


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004

9 June 1953

Report of the Intelligence and Security Sub-Committee
(Sub-Committee 1)

1. Members of the Sub-Committee:



Mr. Frank Rowlett	U.S.	
Mr. V. P. Keay	U.S.	
Mr. W. Godel	U.S.	
Mr. R. Packard	U.S.	
Col. M. L. Sherburn	U.S.	
Lt. Col. J. M. Anderson	U.S.	
Cdr. W. L. Thomas	U.S.	Secretary

2. The Sub-Committee met on June 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th, agreed its agenda and the report of its findings and conclusions attached at Tab A.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-28-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~TAB A
FSC53/1/RI
OO4
9 June 1953

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The committee predicated its discussions upon the following assumptions:

a. The capabilities of the USSR to intercept and exploit radio communications are at least equivalent to our own.

b. It can be assumed that the USSR monitors all landline communications passing through its own or satellite territory. The possibility that it has access to other communications passed solely by landline cannot be excluded, but there is no evidence to assess the extent of this possibility. Any traffic obtained by the USSR from landlines can be exploited to the same extent as traffic obtained from radio transmissions.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

II. VALUE TO THE USSR OF COMINT DERIVED FROM
THE COMMUNICATIONS OF NATO COUNTRIES
(see Footnote 1)

2. Diplomatic ciphers in peace time.



Footnote 1.

It should be noted that the security system of NATO provides sufficient protection for "COSMIC" and "NATO" communications passed electrically. However the NATO security system does not provide protection for national communications carrying related information, nor do all the NATO countries confine "NATO" and "COSMIC" communications to approved channels. Recent examination indicates that the [redacted] Governments are the greatest offenders in this respect and that the [redacted] Governments have not fully complied with these regulations. There is no evidence on which to conclude whether or not other NATO countries observe the NATO procedures.

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TAB A
FSC53/1/RI
004



Footnote 2.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TAB A
FSC53/1/RI
004

b. The value to the Russians of the COMINT derived from the communication of individual NATO countries will vary directly with both (1) their vulnerability and (2) the extent to which ^{they} ~~it~~ contain information, the compromise of which would be damaging to the US or the UK.

(1)

[Redacted]

are on this basis alone thought to represent no current or predictable source of valuable intelligence to the USSR.

(2)

[Redacted]

volume of their communications and the relatively slight participation of these countries in matters which would involve critical information are also thought to represent no current or predictable source of valuable intelligence to the USSR.

(3)

[Redacted]

tion of these countries are considered to represent a potential source of valuable intelligence to the USSR.

(4)

[Redacted]

intelligence to the USSR.

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~TAB A
FSC53/1/R1
004

(5)

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

are considered to be the greatest potential sources of valuable intelligence to the USSR.

3. Diplomatic ciphers in wartime.

It is considered that on outbreak of active hostilities the value to the USSR of the information derived from the communications of NATO countries would be greatly increased.

4. Armed Forces ciphers.

b. In general it is thought that under peace time conditions Armed Forces communications are unlikely to be an important source of valuable intelligence to the USSR. In cases of limited hostilities, it is, however, considered that vulnerable Armed Forces ciphers are a menace to the national interests of the UK and the US and in the case of general hostilities would become a real danger.

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~TAB A
FSC 53/1/R1
004

III

Other sources of intelligence open to the USSR.

5. Clandestine Sources

a. Non-COMