorities based upon the intelligence requirements of USCIB, the JCS, and the Services;
- (2) Co-ordination of COMINT priorities with cryptanalytic and intercept priorities;

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- (3) Selection of messages and traffic analysis items for publication, with appropriate comments;
- (4) Preparation of COMINT summaries, with comments and pertinent collateral information;
- (5) Liaison with Service and other U.S. COMINT groups;
- (6) Liaison with co-operating technical agencies;
- (7) Control of "plain-text" exploitation;
- (8) Publication of COMINT products.

b. It was pointed out that such a group could be established under the terms of the AFSA Charter (JCS 2010), without additional directives or authorization at JCS or NME level. It was believed that the establishment of such a group would eliminate many of the objections to the decentralized system which had been used in support of the adoption of the CONSIDO directive. It was pointed out that if the group could be organized and functioning before 15 October 1949 the JIC would have a strong case against the need for a further consolidation directive.

c. The outline of this plan was presented to the JIC by the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, and it was very nearly accepted by the committee, but its final adoption was prevented by objections from the Air Force members of the Ad Hoc Committee (Colonel J. R. Lovell), who wanted the priorities to be decided by USCIB.

20. Submission of modified report on CONSIDO:

a. On 7 October 1949 another and much modified report regarding CONSIDO was submitted informally by the Ad Hoc Committee to General McNarney for consideration as the JCS reply to the Secretary of Defense. In this report it was stated that the JCS agreed that-

- "a. A consolidation of the evaluation, collation, and dissemination stages of COMINT was practicable and desirable.
- "b. Although most of the specific provisions of the proposed directive of the Secretary of Defense were necessary and desirable, certain provisions thereof should be modified in order not to affect adversely the orderly development of intelligence for the Military Departments and the Department of Defense.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

"c. The proposed directive could be modified without vitiating the primary objectives of attaining greater efficiency, economy and security in the exploitation of COMINT."

b. To the report was attached a version of the proposed directive modified so as to "facilitate the orderly development of intelligence in the Department of Defense and result in greater efficiency, economy and security in the exploitation of COMINT." This modified Consolidation Directive is attached as Appendix G. Its main provisions were

- (1) Name. Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, designated "CONSIDO."
- (2) Establishment. Within the Department of Defense, under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (3) Location: At the main communications intelligence processing center of the Armed Forces Security Agency.
- (4) Purpose. To provide for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the product of AFSA and for the maintenance of liaison between AFSA and the Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (5) Composition: Such facilities and military and civilian personnel as the JCS might assign; the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the FBI were invited to participate.
- (6) Chief. The Chief, CONSIDO was to be appointed by the JCS for a period not exceeding three years, the assignment being rotated among the Military Departments. A full-time deputy was to be assigned from each of the Military Departments and from such other agencies or departments as were represented on CONSIDO.
- (7) Chain of Command: CONSIDO would operate under the direction and control of the JCS, direct supervision to be exercised by the JIC.
- (8) Control. Military and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO would be under the operational control of the Chief, CONSIDO. The administration of the personnel would be the responsibility of the department or agency from which they have been assigned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- (9) Responsibility: Subject to the direction and control of the JIC, the Chief, CONSIDO would execute policies, plans, and doctrines relating to the evaluation and collation of the product of AFSA and the dissemination of the product of CONSIDO.
- (10) The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force: Would (a) take action to facilitate the efficient and economic operation of CONSIDO by assigning military and civilian personnel to CONSIDO; (b) be responsible, within the Department of Defense, for interpretation of the CONSIDO product and for information from all other sources for the production of intelligence; (c) retain responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for dissemination of intelligence bearing the COMINT code word designator; (d) not undertake or continue any of the functions which were assigned by the directive to CONSIDO.
- (11) The Director, AFSA: Would make available to the Chief, CONSIDO such AFSA facilities, equipment, records and files as were determined by the JIC to be required for the performance of the functions of CONSIDO, and after the establishment of CONSIDO would not disseminate the product of AFSA to any U.S. agency other than CONSIDO, except as directed by the JCS. Nothing in the directive was to alter technical agreements ratified by the USCIB, and the provision of information for technical purposes to the Army Security Agency, The Navy Communications Supplementary Activities, and the Air Force Security Service.
- (12) Implementation: CONSIDO was to be placed in operation as soon as practicable.

21. Comments by General McNarney:

a. General McNarney was favorably disposed toward the draft JIC report and the accompanying CONSIDO directive, but in conference on 19 October 1949 with Major General S. Leroy Irwin, who had succeeded General Bolling as Director of Intelligence, General McNarney suggested that certain points required amendment or clarification. These were

(1) The control structure for CONSIDO appeared weak when considered in conjunction with the control structure for AFSA. Specifically, it seemed unwise to have JIC as the controlling body of CONSIDO and another group, AFCIAC as the controlling body of AFSA, when AFSA and CONSIDO were functionally so closely related. A single body, reporting to the JCS, would seem to be required to control both CONSIDO and AFSA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- (2) The directive should be more specific in spelling out the functions to be performed in CONSIDO and delimiting what remained to be done in the Military Departments. CONSIDO should be so chartered that it could provide integrated estimates based on all available COMINT and reflecting the joint view of all the intelligence agencies.
- (3) The directive should include an express prohibition against any Military Department's reconstituting any of its elements which were transferred to CONSIDO or reassuming any of the functions passed to CONSIDO.

b. In his conference with General Irwin, General McNarney stated that the directive should be co-ordinated with the Department of State, CIA, and the FBI, with a view toward making it acceptable to them while still retaining military control of the operation. He recommended that informal discussions with those agencies be conducted by JIC with a view to their participation in CONSIDO, and commented that he was sure that it had been made clear to them previously that the consolidation was a Department of Defense matter and would take place regardless of their opinions.

c. In closing, General McNarney stated that he felt that the proposed consolidation had tremendous possibilities for improving Department of Defense intelligence. He said that the revision incorporating his suggestions need not be referred to him informally again but could be transmitted directly to the JCS.

22. Revision not completed: Before the revision along the lines recommended by General McNarney could be carried out, however, the matter was brought before USCIB. The following portion of this history deals, therefore, with the consideration of the proposal by that Board.

## II. USCIB'S CONSIDERATION OF CONSIDO

### 1. Introduction to USCIB:

a. CONSIDO was introduced for consideration by USCIB at the Forty-Seventh Meeting of that Board, held 2 December 1949<sup>o</sup>. Presentation of the Draft CONSIDO Paper, as outlined in Paragraph 20 above<sup>7</sup> was made by Colonel Lovell, USAF, before the members of USCIB and two members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As visual aid, Col. Lovell used a chart to describe the

---

6. USCIB: 26/1

7. This draft CONSIDO paper was issued as USCIB: 26/2.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

functions of the proposed CONSIDO. This chart, with Col. Lovell's explanatory comments, is attached as Appendix H.

b. Following the presentation, it was agreed (1) that the proposed plan to establish CONSIDO would be studied by representatives of the Department of State, CIA, and FBI, with any assistance these agencies might wish from the JIC Ad Hoc Committee which had drawn the proposal, and (2) that the plan would then be discussed at length at a future meeting of the Board.

2. Comments by CIA:

a. On 12 January 1950 the Director of Central Intelligence forwarded to the USCIB members his comments on the proposed CONSIDO.<sup>8</sup> He pointed out that by the National Security Act of 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency had been made responsible to the National Security Council for (1) correlation and evaluation of communication intelligence activities; (2) provision for the appropriate dissemination of such information; and (3) protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The AFSA Charter and the CONSIDO proposal (as drafted) were, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, in derogation of each of these responsibilities since they:

- (1) Do not contemplate advice or recommendation by the Director of Central Intelligence to the NSC;
- (2) Place evaluation and correlation of the AFSA product and dissemination of the product under the control of the JIC;
- (3) Put source and method security responsibility entirely in the Department of Defense;
- (4) Place requirements and priorities under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence also stated that the AFSA Charter and the proposed CONSIDO (as drafted) were derogations of the responsibilities, authority, and functions of USCIB as established by NSCID No. 9.

c. He therefore recommended that USCIB consider at its next meeting, and adopt positive action to:

- "a. Inform the Secretary of Defense of the conflicts with its responsibilities and functions contained in the CONSIDO

---

8. USCIB: 26/3.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET(Brief History of CONSIDO)

proposal and AFSA directive, and make specific recommendations for modifications necessary for the resolution thereof.

- "b. Request that the Secretary of Defense recognize the individual responsibilities of the non-military member agencies of USCIB and assure that no internal changes or Department of Defense reorganization of COMINT activities will result in interruption of currently established rights of access, methods of collaboration, or dissemination of material or information between those members and the military agencies, or the orderly development thereof.
- "c. Inform the Secretary of Defense that USCIB, in exercise of its responsibilities both for the authoritative coordination of COMINT activities of the Government and for the further purpose of advising the Director of Central Intelligence in matters for which he is responsible, proposes to:
- "(1) Take immediate action toward the formulation of policies and directives necessary to improve the authoritative coordination of COMINT activities in the light of new developments and experience.
  - "(2) Assist the Director of Central Intelligence in his proposed survey conducted to determine any necessity for advising the National Security Council on coordination of communications intelligence matters which his statutory responsibilities require.
- "d. Include in consideration of over-all exploitation problems the existing CIA facility and approve the interim informal proposals of the Director of Central Intelligence described in paragraph (7) of this paper."

d. A copy of the proposed CONSIDO directive, modified along lines more agreeable to the Director of Central Intelligence, was appended. It was stated that this revision was offered not as a proposal with any intent of recommending its adoption by the Secretary of Defense but merely to indicate some of the objectionable features and omissions of the original draft directive.

e. Main changes proposed in the revision were:

- (1) Change of name from CONSIDO to AFSIDO (Armed Forces Special Information Dissemination Office);

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- (2) Limitation of authority within and for the Department of Defense;
- (3) Deletion from the functions of liaison between AFSA and the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (4) Emphasis upon the functioning of AFSIDO in accordance with USCIB policies and directives.

3. Subsequent action by USCIB:

a. At the Forty-eighth Meeting of USCIB, held 13 January 1950, the draft CONSIDO paper was again discussed.<sup>9</sup> Although there was general agreement among the members that there was a definite need for CONSIDO, both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State made it clear that they objected to the form in which the proposal had been drafted because it made the Department of Defense alone responsible for running CONSIDO. Admiral Hillenkoetter, representing CIA, suggested that the CIA could support a CONSIDO proposal in which the Department of State and the CIA would be responsible jointly with the Department of Defense.

b. This view was supported by a statement read by Mr. Armstrong, Department of State, in which appeared the following views:

"It is a matter of record that the Department has consistently felt that there are basic and fundamental reasons which require it to oppose the exclusive control of the dissemination and evaluation of COMINT materials by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other exclusively military body..... The Department is still of the opinion that USCIB is the best framework within which the military and civilian COMINT interests and functions can be developed."

\* \* \*

"This plan...contain(s) numerous desirable and praiseworthy provisions which should contribute materially toward attaining the common objectives of all members of the Board. However, the Department notes that it also includes a number of provisions which by language, if not by intent, extend definitely into the operating and administrative structures of the civilian agencies on USCIB and which contravene and would, if adopted, vitiate principles and

---

9. USCIB: 26/4.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET(Brief History of CONSIDO)

provisions of the charter (NSCID No. 9) which the Department believes to be vital."

c. In general the Department of State believed that the CONSIDO described in the directive contained a number of elements which appeared to lie outside the authority of the National Military Establishment. It, therefore, recommended that the CONSIDO directive be rewritten so that its terms were applicable to the armed services only, with provision for adequate liaison under the authority of USCIB between AFSA and CONSIDO on the one hand and the civilian agencies on the other.

d. General Irwin, representing the Army, explained that General McNarney's directive required that CONSIDO be restricted to an NME organization and that that was the reason it had the appearance of a military creation. If the co-operation of State and CIA could be obtained, he felt that the ultimate in efficiency and security would have been achieved.

e. It was generally agreed that there was sufficient merit in the proposal to warrant USCIB committee action, and, therefore, an Ad Hoc Committee was named (1) to study the CONSIDO proposal in the light of the comments by CIA and the Department of State and (2) to draft a new proposal for presentation to USCIB.

f. The following representatives were, therefore, appointed as members of the Ad Hoc Committee:

State	- Mr. T. A. Polyzoides, Chairman	OGA
CIA	- <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 1em;"></span>	
Army	- Colonel P. K. Porch, USA (Alternate Col. B. Brown)	
Navy	- Captain J. M. Ocker, USN	
Air Force	- Colonel J. R. Lovell, USAF (Alternate Lt. Col. H. H. Towler)	
AFSA	- Captain J. N. Wenger, USN	

g. Progress reports by the Ad Hoc Committee and the date for the final report were left to the discretion of the Chairman.

4. Reports of USCIB Ad Hoc Committee:

a. The USCIB Ad Hoc Committee, meeting for the first time on 16 January 1950, addressed itself to the following problems:<sup>10</sup>

- 
10. Memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB, subject Report of USCIB Ad Hoc Committee for Consideration of CONSIDO, dated 14 March 1950.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- "a. Whether the principle of integration of certain COMINT intelligence activities is feasible on a six-agency basis, and
- "b. If feasible, what type of integrated organization can be established on a basis satisfactory to all member agencies of USCIB."

b. As a first step it was agreed that the civilian agencies should attempt to draft a plan which would meet their requirements and which would be acceptable to the needs of the military agencies.

c. After four meetings held among the non-military agencies, the Ad Hoc Committee reconvened on 13 February 1950 to consider a proposed directive prepared by the Department of State member and accepted by the other non-military members as a basis for further discussions. At the next meeting, however, on 20 February 1950, separate draft directives were submitted by the Air Force member and by the CIA member. The Committee reviewed these drafts and it was decided that the Air Force version, which attempted to compose the differences between the NME draft directive and the State Department draft directive, would form the basis for future discussions.

d. On 2 March 1950, when the Committee met to consider the final draft, the Department of State, CIA, FBI, Air Force and AFSA agreed that, although the latest draft was not acceptable in every particular, it should be edited further and be sent to USCIB for consideration. This was opposed, however, by the Army and the Navy members, who submitted jointly (1) a written statement that the DONSIDO organization proposed in the draft USCIB directive did not meet the requirements of the Defense Establishment, and (2) a revised directive for the establishment of CONSIDO within the Department of Defense under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. It soon became apparent that the cleavage on fundamental principles precluded further effort on the part of the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare an agreed CONSIDO proposal. The report therefore submitted by the Committee stated:

"The Committee..... is unanimous in agreeing that the principle of integration in certain COMINT intelligence activities is feasible on a six-agency basis. The Committee stands divided five to two, as to the type of integrated organization which can be established on a basis satisfactory to all member agencies of USCIB."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)5. Further USCIB discussion:

a. The Forty-ninth Meeting of USCIB received the report of the Ad Hoc Committee in the form of two draft directives for the establishment of CONSIDO. One draft directive would establish a CONSIDO under the control of USCIB, agreed upon by five member organizations (State, CIA, FBI, AFSA and the Air Force) and the other under the control of the military agreed upon by the Army and Navy. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee further pointed out that the vote of 5 to 2 pertained to the consideration of the principle that CONSIDO should be established under USCIB control and did not necessarily mean that there was complete agreement on the details of such a CONSIDO on the part of the five who favored USCIB control. It was agreed to postpone any action on the establishment of a CONSIDO, allowing the Army and the Navy members time to effect internal reconciliation and to explore new avenues of approach.

b. At the next (50th) meeting of USCIB (14 April 1950) the item of CONSIDO was suspended from the agenda, pending informal discussion by the members. It was agreed that the members would meet in Executive Session at the conclusion of the meeting to discuss the CONSIDO problem.

c. At the close of the Executive Session, the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee for Consideration of CONSIDO was reconvened and addressed by Major General Irwin on behalf of the Board. The Committee was directed to resume its work toward formulating a set of basic principles for the creation of CONSIDO. The principles enumerated by General Irwin were:

1. Consider USCIB handling all priorities.
2. Command by:
  - a. USCIB through special intelligence committee including the Intelligence Directors concerned;
  - or
  - b. Joint Chiefs of Staff, through JIC augmented by CIA, FBI and State.
3. CONSIDO must be an organization --- not an ad hoc unit.
4. CONSIDO to disseminate AFSA product.
5. Consider some special operations by certain agencies, i.e., ad hoc additional members for special projects.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

6. Adequate provision must be made for reasonable stability of personnel to permit continuity in functional operation.
7. Chief of CONSIDO to be Military."<sup>11</sup>

d. The Committee was instructed further to provide elucidation of the various methods, within the framework of these principles, whereby CONSIDO could be established.

e. In accordance with these instructions, the Ad Hoc Committee presented a second report (attached as Appendix I) which was in the form of an exposition rather than a directive, and which contained alternate proposals on controversial points.<sup>12</sup> This report was presented at the Fifty-first (Special) Meeting of USCIB on 5 May 1950, and was discussed by the members paragraph by paragraph. The report of the Committee, as revised in the discussion at the meeting, is attached as Appendix J. Changes are indicated by underlining.<sup>13</sup>

6. The demise of the CONSIDO proposal:

a. In the final discussion of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Department of State member reserved his decision in regard to the command control of CONSIDO, and the Navy member reserved his decision on the question of the control of personnel and the deputy.

b. After prolonged discussion, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed unanimously that the problems of form and control of CONSIDO affected all aspects of CONSIDO to such a degree that it was not feasible to draft other portions of a directive until agreement could be reached on these two fundamental problems.

c. At the Fifty-second Meeting of USCIB, held on 9 June 1950, General Irwin recommended that the item of CONSIDO be stricken from the agenda for that meeting since the Military Members required additional time for study. At the Fifty-third Meeting, held on 14 July 1950, the item was removed from the agenda, subject to possible restoration at a future date.<sup>14</sup>

---

11. USCIB: 26/9, Enclosure A.

12. USCIB: 26/9, Enclosure B.

13. Unnumbered USCIB document.

14. References to the discussions of CONSIDO at the 49th through 53rd meetings of USCIB are: 49th Meeting: USCIB: 26/7; 50th Meeting: USCIB: 26/8; 51st Meeting: USCIB: 26/10; 52nd Meeting: USCIB: 26/12; 53rd Meeting: USCIB: 26/13.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

d. To the date of this writing the subject has not been restored on the agenda and it is fair to say that during the period May to July 1950 the CONSIDO concept suffered a decline which caused it to pass from an imminent operational to a purely historical status.

e. The CONSIDO story as related above tells of events in a gestation which lasted about 16 months but which did not terminate in an accouchement, even one that produced only a stillbirth. It is difficult to believe that the imminence of the birth after so many and such lengthy labor pains was simply overlooked by high authority. In certain quarters apparently, so abhorrent is the whole concept that even after the passage of two years the mere mention of the word CONSIDO causes spots before the eyes and tremors of the body.

7. The COMSIDO proposal: The CONSIDO concept is somewhat related to another proposal which was made almost a year after the death of CONSIDO and which also dealt with certain aspects of dissemination of COMINT. Therefore, this history will continue with an account of COMSIDO.

## III. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMSIDO

1. Definition of term: COMSIDO is the abbreviated term for COMBined Special Intelligence Dissemination Office, an organization which, had it been established, was to have provided an integrated dissemination service of U.S. and U.K. - produced COMINT to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). To avoid confusion with CONSIDO, and possibly for the reason alluded to in paragraph 6e above, the term SIDO was by common consent substituted for COMSIDO.<sup>15</sup>

2. Origin of concept:

a. The idea of a combined special intelligence dissemination office at SHAPE had its origin in a request received on 12 March 1951 by the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, from General Eisenhower (SACEUR) that Major General Sir Terrence Airey, British Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, SHAPE, be authorized to receive COMINT in that capacity. After an informal exchange of views between U.S. G-2 and GCHQ representatives, it was proposed that as an interim measure the U.S. Army Special Security Officer (SSO), Paris would serve all authorized U.S. and British COMINT recipients in SHAPE.

b. When the Coordinator, USCIB, was advised by the Director of Intelligence of this request, he recommended that until agreed conditions of dissemination and security regulations have been drawn up and approved by both USCIB and LSIB, dissemination of U.S. COMINT should be confined to U.S.

---

15. See USCIB: 13/193.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

personnel and that the British be asked to serve British personnel. In view of the fact that there was a complete exchange between GCHQ and AFSA, the Co-ordinator thought this arrangement should result in no loss of intelligence either to the British Intelligence Head or to General Eisenhower. The matter was referred to USCIB for information and consideration.

3. Consideration by USCIB:

a. At the Sixty-second Meeting of USCIB, held on 13 April 1951, the subject was raised by Major General Bolling, and the relation of General Airey's clearance to the larger question of security regulations for Global COMINT Collaboration was discussed.<sup>16</sup>

b. Admiral Stone presented informal views of the British on this subject, received the day before, which were to the effect that until a policy on dissemination of intelligence generally had been prepared no COMINT in any form, raw or digested, would be disseminated to SHAPE. But given (1) a decision on this matter, and (2) U.S.-British agreement that there should be a service of COMINT to SHAPE, the British view was that "the flows of COMINT and SIGINT in all forms should if possible meet in one security and distribution office and there be co-ordinated by COMINT and SIGINT specialists into a single flow to SHAPE."

c. The USCIB decision at this meeting was that the USCIB Co-ordinator should advise the Director, GCHQ, of the Board's opinion that, as an interim arrangement, General Airey be serviced with COMINT by a British representative, and that the Director, GCHQ should be informed that this was a matter deserving prompt attention. This was done by letter dated 14 April 1949.<sup>17</sup> On 16 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of the USCIB decision.

4. British reply:

a. The British reply,<sup>18</sup> dated 10 May 1949, repeated its request that as an immediate and interim measure, the U.S. Army SSO in Paris should undertake to supply to General Airey such COMINT as USCIB would consider necessary to enable him to play his full part as Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) to General Eisenhower. As permanent arrangements for the supply of COMINT to authorized U.S./British officers in SHAPE, it was proposed that:

---

16. USCIB: 13/170.

17. USCIB: 13/166.

18. USCIB: 13/176.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

- "a. Authorized U.S. and British officers in SHAPE should be served with COMINT by a combined U.S./U.K. office;
- "b. The British element in this office should consist of an officer and any necessary small supporting staff;
- "c. While COMINT sent to this office should, in principle, be for common U.S./U.K. use, it should reach the office through channels providing "U.S. EYES ONLY" and "U.K. EYES ONLY" facilities so that, where necessary, matters of purely national concern could be communicated;
- "d. In principle, U.S. and U.K. authorities should inform each other what COMINT each has sent to SHAPE and the means to achieve this should be explored."

5. Reaction to British view:

a. The British proposal was read and discussed at the Sixty-third Meeting of the Board, held 11 May 1949.<sup>19</sup> The USCIB Co-ordinator recommended that the British proposal be referred to the USCIB Intelligence Committee for study and recommendation, but this recommendation was opposed by Major General Cabell, USAF, who expressed the opinion that the nature of the traffic concerned did not lend itself to a joint office, and suggested that the Board take cognizance of this fact and agree that separate offices be established. General Cabell's view was supported by Lt. General W. B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of USCIB, on the grounds that General Eisenhower probably would not tolerate a situation like that proposed by the British, principally because the existence of an Anglo-American joint center would place him (Gen. Eisenhower) in a bad position vis-à-vis the French, the Dutch and other nations represented in SHAPE Headquarters. This opinion met with agreement among most of the members of the Board, but Major General Ralph J. Canine, representing the Army, for Major General Bolling, informed the members that Lt. Colonel Russel B. Holton, one of his officers, had just returned from Paris and that he thought that Col. Holton might have some information on the attitude of General Gruenther, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, toward the proposed joint COMINT office in SHAPE. When brought before the Board, Col. Holton informed that body that Brig. General (then Colonel) Schow of SHAPE had been thoroughly briefed on the U.K. proposal and had stated that he thought it would be satisfactory. He presumed that General Schow had cleared the matter with General Gruenther.

---

19. USCIB: 13/178.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

b. At the proposal of General Smith, it was agreed that before a reply was made to the British on the subject proposal, the USCIB Co-ordinator should prepare a message to General Gruenther to obtain his views. It was further agreed that this message would point up possible difficulties in the operation of a Joint U.S./U.K. COMINT office in SHAPE, yet advise General Gruenther of USCIB's willingness to approve the proposal if it was deemed desirable.

6. Views of SACEUR: In reply to the message sent, as instructed, by the USCIB Co-ordinator to the SACEUR, a message was received by Major General Bolling for USCIB from the SACEUR, dated 18 May 1951. In this message, SACEUR pointed out that the time had come "to decide precisely how COMINT is to be handled as between British and Americans at SHAPE."<sup>20</sup> SACEUR reviewed the difficulties inherent in a joint Anglo-American unit in SHAPE and stated that COMINT should be handled at SHAPE by a U.S. terminal as at present. At the same time SACEUR emphasized that it was essential that intelligence material reaching G-2 at SHAPE should arrive as an integrated Anglo-American Service. It was therefore recommended that intelligence material arriving at SHAPE first be integrated on an Anglo-American basis in London or Washington, preferably the former for ease of reference and fullest exploitation of European sources. In cases where there was divergence of opinion in interpretation of material, this should simply be stated. It was noted in the message that General Airey was putting the proposal to the British authorities and felt confident they would agree. SACEUR stated that he hoped arrangements could be made to implement this policy without delay.

7. Reply of USCIB to SACEUR:

a. Following consideration of this message at the Sixty-fourth (Special) Meeting of USCIB, held on 24 May 1951,<sup>21</sup> USCIB agreed to accept the proposal that COMINT be supplied to SHAPE from an integrated Anglo-American Service located in London. It was further agreed that the Deputy USCIB Co-ordinator, RADM (then Capt.) J. N. Wenger, and Lt. Colonel Holton (AC of S, G-2) would proceed to London and Paris to work out necessary details with GCHQ and SHAPE representatives. Dispatches were to be sent to SHAPE and GCHQ on these arrangements.

b. The reply sent by General Bolling to General Gruenther<sup>23</sup> expressed USCIB's concurrence in the proposal on handling COMINT and in SACEUR's preference of London as the point of integration. Consideration was expressed for the risk involved in the U.S. serving British in SHAPE while denying material to other nationals, but it was stated that USCIB believed this danger could be minimized by proper communications and handling procedures. As was desired by USCIB<sup>22</sup> it was expressly stated that USCIB did not visualize that

20. USCIB: 13/177.

~~TOP SECRET~~

21. USCIB: 13/186.

23. USCIB: 13/186. This view had not been included in the original draft of the message to SACEUR (USCIB: 13/182).

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(Brief History of COMSIDO)

the combined London office would be an intelligence division for SHAPE but rather a "specialized message center in continuous operation to integrate and pass on to SHAPE evaluated and other U.S. and British COMINT received from U.S. and British sources." The concurrence or comment of SACEUR was requested.

8. Reaction of GCHQ:

a. The reaction of GCHQ to General Eisenhower's proposal was very favorable. On 22 May [redacted] of the British Liaison Office in Washington relayed a message from the Director, GCHQ, as follows:<sup>24</sup>

"Have not yet had time to submit to LSIB this proposal by Eisenhower for supply of SIGINT to be integrated in either London or Washington and supplied to S.H.A.P.E. through an American office in Paris. I think, however, and will recommend to the Board and am confident of their acceptance, that this proposal should be agreed to, and that the Board's original proposal for a joint office in Paris should be withdrawn, now that S.H.A.P.E. have said it would be unsuitable.

"Think that London is obvious choice for Location. We would warmly welcome and would give every facility to the U.S. element in an integrated Anglo-U.S. party in London."

b. On 1 June 1951 the USCIB Co-ordinator was informed by the Senior British Liaison Officer in Washington that LSIB had approved in principle SHAPE's proposals as contained in General Eisenhower's cable and had authorized the Director, GCHQ, to negotiate agreement with USCIB.

9. Mission to London:

a. As had been agreed upon by USCIB, representatives were sent by USCIB to GCHQ to work out necessary details with SHAPE and British representatives. These representatives, RADM Wenger, Lt. Colonel Holton, and Mr. John O'Gara, met with British representatives in London and there drew up Terms of Reference for the Combined Special Intelligence Dissemination Office, designated (COMSIDO). As has been indicated above,<sup>25</sup> this office was later referred to as Special Intelligence Dissemination Office or SIDO.

---

24. USCIB: 13/181.

25. Paragraph 1.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

b. Upon the return of the representatives, the Terms of Reference were presented to USCIB at the Sixth-fifth Meeting of that Board, held on 22 June 1951. These were as follows:<sup>26</sup>

"Terms of Reference for Combined Special Intelligence Dissemination Office. Preamble. There is hereby established under the authority of USCIB and LSIB a Combined Special Intelligence Dissemination Office. Designated and hereafter referred to as SIDO, operating under the administrative control of the A.C. of S., G-2, GSUSA, acting as Executive Agent on behalf of USCIB and LSIB. The SIDO shall be located at London and shall have the purpose, composition, and functions hereinafter described.

1. Purpose. SIDO is established in order to provide an integrated service of U.S. and U.K.-produced COMINT to SHAPE.

2. Composition.

A. SIDO shall consist of such facilities and personnel as are required to provide integrated COMINT service to SHAPE.

B. A U.S. officer will be the administrative head of SIDO.

3. Functions.

A. SIDO's primary mission will be to integrate the flow to SHAPE of COMINT from the respective U.S. and U.K. Executive Agents.

B. SIDO shall not function as an agency for the exchange of COMINT between U.S. and U.K. agencies.

C. Personnel detailed to SIDO will be under the operational control of their respective executive agents, I.E., A.C. of S., G-2, or GCHQ. U.S. personnel will contact British COMINT agencies only through the SUSLO.

4. Methods of Operation. To achieve integrated flow of COMINT to SHAPE, COMSIDO will perform the following general functions:

A. Eliminate duplication of identical items.

B. Elimination of discrepancies of fact and, as far as possible discrepancies in interpretation of T/A in terms of order of battle, move of units, etc., with indication of origin, at least where differences remain.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of COMSIDO)

C. COMSIDO shall not attempt in any way to reconcile differences in the evaluation (including comments) between British and U.S. COMINT. Where such differences exist, coordination shall be limited to insuring that SHAPE is advised of such differences, or that each version is clearly identified as to source. Possible means of accomplishing this advice are:

(1) When both versions are available to COMSIDO at the same time, they may be forwarded in the same transmission.

(2) When one version has previously been transmitted to SHAPE, the conflicting version should be cross referenced by COMSIDO.

5. Communications. COMSIDO will employ the special channels for COMINT dissemination operated by the AC of S, G2, GSUSA.

6. Implementation.

A. This directive shall be made effective upon agreement between USCIB and LSIB and COMSIDO shall be placed in operation as soon thereafter as practicable.

B. After COMSIDO is in operation, all U.S. or U.K.-produced COMINT other than U.S. or U.K. EYES ONLY will be disseminated to SHAPE through COMSIDO, London. In addition, all such COMINT which is supplied to SHAPE from sources within the SHAPE command area will also be supplied to COMSIDO.

C. The provisions of these terms of reference shall not be construed as contravening any provisions of the U.S.-British COMINT agreement.

D. The pattern of COMSIDO shall not necessarily be taken as a precedent for the dissemination of COMINT to commands in changed conditions, for example in war."

c. In addition to the terms of reference it was agreed that the integrated unit would be located at Grosvenor Square. The British strongly favored locating the office at GCHQ, but in order to avoid becoming involved in combined evaluation of COMINT for SHAPE the U.S. authorities considered it advisable to maintain the office at Grosvenor Square (London) under U.S. jurisdiction, and this location was agreed to by the British. Admiral Johnson, USN was authorized by USCIB to cable CINCELM in an effort to expedite the latter's furnishing space in the Grosvenor Square area for this office. The office would operate under authority of USCIB and LSIB and administrative control would be exercised by the U.S. Army, G-2, in accordance with its interim responsibility as Executive Agent of SHAPE. Each side would exercise operational control of his own personnel attached to the office.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 28

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

d. All members of the Board agreed to the terms of reference as read, with the exception of General Ackerman, USAF who stated that while he could perceive no serious objections thereto, he would like to defer the Air Force's decision until after General Cabell's return to Washington. On Sunday, 24 June 1951, General Ackerman informed the USCIB Secretary of the Air Force's concurrence. On Monday, 25 June, however, the Navy and Air Force members withdrew their approval pending consideration of the problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. Opposition of JCS:

a. At the Sixth-sixth Meeting of USCIB, held 13 July 1951, discussion of the terms of reference for SIDO was reintroduced.<sup>27</sup> General Bolling stated that in view of recent developments he would prefer to withdraw his original recommendation concerning the establishment of the office to serve SHAPE. Admiral Johnson, representing the Navy, stated that his proposed message requesting space for the SIDO office in Grosvenor Square had been the subject of very strenuous objection on the part of his Chief, and that subsequent consideration of the project by the Operational Deputies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lt. General C. L. Bolte, Vice Admiral D. B. Duncan, and Major General T. D. White) had elicited similar objections, it being believed impossible to conceal such a bilateral arrangement from other signatories of NATO.

b. Faced with this disapproval on the part of the JCS, the Board recalled with some embarrassment that it had already informed SHAPE and GCHQ that USCIB agreed in principle with SIDO and would now have to inform these Headquarters of its inability to implement the plan. It was apparent, however, that the JCS would not recognize such a bilateral agreement.

c. An alternative proposal was made by General Cabell, under which the Air Force Commander in Europe would give SHAPE a combined opinion on air problems, the Ground Force Commander on ground problems, etc., but it was pointed out by the Chairman, General Smith, that General Eisenhower was operating at a level at which the non-military side was at least as important as the military side, if not more so, particularly since the command was not engaged actively in war. General Cabell's plan would therefore result in five or six channels going into SHAPE simultaneously.

11. USCIB Ad Hoc Committee appointed: After some discussion, it was agreed that the matter should be given to an Ad Hoc Committee with instructions that the plan be considered further and that recommendations be made to the Board. The Ad Hoc Committee appointed consisted of Lt. Col. R. G. Holton as

---

27. USCIB: 13/197.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

Chairman, Col. W. J. Davitt, and Commander R. L. Taylor. The Committee was instructed to draft a proposed message to General Gruenther, explaining to him the existing situation with regard to SIDO, and suggesting a course of action in view of the Board's inability to obtain concurrence in the proposed terms of reference for SIDO. This message was to be circulated among the members for consideration before dispatch. It was further agreed that the appropriate U.K. authorities would be informed of the inability of the U.S. to implement the SIDO proposal.

12. SACEUR and GCHQ informed of decision: In accordance with the USCIB decision, a message was dispatched on 31 July 1951,<sup>28</sup> to the SACEUR informing him of the inability of USCIB to implement SIDO. Appropriate U.K. authorities were also informed of the nature of the decision. The message is reproduced in full:

"SACEUR from USCIB.

"The plan for establishment of a combined US-UK Special Intelligence Dissemination Office in London cannot be implemented by USCIB pending JCS determination of policy concerning bilateral arrangements within the NATO structure. Considerable opposition to the proposed arrangements has been expressed by the "Operations Duty Chiefs of Staff."

"Until such time as the JCS policy has been determined, US recipients in SHAPE and General Airey will continue to receive COMINT through the US Army SSO, Paris.

"In view of the expressed opposition to an integrated COMINT service, USCIB suggests you reconsider your objections to the previous proposal that the British establish an SSO within the British national facilities SHAPE to provide British COMINT to SACEUR and British recipients at SHAPE.

"Pending your decision on the above suggestion, as a further measure to assure best possible interim solution, Army SSO London will transmit such COMINT as British desire to send SACEUR over Army SSO system to SSO Paris."

13. Informal arrangements established:

a. At the Sixty-ninth Meeting of USCIB, held 14 September 1951,<sup>29</sup>

---

28. USCIB: 14/147.

29. USCIB: 14/156.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~(Brief History of CONSIDO)

Lt. Col. Holton, who had been sent to Paris and London to confer with senior recipients at SHAPE and British authorities at GCHQ in regard to the U.S. position on SIDO, reported to the members that he had informed the British authorities that the U.S. was prepared to proceed, on a highly informal basis, with implementation of the principle of the combined dissemination arrangements originally proposed. LSIB authorities, he said, were receptive to the plan outlined and as a result the British decided to provide one civilian qualified in intelligence and one secretary, while the U.S. personnel would consist, ultimately, of one colonel and one captain. Physical space for this personnel had been made available by RADM Boone, Chief of Staff to COMNAVEASTLANTMED.

b. Following Col. Horton's report, USCIB agreed to approve informal arrangements with British authorities for the servicing of General Eisenhower with COMINT, and to inform the Director, GCHQ of this decision. This was done by memorandum 25 September 1951.<sup>30</sup>

c. At the Seventieth Meeting of USCIB, held 12 October 1951,<sup>31</sup> General Smith reported that the informal arrangements for servicing SHAPE appeared to be very satisfactory. The item was dropped from the agenda.

*William F. Friedman*

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN  
Consultant

28 February 1952

---

30. Memorandum for the Senior British Liaison Officer, Washington, subject: Dissemination of COMINT to British Personnel at SHAPE, dated 25 September 1951.

31. USCIB: 14/162.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~GLINT~~~~TOP SECRET~~  
17 May 1949b  
ASUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

1. The Problem: To examine present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination in order to determine a method which will provide full exploitation of this source with the maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

a. The U.S. annually expends approximately \$35,000,000 for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It has roughly a \$48,000,000 plant investment in the facilities of ASA and CSAW.

b. Each of the members of USCIB maintains a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit. For the most part, the work of these five units is not coordinated and, to date, there has not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. Under the present arrangement, there is no provision for the timely application of total COMINT to the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council or the policy planners of the departments or agency represented on USCIB.



3. Discussion:

a. The unique and vital nature of COMINT and the cost of COMINT production dictate that arrangements be established which insure maximum exploitation of this source. The present arrangements for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT preclude such exploitation. They are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, moreover, they fail to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

(1) Efficiency: The five COMINT evaluation units produce and disseminate a number of publications covering fields of primary interest to their respective departments--e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (Navy), the DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY (produced largely by State under the authority of USCIB), ORDER OF BATTLE (Army, Navy, Air); and special studies (all departments). These publications contain evaluated

~~TOP SECRET GLI~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

COMINT on various subjects. Occasionally, the same raw material--evaluated from the point of view of the department or agency involved--is used as the basis for reports from two or more of the units. To date, there has not been produced an integrated COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements.

[redacted] Nor, under the present arrangements, could a combined estimate be produced with sufficient speed to make such an undertaking practicable, and policy level recipients of COMINT receive a variety of GLINT reports, which may duplicate or conflict with, one another, and which the reader himself must synthesize. In addition to its separation from other COMINT units, each of the five evaluating units functions more or less apart from the general intelligence units within its department or agency and, of course, from the general intelligence units of the other departments or agency. Such arrangements, although necessary for COMINT security under present conditions, inhibit rapid, direct application of collateral intelligence to COMINT and militate against the timely production of total intelligence on a given subject both within and among the USCIB members.

(2) Timeliness: Clearly, the value of all intelligence depends to a large extent on its timeliness. This is particularly true in the case of COMINT. A message indicating impending attack disseminated after the fact is of academic interest only. Under the present arrangements, however, the inevitable time-lag resulting from the separation of the five evaluating units from each other, and of each of them from one or both of the cryptanalytic processing agencies, effectively reduces the chances of receiving such a message before it is too late to act. (It is assumed as a strong probability that no single message will contain positive, self-evident indication of hostile intent--without evaluation on the basis of other information available at one or all of the intelligence units.) In addition, the separation of evaluating and processing units makes impossible the timely preparation of basic COMINT studies on subjects of joint interest and the maintenance of such studies at a current date level.

(3) Security: The distribution of COMINT raw material to five intelligence units in Washington presents an obvious physical security hazard. The separation of these units from the processing agencies requires the publication of individual message texts, netated so as to reveal the cryptographic system in which they were sent and the radio circuits from which they were intercepted--a practice which reveals the core of US COMINT operations: specific status of cryptanalytic attack.

~~TOP SECRET GLI~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GLIN



(4) Keeney: The existence of five COMINT evaluating units results in excessive expenditures for personnel and equipment and considerable duplication of effort. This duplication of effort results in a dissipation of the limited, available, qualified manpower and adversely affects the quality and quantity of COMINT produced. In addition, it creates the need for publishing many copies of the COMINT raw material, for an extensive courier service, for several files of the same material, and for the publication by the processing agencies of many items which could have been discarded at the first stage of processing if an evaluating group had been close at hand to guide the work of the technicians.

b. The establishment of a single COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit, to be located preferably at the cryptanalytic processing agency (assuming approval of proposed Directive establishing Armed Forces Security Agency), would eliminate the disadvantages described above, and would permit better, and possibly maximum exploitation of COMINT. The contrast between the situation resulting from the present arrangements and that which would result from the establishment of a single unit for evaluation and dissemination is demonstrated by examining the same elements as were discussed in paragraph a above.

(1) Efficiency:

(a) Such an arrangement would provide, at the very least, the physical conditions necessary for collaboration among the COMINT evaluating personnel of the USCIB members.

(b) Basic COMINT evaluation would be improved, for the following reasons:

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at its source--an optimum condition for accurate intelligence production.

(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The processing agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the processing agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources now separately held by each of the five USCIB members.

(iii) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields of primary interest to each of the USCIB members would be improved by the proximity of evaluators to translators and traffic analysts.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
GLIN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~GLINT~~

(c) COMINT operations as a whole would be improved. The quick and unimpeded exchange of new ideas, new developments, and new intelligence or technical requirements would greatly increase the efficiency of both technical and evaluating personnel.

(d) Finished GLINT intelligence would be available for dissemination to policy-level recipients in a form designed to meet their needs--i.e., they would receive total COMINT on a given subject, in one synthesized report.

(2) Timeliness:

(a) The proximity of evaluating personnel to technical personnel would permit discarding of unimportant material at the earliest stages of cryptanalysis and, in so reducing the mass of material fully processed, would expedite the processing of vital material.

(b) Basic intelligence studies of joint interest to all consumers could be expeditiously initiated and currently maintained.

(c) Elimination of the publication and delivery of many copies of COMINT raw material would substantially reduce the time lag between message solution and evaluation.

(3) Security:

(a) The dissemination of COMINT raw material outside the processing agencies would be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Knowledge of the degree of specific cryptanalytic success could more easily be limited to working personnel with the need to know and, in the case of evaluating personnel, confined to one installation.

(4) Economy:

(a) Discard of unimportant material at earliest stages of cryptanalytic processing would reduce the total cost of intelligence produced in relationship to total material processed.

(b) Publication costs would be materially reduced.

(c) Duplication of intelligence files, with its attendant uneconomical use of limited space and personnel, and unnecessary duplication of effort at the evaluation level would be eliminated.

4. Conclusions

a. A central COMINT unit should be established at the cryptanalytic

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~GLINT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

processing agency, with the responsibility for producing all intelligence based on COMINT and disseminating all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

b. Each of the five USCIB member departments or agency should contribute personnel to this center. Such personnel should perform the dual function of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.

c. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members should be dissolved.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at the cryptanalytic processing agency.

b. This unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

c. Each of the five USCIB member departments or agency contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments or agency and operationally subordinate to the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency, and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments or agency.

d. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25 April 1949

B

TO: Director of Intelligence, GSUSA

SUBJECT: Proposed Memorandum for Chairman, USCIB, subject:  
Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. Subject memorandum, submitted by Chief, ASA, recommends that:

a. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the cryptanalytic processing agencies.

b. This unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

c. Each USCIB member contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments and operationally subordinate to the chief of the technical agency and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.

d. That, upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.

2. Attached to the subject memorandum is a staff study which discusses the inadequacies of the present methods of handling COMINT evaluation and dissemination and the advantages of the method recommended. It is obvious that, under the present system, maximum exploitation of COMINT cannot be achieved and that, in theory, the recommendations made in the subject memorandum would provide a means of achieving full exploitation of this source. If submitted to USCIB, however, the following alternative results could be expected:

a. The recommendations would be rejected, with Navy and Air Force opposed on the grounds that such a proposal would preclude the operational control necessary to satisfy their intelligence requirements.

b. The recommendations would be accepted in principle by USCIB. In this case, the ultimate recommendations forwarded to the National Security Council would probably take the following form:

(i) That a central evaluating and disseminating unit be established under the authority and direction of CIA.

(ii) That, since a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit of ONI is already in operation at CSAW, this central unit be located at CSAW.

Moreover, if the recommendations of the subject memorandum were accepted by USCIB, they might lead to a further recommendation that full responsibility for COMINT processing, evaluation and dissemination be given to CIA.

3. Without reference to the possible effect of the subject memorandum on USCIB, the recommendations of that memorandum appear to be objectionable to the Department of the Army and the National Military Establishment on the following grounds:

a. A single department within the National Military Establishment would have operational control of all COMINT evaluation and dissemination at the Washington level; and ultimate control would be in the hands of a board which includes non-military members and is responsible to the National Security Council.

b. The recommendations state that personnel of the central evaluating and disseminating unit would be responsible for producing intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments. No provision is made, however, for direction or control by these departments of the production and dissemination of such intelligence.

c. The recommendations state that personnel of the central unit would be responsible for producing total intelligence for the National Security Council. The total intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not mentioned and, under the organization as recommended, the Joint Chiefs would have no means of directing and controlling the production and dissemination of such intelligence.

d. The recommendations are made on the assumption that two (or, eventually, three) cryptanalytic processing agencies will continue in existence. In this case, the location of the central unit at one of the technical agencies would only partially satisfy the requirements for maximum exploitation of COMINT as



outlined in the staff study. Moreover, the reasons which lead to the conclusions on which the recommendations are based lead also to the conclusion that a unified Armed Forces Security Agency should be established.

4. Assuming that a unified Armed Forces Security Agency is established, the recommendations made in the subject memorandum could be applied within the National Military Establishment, as follows:

a. A central COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit could be established at the Armed Forces Security Agency, composed of personnel contributed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA (who, in turn, would be subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

b. The personnel contributed to the center by the three services could have the dual responsibility of producing intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intelligence of primary interest to their respective services. Such an arrangement would provide the National Military Establishment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with that portion of total intelligence based on COMINT which has been allocated to the National Military Establishment under the NIS. It would not provide the means for integrating those fields of intelligence which are currently allocated to the State Department and CIA with the intelligence produced by the AFSA unit. However, upon the establishment of a central COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit within the National Military Establishment, the State Department and CIA could be invited to contribute personnel to the central unit. The full advantages outlined in the staff study attached to the subject memorandum would thus be achieved without the danger of loss of operational control by the National Military Establishment.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The subject memorandum not be submitted to the Chairman, USCIB.

b. The attached memorandum, subject: Maximum Exploitation of Communication Intelligence within the National Military Establishment, be submitted to the Chief of Staff, with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration in conjunction with the report of the Stone Board.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~SECRET~~**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:****SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of Communication Intelligence  
within the National Military Establishment.**

1. The Intelligence agencies of the three service departments are presently engaged in the production of intelligence based on COMINT in their respective fields of primary interest and in the several fields in which all services have a common interest. Under this arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense are not provided with total intelligence derivable from COMINT.

2. A study has been prepared by ID, GSUSA, which examines present COMINT exploitation and dissemination by the three services for the purpose of determining a method which will insure full exploitation of this source with maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy, and which will provide each department with all essential COMINT required for its own needs. The study demonstrates the close relationship between the production and the evaluation of COMINT and concludes that maximum exploitation of COMINT requires changes in present arrangements within the NME, not only for evaluating and disseminating, but also for cryptanalytic processing of COMINT. One of the recommendations made in this study is that a unified Armed Forces Security Agency be established. This has been recommended by the Department of the Army in the Study of Joint Organizations for the Production of Communication Intelligence, dated 30 Dec 48, prepared for the Secretary of Defense. The reasons leading to this recommendation in the attached staff study are in addition to those given in the study of 30 Dec 48, which considered the COMINT problem only through the stage of cryptanalytic processing. The full recommendations of the staff study are as follows:

a. That a unified Armed Forces Security Agency be established.

b. That a central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at the AFSA.

c. That this unit be responsible for the production of intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence for the NME.

d. That each of the three services contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA, and to have the dual responsibility of producing intelligence for the JCS and intelligence of primary interest to their respective services.

3. If these recommendations were adopted, the COMINT requirements of the services and of the JCS could be met. The further step of integrating political and economic with military intelligence could then be achieved by inviting the remaining members of the United States Communication Intelligence Board -- State Department and CIA -- to contribute personnel to the central evaluating unit at AFSA.

4. It is recommended that this staff study be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration in conjunction with the study of Joint Organizations for the Production of Communication Intelligence.

MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION OF COMINT WITHIN THE NATIONAL MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT

1. The Problem: To examine present COMINT exploitation and dissemination within the NME in order to determine a method which will provide full exploitation of this source with the maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

a. The NME annually expends approximately \$35,000,000 for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It has roughly a \$48,000,000 plant investment in the facilities of ASA and CSAW. The establishment of a third technical agency by the Air Force is imminent.

b. Each of the departments of the NME maintains a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit. For the most part, the work of these three units is not coordinated and, to date, there has not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total JCS intelligence requirements. Under the present arrangement, there is no provision for the timely application of total COMINT to the intelligence requirements of the JCS or the policy planners of the three services.

3. Discussion

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

a. The unique and vital nature of COMINT and the cost of COMINT production dictate that arrangements be established which insure maximum exploitation of this source. The present arrangements for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT within the NME preclude such exploitation. They are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, moreover, they fail to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

(1) Efficiency: The three COMINT evaluation units produce and disseminate a number of publications covering fields of primary interest to their respective services--e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (Navy); ORDER OF BATTLE (Army, Navy, Air); and special studies (all services). These publications contain evaluated COMINT on various subjects. Occasionally, the same raw material--evaluated

from the point of view of the service involved--is used as the basis for reports from two or more of the units. To date, there has not been produced an integrated COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total intelligence requirements of the JCS.

Nor, under the present arrangements, could a combined estimate be produced with sufficient speed to make such an undertaking practicable. Policy level recipients of COMINT receive a variety of GLINT reports, which may duplicate, or conflict with, one another, and which the recipients themselves must synthesize. In addition to its separation from other COMINT units, each of the three evaluating units functions more or less apart from the general intelligence units within its service and, of course, from the general intelligence units of the other services. Such arrangements, although necessary for COMINT security under present conditions, inhibit rapid, direct application of collateral intelligence to COMINT and militate against the timely production of total intelligence on a given subject both within and among the services.

(2) Timeliness: Clearly, the value of all intelligence depends to a large extent on its timeliness. This is particularly true in the case of COMINT. A message indicating impending attack disseminated after the fact is of academic interest only. Under the present arrangements, however, the inevitable time-lag resulting from the separation of the three evaluating units from each other, and of each of them from one or both of the technical agencies, effectively reduces the chances of receiving such a message before it is too late to act. (It is assumed as a strong probability that no single message will contain positive, self-evident indication of hostile intent--without evaluation on the basis of other information available at one or all of the intelligence units.) In addition, the separation of evaluating and technical units makes impossible the timely preparation of basic COMINT studies on subjects of joint interest and the maintenance of such studies at a current date level.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

(3) Security: The distribution of COMINT raw material to the intelligence units of the services and to the COMINT units of State Department and CIA presents an obvious physical security hazard. The separation of these units from the technical agencies requires the publication of individual message texts, notated so as to reveal the cryptographic system in which they were sent and the radio circuits from which they were intercepted--a practice which reveals the core of US COMINT operations: specific status of cryptanalytic attack.

COMINT

(4) Economy: The existence of three COMINT evaluating units within the NME results in excessive expenditures for personnel and equipment and considerable duplication of effort. Dissipation of the limited, available, qualified manpower adversely affects the quality and quantity of COMINT produced. In addition, the existence of several, separate evaluating units creates the need for publishing many copies of the COMINT raw material, for an extensive courier service, for several files of the same material, and for the publication by the technical agencies of many items which could have been discarded at the first stage of processing if an evaluating group had been close at hand to guide the work of the technicians.

b. The establishment of a unified Armed Forces Security Agency (as recommended by the Department of the Army in the Study of Joint Organizations for the Production of Communication Intelligence, dated 30 Dec 48), and of a single COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit at that agency, would eliminate the disadvantages described above and would permit maximum exploitation of COMINT within the NME.

(1) Efficiency:

(a) Such an arrangement would provide, at the very least, the physical conditions necessary for collaboration among the COMINT evaluating personnel of the NME.

(b) Basic COMINT evaluation would be improved, for the following reasons:

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at its source--an optimum condition for accurate intelligence production.

(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The technical agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the technical agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources now separately held by each of the three services.

(iii) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields of primary interest to each of the services would be improved by the proximity of evaluators to translators and traffic analysts.

(c) COMINT operations as a whole would be improved. The quick and unimpeded exchange of new ideas, new developments, and new intelligence or technical requirements would greatly increase the efficiency of both technical and evaluating personnel.

GLINT

(d) Finished GLINT intelligence would be available for dissemination to policy level recipients in a form designed to meet their needs--i.e., they would receive total COMINT on a given subject, in one synthesized report.

(2) Timeliness:

(a) The proximity of evaluating personnel to technical personnel would permit discarding of unimportant material at the earliest stages of cryptanalysis and, in so reducing the mass of material fully processed, would expedite the processing of vital material.

(b) Basic intelligence studies of joint interest to all consumers could be expeditiously initiated and currently maintained.

(c) Elimination of the publication and delivery of many copies of COMINT raw material would substantially reduce the time-lag between message solution and evaluation.

(3) Security:

(a) The dissemination of COMINT raw material outside the AFSA would be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Knowledge of the degree of specific cryptanalytic success could more easily be limited to working personnel with the need to know, and, in the case of evaluating personnel of the NME, confined to one installation.

(4) Economy:

(a) Discard of unimportant material at earliest stages of cryptanalytic processing would reduce the total cost of intelligence produced in relationship to total material processed.

(b) Publication costs would be materially reduced.

(c) Duplication of intelligence files, with its attendant uneconomical use of limited space and personnel, and unnecessary duplication of effort at the technical and evaluation levels, would be eliminated.

4. Conclusions:

a. A unified Armed Forces Security Agency should be established.

TOP SECRET

b. A central COMINT unit should be established at the AFSA, with the responsibility for producing intelligence based on COMINT and disseminating such intelligence for the NME.

c. Each of the three services should contribute personnel to this center. Such personnel, under the direction of the Chief, AFSA, should perform the dual function of producing intelligence for the JCS and intelligence of primary interest to their respective services.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. A unified Armed Forces Security Agency be established.

b. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at the AFSA.

c. This unit be responsible for the production of intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence for the NME.

d. Each of the three services contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA, and to have the dual responsibility of producing intelligence for the JCS and intelligence of primary interest to their respective services.



CSOAS

MEMORANDUM FOR: General McNarney

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Single Communication Intelligence Evaluation  
and Dissemination Center

1. There was recently submitted to you a draft of a proposed Consolidation Directive having as its aim the integration of all cryptologic activities of the Armed Forces, including those connected with the security of our own communications as well as those devoted to the interception and cryptanalytic processing of foreign communications. If that directive is adopted, it is believed that a great step forward will have been taken in the overall efficiency of these activities.

2. The present memorandum deals with a phase of communication intelligence activities not covered in the above-mentioned directive and perhaps of equal importance with integration of interception and cryptanalytic processing of foreign communications. It is obvious that maximum benefit from all the effort and funds devoted to these two expensive operations will be obtained only if there is maximum efficiency in the exploitation of the fruits thereof. The exploitation involves, as preliminary steps, the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the results of cryptanalytic processing. As you are no doubt well aware, the latter three steps have for a long time been regarded strictly as intelligence activities which must be conducted within and under the direct supervision of the Intelligence organizations of the respective Services, a thesis with which I am generally in agreement. However, these Intelligence organizations now function independently, with separate staffs and plant facilities, and therefore, although they are provided with or have access to all the data which we call COMINT raw material (that is, the final translations of solved messages resulting from cryptanalytic processing), the evaluation, publication, and dissemination operations are conducted independently and separately by those organizations. There is some limited coordination, it is true, but that cannot be as efficient as unified direction. In fact, the present situation not only results in unnecessary duplication in certain types of studies, with occasional inconsistencies in final results, but also disperses the U.S. effort so that certain types of studies cannot be made because of lack of personnel and facilities.

3. a. Another element in the picture serves to complicate the situation. The respective Intelligence organizations of the Armed Forces must necessarily have close relations with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. The United States Communication Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~ *CS*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Board (SECIB), an organization under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council, was established by the NSC in its Directive No. 9 (Inlosure 1, par. 1), "to affect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible". The NSC Directive No. 9 (Par. 2) also fixed the composition of the Board to consist "of not to exceed two members from each of the following Departments or Agencies: The Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency". Consistent with the definition of "Communications Intelligence activities", given in Par. 12g of NSC Directive No. 9, the coordination mentioned above includes that of coordinating the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence. Now Par. 4 of the NSC Directive states that "Decisions of the Board will be based on the principle of unanimity" and Par. 10 of the Directive states that "The Board shall leave the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member Departments or Agencies". Hence, as is inherent in the nature of a Board such as the foregoing, which has only coordinating functions, no authority to implement its decisions, and is composed of members responsible to separate agencies sometimes having conflicting aims, ideas, and opinions, its efficacy, even in the matter of coordination, is questionable.

b. The accompanying Inlosure 2 is a study dealing specifically and solely with the present situation as regards evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence, giving a quite succinct picture of the defects therein and presenting certain recommendations for its improvement.

c. Based upon the recommendations embodied in Inlosure 2, a proposed Consolidation Directive has been drafted for your consideration, and is presented herewith as Inlosure 3. A few words of explanation of certain features thereof may be in order.

4. a. First of all, the classification given the proposed Directive is necessitated by the clear implication that we are now deriving intelligence from foreign communications, a fact which must be kept quite well hidden to prevent countermeasures that might dry up this type of intelligence at its sources. The classification TOP SECRET GLINT has therefore been applied to the Directive in accordance with current applicable regulations.

b. Arising from the necessity of affording ample security protection to the activities covered by the proposed Directive, but because some

~~TOP SECRET~~

name must be given to the contemplated centralized office for purposes of reference and designation in correspondence, etc., the rather innocuous designation indicated in Par. 1b thereof is suggested. Also, for reasons presently to be given, the prefatory qualifying adjective "Consolidated" rather than "Armed Forces" has been employed.

c. Referring to Par. 8a, it is obvious that a Directive signed by the Secretary of Defense cannot be binding upon organizations outside the NME, and therefore the wording "are cordially invited to participate" is employed in the present draft in referring to participation by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. But it is suggested that should preliminary negotiations with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be successful in gaining their acceptance of the thesis upon which the proposed Directive is based, the quoted phrase would be replaced simply by the words "will participate" or "may participate"; also, the introductory clause of Par. 8b, "If the foregoing invitation is accepted", would be deleted.

d. Referring to Par. 9a, it is deemed essential to locate the contemplated central evaluation, publication, and dissemination office at a cryptanalytic processing center in the Washington area because of the better technical efficiency that will accrue to both categories of operations involved. This point is explained in Par. 3b of Inclosure 2.

e. Referring to Par. 9b, it is deemed advisable to make it clear that the central dissemination office must be ready to meet an emergency dissemination situation at any moment, and in order to be in a position to do so the means and facilities therefor will have to be provided for in budgetary arrangements.

f. Referring to Par. 11a, it is deemed essential to the security of our communication intelligence activities, techniques, and operations themselves to eliminate at the earliest possible moment the present rather wide distribution of the texts of solved and translated messages, now unavoidable because the currently decentralized operations of evaluation, publication, and dissemination make it necessary to distribute copies of translated texts to the five organizations separately engaged in conducting those operations. It is realized that imposition of a prohibition against routine dissemination, a measure which is necessary for security reasons, may meet with strenuous objections from the Department of State and from the Central Intelligence Agency should these two organizations be unwilling to subscribe to the proposed Directive, but at the same time, firmness and insistence on this point by the Armed Forces, which are the producers of the basic material, may have the desired persuasive effect on those two organizations to join with us in establishing the single central office

forming the subject of this paper, to the ultimate advantage of all the agencies involved. Should this come to pass the adjective "Consolidated", would be particularly applicable as part of the designation of the centralized office.

g. It will be noted that the Directive provides that the chief of the central dissemination and evaluation agency is subordinated to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency. This is considered essential if the consolidated agency is situated at the cryptanalytic center, Armed Forces Security Agency. To do otherwise would violate a fundamental principle of command. If, however, this consolidated agency is located in the Pentagon or elsewhere, Paragraphs 2a and 2b of the Directive might read as follows:

"2. a. The office of the CONSIDO serving the Hq, MEX will operate under the general supervision of the Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be designated as CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

b. The Chief, Joint Intelligence Group, under the general direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee will serve also as Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and for the purpose of assisting him in executing his functions in the latter capacity he will have a deputy from each of the Services other than the one to which he belongs. "

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, Signal Corps  
Chief, Army Security Agency

3 Incls

77-1 (1) 1111

---

1111 1111 1111

~~TOP SECRET~~

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

---

  
(Date)

Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information  
Dissemination Office, NME.

1. a. In order to improve efficiency and economy in the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence, and with a view to giving better security protection to the sources of such intelligence, a single consolidated office for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of all intelligence based upon COMINT raw material\* resulting from the operations of the Armed Forces Security Agency will be established at the Headquarters of the National Military Establishment in Washington. Similar offices may be established in Overseas Theaters at the Headquarters of any Joint Command at or within which COMINT raw material is produced locally by the Armed Forces Security Agency branch office within said Theater or Joint Command.

b. For purposes of cover, a consolidated office performing the above-mentioned functions will be designated as a CONsolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, abbreviated as CONSIDO.

2. a. The office of the CONSIDO serving the Hq, NME will operate under the general supervision and operational control of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency and will be designated as CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

b. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be appointed by the Joint Intelligence Committee. As provided in Paragraph 2a above, he will operate under the general supervision and operational control of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency. For the purpose of assisting him in executing his functions in producing communication intelligence he will have a deputy from each of the Services.

c. The chief of a CONSIDO serving a Joint Command will be appointed

\*Defined as the published English versions of decrypted messages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

by the Commander thereof, but in view of the close technical relations which must exist between CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and similar offices operating for Joint Commands, such appointments will be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. a. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be responsible for the production of communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the cryptanalytic processing agency of NEE in the Washington area and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence to agencies authorized to receive it.

b. The Chief of a CONSIDO outside Washington will be responsible for the production of communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the local cryptanalytic processing center and for the publication and dissemination of such intelligence to the local command, and to other local agencies as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Referring specifically to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the respective Secretaries of the three Service Departments are hereby authorized and directed to transfer to the control of the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON such facilities, equipment, records, and files as are now employed by their agencies in the Washington area for the evaluation of COMINT raw material and for the publication and dissemination of the resultant communication intelligence.

5. a. Military and civilian personnel will be detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON by the respective Services in quotas as requested by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and as approved by the Secretaries of the respective Departments concerned.

b. As a matter of policy, officer personnel will be detailed to such duty for a period of not less than thirty (30) months, and civilian personnel, for indefinite periods, reserving, however, to each Department, after appropriate notification to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the right to withdraw, add to, or substitute.

6. Military and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and administratively subordinate to the respective Departments from which they have been detailed. The administration will be exercised through the Senior Officer detailed from each Service to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, which officer will report, as appropriate, to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or to the Chief of Naval Operations for additional duty for this purpose. In addition to their other duties, the Senior Officers from each Service will be responsible for normal and routine inspection of their Service components in CONSIDO-WASHINGTON in accordance with current directives and policies respectively promulgated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, or by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or by the

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

Chief of Naval Operations. In addition, inspection or investigation of the respective individual Service components may be made by the corresponding Service representatives when so directed by competent authority, the Chief, COMSISO-WASHINGTON being notified in each instance.

7. a. The specific responsibilities of COMSISO-WASHINGTON are as follows:

- (1) To produce communication intelligence from COMINT raw material and to fuse such intelligence with pertinent collateral information received from other sources.
- (2) To publish and disseminate such intelligence to the JCS, to the three Services, and to other U.S. agencies as authorized and directed by the JCS.
- (3) To prepare summaries, studies and reports based upon such intelligence.
- (4) To disseminate to appropriate agencies in the Washington area communication intelligence received from a field cryptanalytic processing center, or from a Theater COMSISO, or from a non-U.S. COMINT center with which cooperation has been authorized.
- (5) To maintain close liaison with the JCS and the Intelligence Divisions of the respective Services in all matters involving the dissemination of such intelligence and the establishment of priorities therein, as well as those involving procurement of collateral information from U.S. sources.
- (6) To execute policies established by the JCS for the exchange of such intelligence with non-U.S. COMINT agencies.
- (7) To exercise general supervision over the special system for the electrical transmission of such intelligence to Theater Commanders and to furnish the texts of such material for transmission, according to priorities determined by the Chief, COMSISO-WASHINGTON.
- (8) To supply to the cryptanalytic processing agency pertinent technical and collateral information which may be developed in the course of evaluation and which may be of assistance in gathering and processing COMINT raw material.
- (9) To exercise general supervision over the security of publication and dissemination procedures, under regulations established by the JCS.
- (10) To maintain all appropriate files and records.

~~GLINT~~

b. The responsibilities of a CONSIDO serving a Joint Command will in general be similar to those outlined in sub-paragraph a above. Its principal responsibility is (1) to evaluate, publish, and disseminate communication intelligence based upon COMINT raw material furnished by the local cryptanalytic processing agency, and (2) to disseminate to appropriate agencies within the Theater, as authorized by the JCS, such communication intelligence as is forwarded by CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

8. a. The Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency are cordially invited to participate in the work of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, by contributing available personnel, facilities, equipment, and files thereto and as appropriate to their respective needs, subject to approval of the JCS.

b. If the foregoing invitation is accepted, the personnel furnished by the Department of State and/or the Central Intelligence Agency will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and administratively subordinate respectively to the Department and/or to the Agency by which they have been furnished. The administration will be exercised through the Senior Representative from the Department of State and/or from the Central Intelligence Agency for their respective personnel quotas.

c. The Senior Representative from the Department of State and/or the Senior Representative from the Central Intelligence Agency may serve as Deputy Chiefs of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, with responsibilities similar to those of the Deputy Chiefs from the Armed Services.

9. a. The physical location of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be at the NME cryptanalytic processing center in the Washington area.

b. CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will operate on a continuous basis, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

10. This Directive will become effective on or before 1 July 1949. Thereafter, no units of the NME in the Washington area other than CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will engage in evaluating, publishing and disseminating communication intelligence and all COMINT evaluation, publication, and dissemination units other than CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be abolished as soon thereafter as practicable.

11. a. With a view to eliminating existing security hazards, on and after 1 July 1949 no cryptanalytic processing center of the NME will disseminate as a routine matter to any U.S. Agency or personnel not operationally employed within such a center any COMINT raw material. However,

~~TOP SECRET~~



---

when appropriate and as determined in each instance by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON or by the Chief of a Theater CONSIDO, a copy of a specific decrypt may be furnished to a U.S. Agency or to U.S. personnel, but only on the basis that the possession of such a decrypt is operationally essential.

b. The foregoing prohibition will not apply to the dissemination of COMINT raw material to cooperating COMINT centers with which exchange of such material has been authorized.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
5

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington

10 May 1949

15

~~GLINT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT

1. I am considering a further step to increase the efficiency and economy of NME communications intelligence activities by the establishment of a consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office.

2. Please let me have your comments and recommendations with respect to the attached staff study\* and draft consolidation directive\*\* by 15 June 1949.

/s/ Louis Johnson

\* Appendix "A" hereto

\*\* Appendix "B" hereto

~~TOP SECRET GLINT~~

15

APPENDIX  
(Revised Draft Directive)

Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information  
Dissemination Office, National Military Establishment

1. a. A consolidated office for evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence (COMINT) resulting from the operations of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) will be established at the Headquarters of the National Military Establishment. Similar offices may be established at the Headquarters of unified commands and such other commands as may be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. For purposes of cover, a consolidated office performing the above-mentioned functions will be designated as a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, abbreviated as CONSIDO.

2. a. The office of the CONSIDO serving the Headquarters, National Military Establishment, designated as CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will operate under the general supervision and operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such supervision to be exercised by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

b. The assignment as Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will be rotated among the Services. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will be appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a period not exceeding two years. For the purpose of assisting him in executing his functions, the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will have a deputy from each of the Services.

c. In general, the Chief of a CONSIDO serving a unified or other command will be appointed by the commander thereof.

3. a. The Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will be responsible for evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence processed by AFSA. The Deputies from the Services, in addition to being responsible

~~TOP SECRET~~

to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, for the evaluation and dissemination of communication intelligence as directed by him, will be responsible also to their respective departments for the dissemination of communication intelligence to those departments and to field commands, in accordance with departmental policies and directives pertaining to such dissemination.

b. The Chief of a CONSIDO outside Washington will be responsible for evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence to the local command and for the forwarding of communication intelligence produced locally to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON and other commands, as required.

4. Referring specifically to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the respective Chiefs of Staff of the three Services will make available to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, facilities, equipment, records, and files necessary for evaluation and dissemination of communication intelligence.

5. a. Military and civilian personnel will be detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON by the respective Services in quotas as requested by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. As a matter of policy, military personnel will be detailed to such duty for a period of not less than thirty (30) months, and civilian personnel, for indefinite periods. The Services will reserve the right to add, withdraw, or substitute personnel, within limitations of authorized personnel strength of CONSIDO, and subject to agreement by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON.

6. Military and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and administratively subordinate to the respective departments from which they have been detailed. The administration will be exercised through the Deputy detailed from each Service to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, which officer will report, as appropriate, to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or to the Chief of Naval Operations for additional duty for this purpose and for those outlined in par 3. a., above.

7. The specific responsibilities of the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, are as follows:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- a. To provide to AFSA the intelligence guidance necessary to enable it to meet the needs of the intelligence agencies.
- b. To determine COMINT Intelligence Priorities based upon the intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and USCIB; to provide such priorities to AFSA.
- c. To coordinate COMINT Intelligence Priorities with AFSA technical priorities; to represent Intelligence interests as a voting member of AFSA technical priorities groups.
- d. To select messages and Traffic Analysis items for publication for use by CONSIDO; to prepare intelligence comments to such messages and items as appropriate.
- e. To evaluate and disseminate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and other U.S. agencies as authorized and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the communication intelligence processed by AFSA.
- f. To prepare summaries, studies, and reports based on communication intelligence processed by AFSA.
- g. To maintain close liaison with the intelligence divisions of the respective Services and other U.S. agencies authorized to receive COMINT on all matters involving the dissemination of such intelligence and the establishment of priorities therein, as well as matters involving procurement of collateral information from U.S. sources.
- h. To execute policies established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the exchange of communication intelligence with non-U.S. COMINT agencies.
- i. To provide AFSA with pertinent technical and collateral information which may be of assistance.
- j. To exercise general supervision over the security of publication and dissemination procedures, under regulations established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- k. To maintain such COMINT and collateral files as are required in addition to the files of AFSA for performance of the functions of CONSIDO.
8. Where appropriate, the responsibilities of a CONSIDO serving a field command will be similar to those outlined in par 7., above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. a. The Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are invited to participate in the work of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, by making available personnel, facilities, equipment, and files, as appropriate to their respective needs, subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. If the foregoing invitation is accepted, the senior representatives from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation will serve as Deputy Chiefs of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, with responsibilities similar to those of the Deputy Chiefs from the Services. Personnel furnished under such an arrangement will be operationally subordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, and administratively subordinate to their respective senior representatives.

10. a. The physical location of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will be at the COMINT processing center of AFSA.

b. CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will operate on a continuous basis, 24 hours per day, seven days per week.

11. This directive will be made effective by order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as practicable after the establishment of AFSA. As soon as practicable after the establishment of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, all units of the National Military Establishment in the Washington area engaged primarily in the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of communication intelligence will be abolished.

12. a. With a view to decreasing existing security hazards, after the establishment of CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, the Armed Forces Security Agency will not provide any COMINT to any U.S. agency other than CONSIDO. However, when appropriate and as determined by the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, or by the Chief of a field CONSIDO, COMINT may be furnished, on a "need to know" basis, to U.S. Government personnel not participating in CONSIDO.

b. The foregoing prohibition will not apply to the dissemination of communication intelligence to COMINT centers with which exchange of such material has been authorized.

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F TAnnex to Appendix "A"  
(Revised Draft Directive)

Consolidation Directive No. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR:Subject: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information  
Dissemination Office, Department of Defense

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law No. 253, 80th Congress), as amended by Public Law 216, 81st Congress, and in the interest of greater efficiency and economy, there is hereby established within the Department of Defense, under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office, designated and hereinafter referred to as "CONSIDO" which shall be located at the main communications intelligence processing center of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), and which shall have the purpose, composition, authority and responsibilities hereinafter described.

1. Purpose

CONSIDO is established in order to provide for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the product of the Armed Forces Security Agency and for the maintenance of liaison, in connection with the functions and responsibilities outlined in paragraph 3 below, between AFSA and the Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. Composition

a. CONSIDO shall consist of such facilities and military and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may determine to be necessary to fulfill the functions herein assigned. The Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are invited to participate in CONSIDO by making available personnel and facilities as appropriate to their respective needs.

b. The Chief, CONSIDO, will be appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a period not exceeding three years. The assignment as Chief, CONSIDO, will be rotated among the Military Departments.

c. For the purpose of assisting him in executing his functions, the Chief, CONSIDO, will have a full-time deputy from each of the Military Departments and from such other departments and agencies as may be represented in CONSIDO.

3. Functions and Responsibilities

a. CONSIDO will operate under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct supervision to be exercised by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

b. Military and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO will be under the operational control of the Chief, CONSIDO.

c. The administration of the personnel of CONSIDO will be the responsibility of the department or agency from which they have been assigned and will be exercised through the deputy detailed from each department or agency.

d. In exercising direct supervision over CONSIDO, the Joint Intelligence Committee will:

- (1) Establish policies and doctrines for the conduct of CONSIDO activities which will insure that CONSIDO is responsive to the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the individual departments and agencies participating in CONSIDO.
- (2) Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the facilities and military and civilian personnel to be provided to

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

CONSIDO, such recommendation to be based on requirements as determined by the Chief, CONSIDO.

- (3) With the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Offices as may be required at the headquarters of unified commands and such other commands as may be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Subject to the direction and control of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Chief, CONSIDO, will execute policies, plans, and doctrines relating to the evaluation and collation of the product of AFSA and the dissemination of the product of CONSIDO. His specific responsibilities are as follows:

- (1) To insure equitable treatment in the satisfaction of the communication intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (2) To provide and maintain close liaison with AFSA, the Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on all matters involving the dissemination of the product of CONSIDO and the establishment of priorities therein, as well as matters involving procurement of collateral information for AFSA and CONSIDO.

4  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Annex to Appendix "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

- (3) To determine intelligence priorities applicable to COMINT based on the intelligence requirements

## Method #1

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments and the other agencies of the United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB); to submit such recommended priorities to USCIB for approval and transmittal

to the Director, AFSA, and to coordinate those priorities with AFSA priorities groups and otherwise to provide AFSA with detailed intelligence guidance necessary to enable it to meet the requirements of the intelligence agencies.

## Method #2

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments; to integrate those priorities with the priorities of the United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB); to provide an integrated list of such priorities

## Method #1

It is to be noted that the interest or authority of USCIB does not extend to the determination of relative priorities between agencies within the Department of Defense.

## Method #2

--

- (4) To insure proper and timely evaluation and collation of the product of AFSA and dissemination of the product of CONSIDO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

- (5) To prepare and disseminate information summaries, studies and reports based on the product of AFSA. To prepare and disseminate such other summaries, studies and reports as the Joint Intelligence Committee may authorize and direct.
- (6) To provide, and exercise supervision over, the means of dissemination of intelligence bearing the communication intelligence code word designator.
- (7) To insure the security of CONSIDO dissemination procedures, in accordance with the basic security policies prescribed by the United States Communication Intelligence Board.
- (8) To provide AFSA with pertinent technical and collateral information.
- (9) To collaborate with the Director, AFSA, in maintaining joint files suitable to the use of both CONSIDO and AFSA and to maintain such files as may be necessary to meet the exclusive needs of CONSIDO.
- (10) To insure that civilian and military personnel assigned to CONSIDO comply with the regulations promulgated by the Director, AFSA, for the administrative operation of the main COMINT processing center.
- (11) To insure continuous operation of CONSIDO on a "watch" basis, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

f. The Deputy Chiefs of CONSIDO will be responsible to the Chief, CONSIDO, and will assist him in carrying out his duties and responsibilities, particularly those relating to their respective departments or agencies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

- g. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will:
- (1) Take necessary action to facilitate the efficient and economic operation of CONSIDO, such action to include the assignment of personnel and furnishing of facilities and equipment. The respective Secretaries are hereby authorized to issue such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this directive.
  - (2) Normally assign military personnel to CONSIDO for a period of not less than 30 months, and civilian personnel for indefinite periods, reserving the right to add, withdraw or substitute personnel within limitations of authorized personnel strength of CONSIDO and subject to the agreement by the Chief, CONSIDO.
  - (3) Be responsible, within the Department of Defense, for interpretation of the CONSIDO product and information from all other sources for the production of intelligence.
  - (4) Retain responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for the dissemination of intelligence bearing the communication intelligence code word designator, employing, for inter-departmental and field dissemination, the means provided by CONSIDO.
  - (5) Not undertake or continue any of the functions which are assigned herein to CONSIDO.
- h. The Director, AFSA:
- (1) Will make available to the Chief, CONSIDO, such AFSA facilities, equipment, records and files as are determined by the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject to approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be required for the performance of the functions of CONSIDO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

(2) After the establishment of CONSIDO, will not disseminate the product of AFSA to any US agency other than CONSIDO, except as otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nothing in this directive, however, shall alter technical agreements ratified by the USCIB, and the provision of information for technical purposes to the Army Security Agency, the Navy Communications Supplementary Activities, and the Air Force Security Service.

#### 4. Implementation

a. CONSIDO will be placed in operation as soon as practicable.

The other portions of this directive shall be made effective immediately thereafter.

b. The fundamental relationship between the Armed Forces Security Agency and the Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office is as indicated herein. Such adjustments in the relationship as may become necessary will be accomplished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#### 5. Definitions

For the purposes of this directive the following definitions apply:

a. Evaluation -- the process of determining the credibility and accuracy of information and of eliminating irrelevant and unreliable matter from further consideration.

b. Collation -- a critical comparison of various items of information concerning the same general subject.

c. Interpretation -- the determination of the probable meaning and significance of processed information in terms of past, present and future factors.

d. Dissemination -- the distribution of intelligence and information in such a manner as to insure that they reach the agencies needing them, in usable form, and in accordance with the urgency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~D R A F T

e. Communication intelligence -- the intelligence information which is derived from the study of foreign communications. (It is to be noted that this definition is inconsistent with the normal differentiation between information and intelligence, but is adopted because of long usage.)

f. The AFSA Product -- the product resulting from communications intelligence collection which is defined as the procurement of foreign communications and the conversion of such communications into usable English form.

g. The CONSIDO Product -- the product resulting from evaluation and collation of the AFSA product.

h. Intelligence Requirements -- the requirements for information of each Military Department, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation established without reference to existing and potential capabilities of procurement agencies.

i. Intelligence Priorities -- intelligence requirements expressed in an order of preference which has been determined on the basis of a consideration of both the importance and urgency of each requirement and the existing and potential capabilities of procurement agencies.

j. USCIB Intelligence Priorities -- the integrated intelligence requirements of the member departments and agencies of USCIB for information from [non-military (applicable to Method #2, paragraph 3 e (3))] foreign communications expressed in an order of preference based on the following considerations:

- (1) The importance and urgency of each requirement with respect to the national interest and the interest of each member department or agency.
- (2) The existing or potential capabilities of the procurement agencies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REMARKS MADE BY COL. LOVELL AT 47TH MEETING OF USCIB  
HELD 2 DECEMBER 1949 IN EXPLANATION OF CHART  
ACCOMPANYING THE DRAFT CONSIDO PAPER

(Extracted from USCIB: 26/1)

"The chart we are about to use to describe the functions of the proposed CONSIDO was originally prepared for presentation to the Joint Intelligence Committee. The methods employed for the production of Joint Intelligence apply in the same manner for the production of National Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency. This is illustrated by a second chart which portrays the identical idea in outline form.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Your attention is now invited to the first chart. To facilitate explanation, it will be explained in parts.

"The color convention used is as follows:

Dark red for COMINT information.  
Light red for collateral information.  
Blue for intelligence.  
Blue and red for intelligence containing COMINT.  
Dotted black for liaison.

"This section of the chart shows the method employed for producing joint intelligence by the military departments.

"Information is introduced at the basic research level to produce factual intelligence such as that used in the National Intelligence Surveys. COMINT is given special handling in accordance with the USCIB security regulations.

"Factual intelligence is then used by the intelligence staffs to produce finished intelligence in the form of strategic estimates and studies.

"Finished intelligence from all of the intelligence agencies is synthesized by the JIG which upon approval by the JIC becomes Joint intelligence.

"The method illustrated on this section of the chart was used recently to produce ABCI-15, a joint estimate of the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The second part of the chart illustrates the indispensable role played by CIA and State Department in the production of Joint intelligence on foreign nations. The political, economic, sociological and scientific intelligence produced by those agencies is vital in the production of estimates of foreign powers. In the production of the estimate of the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union contained in ABCI-15, the political and economic sections of that paper were prepared by State and CIA.

(Extracted from USCIB: 26/1)

"As pointed out earlier, the method is the same for the production of National Intelligence.

"The FBI is not shown on either of these charts because they deal exclusively with the production of positive intelligence on foreign powers. For the production of counterespionage and counterintelligence, the FBI would be shown on these charts on the same level and functioning in the same manner as the other intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government.

\* \* \* \* \*

"The third and final section of the chart shows AFSA and illustrates the manner in which the proposed CONSIDO functions in the overall intelligence system.

"Four important functions of CONSIDO are shown on the chart.

"The first is liaison between the intelligence agencies on the one hand and AFSA and CONSIDO on the other. This liaison is important for three reasons:

It provides for the selection of information needed to fill gaps in research knowledge in the intelligence agencies.

It provides guidance for the selection of items of information for transmission by electrical means.


It provides detailed intelligence guidance to AFSA to enable that agency to carry out its mission efficiently.

"The second function is the preparation of summaries and reports tailored to meet the specific needs of the various intelligence agencies. In this connection, every effort should be made to utilize the material in the central files in the original language as well as the translated material.

"The third function is the watch desk which operates on a round the clock basis for the electrical transmission of important messages of a timely nature to operational commands and the interested intelligence agencies.

"The final and certainly one of the most important is the operation of the security system for the handling of information and intelligence bearing the code word designator classification. As in the case of the central files, it is intended that a single security message center be employed jointly with AFSA."





*Copy No. 15*

FUNCTION OF CONSIDO.  
IN  
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION  
OF  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ISA-6079-15

INT  
GUIDANCE  
TO  
AFSA

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

4 May 1950

STATEMENT OF CERTAIN METHODS FOR  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSIDO

1. Intelligence priorities to guide the effort of AFSA shall be established by USCIB,

- a. The intelligence requirements of each USCIB member department or agency, expressed at least in terms of countries and specific subjects about which information is required, will be submitted to USCIB for consideration and establishment of intelligence priorities applicable to COMINT.
- b. The USCIB Intelligence Committee will establish the priority order in which AFSA should fulfill the intelligence requirements of all USCIB members. In the establishment of this priority order, the following criteria may be considered:
  - (1) The urgency of each requirement, both from the point of view of the national interest and of the interest of the individual member department and agencies of USCIB.
  - (2) The availability of information from sources other than COMINT.

INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES

- 1 -  
~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) The capabilities of AFSA to produce the information required.

c. The USCIB Intelligence Committee will establish intelligence priorities as required for the guidance of AFSA:

- [1] (by majority vote) or
- [2] (on the basis of unanimity) or
- [3] (by arbitration by the Committee Chairman in the absence of unanimity).

d. USCIB intelligence priorities will then be forwarded to the Director, CONSIDO for coordination with the DIRAFSA. Such detailed interpretation as may be required by the AFSA Office of Operations and its technical priorities committees will then be obtained.

2. Command control of CONSIDO to be vested in:

- [1] (a Special Intelligence Committee of USCIB consisting of the six intelligence directors concerned) or
- [2] (a Special Intelligence Committee of JIC consisting of the three intelligence directors of the Military Departments and the three intelligence directors from CIA, Department of State, and the FBI).

- a. In either situation outlined above, the members of the Special Intelligence Committee are the same.
- b. In the first method above, USCIB would prescribe policy for the operation of CONSIDO and verify the

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

execution thereof. After reviewing and approving the organization, personnel allocations and methods or procedure, it would take the necessary action with the departments and agencies concerned to provide personnel and equipment on a continuing basis for the operation of CONSIDO. Based on the periodic report of the Director, CONSIDO, USCIB would give general guidance and direction for the preparation of reports designed to facilitate the production of intelligence by the various intelligence agencies responsible therefor. Dispute within the membership would be resolved in the prescribed manner with ultimate resolution by NSC if necessary.

- c. In the second method above, CONSIDO will become an organ of the Department of Defense under the direct supervision of the JCS (Augmented JIC). USCIB, however, would continue to prescribe broad policy for the coordination of COMINT activities and the JCS would, of course, be bound to comply in exercising its supervision over CONSIDO. The Augmented JIC would take action to provide personnel and facilities from the participating agencies and give general guidance to the operations of CONSIDO pursuant to the policies and priorities of USCIB as is done now in security matters. All JIC papers pertaining to CONSIDO would

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

be handled by:

- [1] (a special section in the JIC secretariat) or
- [2] (the USCIB secretariat) or
- [3] (the CONSIDO staff).

In the event of failure to achieve unanimity within the augmented JIC, the following procedures for appeal would apply:

- (1) Whenever there is a difference of view among the military members, the matter will be transmitted as a split paper to the JCS for decision. This decision will establish the position of the Department of Defense.
- (2) Whenever there is a difference of view between (a) the Department of Defense on the one hand and one or more of the civilian departments on the other or (b) among the civilian departments, the matter will be transmitted to the USCIB Secretariat for reference directly to NSC for decision.

3. CONSIDO to be an organization -- not an ad hoc unit.

It is essential to the proper functioning of CONSIDO that it have a clear-cut organization with a fixed establishment to carry out its mission. It must be capable of meeting the continuing and varying needs of the participating departments and agencies. To assure

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET

permanence and continuity within the CONSIDO establishment, the following methods of organization would apply:

- a. Functions. CONSIDO will provide such service as is considered necessary to meet the needs of the participating departments and agencies. The particular functions involved in the provision of this service will be recommended by the Director, CONSIDO and his Deputies and will be approved by the control body. Nothing in these arrangements will operate to preclude the performance by CONSIDO or at CONSIDO (within the meaning of Principle 5 below) of such functions or tasks as may be desired by any participating department or agency, subject only to limitations of space and facilities.
- b. Assignment of Personnel. CONSIDO will be established on a T/O basis with permanently assigned position vacancies. These vacancies will be based on the interests and needs of the participating departments and agencies, and will be apportioned by the control body. All participating departments and agencies will bear responsibility to keep their assigned vacancies filled insofar as possible.

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

c. Control of Personnel. Personnel detailed to work at CONSIDO on special operations (within the meaning of Principle 5 below) will:

1 (remain under the operational direction of the agency undertaking the special operation) or

2 (remain under the operational direction of the agency undertaking the special operation or be assigned temporarily under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO for the accomplishment of the specific task in hand as agreed between the Director and the agency concerned).

All personnel assigned to permanent position vacancies will:

1 (be under the operational control of Director, CONSIDO) or

2 (be under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO through the respective deputies of the participating departments and agencies).

d. Deputy. Each participating department or agency will:

1 (assign a Deputy to the Director, CONSIDO to serve on a full-time basis.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

The Deputies will be under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO.) or

2 (assign a Deputy to the Director, CONSIDO. The Deputies will be under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO.) or

3 (assign a Deputy to the Director, CONSIDO. The Deputies will also serve as the responsible liaison representatives of their parent departments or agencies).

e. Administration. Administrative matters between CONSIDO and the participating departments and agencies will be handled through the appropriate Deputies.

h. CONSIDO to disseminate the AFSA product.

The entire AFSA product will be made available to CONSIDO. CONSIDO will render information service to the intelligence agencies by making the AFSA product available in the form and manner best suited to facilitate research and action by the respective intelligence agencies. Every effort will be made to reduce the general distribution of the AFSA product. AFSA will cease distribution of the AFSA product upon the establishment of CONSIDO except that (a) special handling will be given to especially sensitive material in accordance with the requirements of the intelligence agency primarily concerned and (b) all existing and

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

future agreements approved by USCIB pertaining to the AFSA product will be observed.

5. CONSIDO to conduct special operations by certain agencies, i.e., ad hoc additional members for special projects.

Occasions will arise wherein important source material will temporarily increase in volume exceeding the capacity of assigned personnel. Or, again, the nature of source material may require highly specialized knowledge for its proper exploitation. In either case CONSIDO will be unable to properly exploit the material at hand. In such instances any or all of the interested participants could send special teams to augment the CONSIDO contingent until the material at hand has been either fully exploited or brought within the capability of CONSIDO.

6. Adequate provision to be made for reasonable stability of personnel to permit continuity in functional operation.

Military personnel will be assigned to CONSIDO for duty for periods of not less than 30 months. Civilian personnel will be assigned with a view to promote the permanence and continuity of CONSIDO.

7. Chief of CONSIDO to be an official from one of the military departments.

JIC will normally select and nominate an officer as Director, CONSIDO, and submit the nomination to USCIB for approval. The detail as Director, CONSIDO, normally will be rotated among the military departments.

- 8 -  
~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STATEMENT OF CERTAIN METHODS FOR  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSIDO

(The Second Report of the Ad Hoc Committee as revised by discussion at the Fifty-first (Special) Meeting of USCIB)

1. Intelligence priorities to guide the effort of AFSA shall be established by USCIB.

- a. The intelligence requirements of each USCIB member department or agency, or when applicable, of the JCS expressed at least in terms of countries and specific subjects about which information is required, will be submitted to USCIB for consideration and establishment of intelligence priorities applicable to COMINT.
- b. The USCIB Intelligence Committee will establish the priority order in which AFSA should fulfill the intelligence requirements of all USCIB members. In the establishment of this priority order, the following criteria may be considered:
  - (1) The urgency of each requirement, both from the point of view of the national interest and of the interest of the individual member department and agencies of USCIB.
  - (2) The availability of information from sources other than COMINT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) The capabilities of AFSA to produce the information required.

- c. The USCIB Intelligence Committee will establish intelligence priorities as required for the guidance of AFSA by majority vote, with an additional vote being cast by the committee chairman in the event of a tie.
- d. USCIB intelligence priorities will then be forwarded to the Director, CONSIDO for coordination with the DIRAFSA. Such detailed interpretation as may be required by the AFSA Office of Operations and its technical priorities committees will then be obtained.

2. (Department of State reserved its decision on this paragraph.)

Command control of CONSIDO to be vested in a Special Intelligence Committee of JIC consisting of the three intelligence directors of the Military Departments and the three intelligence directors from CIA, Department of State, and the FBI:

- a. In the event of a difference in view between the committee members:
  - (1) In the field of USCIB authority, the matter will be referred direct to USCIB for resolution.
  - (2) In fields other than those in (1) above, the matter will be referred to JCS for resolution.

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. In the event there is a question whether a subject of disagreement is referable to USCIB, the matter will be referred to USCIB for decision as to its acceptability by that agency.

3. CONSIDO to be an organization -- not an ad hoc unit.

It is essential to the proper functioning of CONSIDO that it have a clear-cut organization with a fixed establishment to carry out its mission. It must be capable of meeting the continuing and varying needs of the participating departments and agencies. To assure permanence and continuity within the CONSIDO establishment, the following methods of organization would apply:

a. Functions. CONSIDO will provide such service as is considered necessary to meet the needs of the participating departments and agencies. The particular functions involved in the provision of this service will be recommended by the Director, CONSIDO and his Deputies and will be approved by the control body. Nothing in these arrangements will operate to preclude the performance by CONSIDO or at CONSIDO (within the meaning of Principle 5 below) of such functions or tasks as may be desired by any participating department or agency, subject only to limitations of space and facilities.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- b. Assignment of Personnel. CONSIDO will be established on a T/O basis with permanently assigned position vacancies. These vacancies will be based on the interests and needs of the participating departments and agencies, and will be apportioned by the control body. All participating departments and agencies will bear responsibility to keep their assigned vacancies filled insofar as possible.
- c. (The member representing DNI reserved decision on this subparagraph.)

Control of Personnel. Personnel detailed to work at CONSIDO on special operations (within the meaning of Principle 5 below) will remain under the operational direction of the agency undertaking the special operation or be assigned temporarily under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO for the accomplishment of the specific task in hand subject to agreement of the agency concerned. All personnel assigned to permanent position vacancies will be under the operational control of the Director, CONSIDO by agreement with the respective deputies of the participating departments and agencies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- d. (The member representing DNI reserved decision on this subparagraph.)

Deputy. Each participating department or agency will assign a Deputy to the Director, CONSIDO. The Deputies will also serve as the responsible representatives of their parent departments or agencies.

- e. Administration. Administrative matters between CONSIDO and the participating departments and agencies will be handled through the appropriate Deputies.

4. CONSIDO to disseminate the AFSA product.

The entire AFSA product will be made available to CONSIDO. CONSIDO will render information service to the intelligence agencies by making the AFSA product available in the form and manner best suited to facilitate research and action by the respective intelligence agencies. Every effort will be made to reduce the general distribution of the AFSA product. AFSA will cease distribution of the AFSA product upon the establishment of CONSIDO except that (a) material requiring special handling will be disseminated in accordance with the needs of the intelligence agency primarily concerned and (b) all existing and future agreements approved by USCIB pertaining to the AFSA product will be observed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. CONSIDO to conduct special operations by certain agencies, i.e., ad hoc additional members for special projects.

Occasions will arise wherein important source material will temporarily increase in volume exceeding the capacity of assigned personnel. Or, again, the nature of source material may require highly specialized knowledge for its proper exploitation. In either case CONSIDO will be unable to properly exploit the material at hand. In such instances any or all of the interested participants could send special teams to augment the CONSIDO contingent until the material at hand has been either fully exploited or brought within the capability of CONSIDO.

6. Adequate provision to be made for reasonable stability of personnel to permit continuity in functional operation.

Military personnel will be assigned to CONSIDO for duty normally for periods of not less than 30 months. Civilian personnel will be assigned with a view to promote the permanence and continuity of CONSIDO.

7. Chief of CONSIDO to be an official from one of the military departments.

JIC will normally select and nominate an officer as Director, CONSIDO, and submit the nomination to USCIB for approval. The detail as Director, CONSIDO, normally will be rotated among the military departments.

~~TOP SECRET~~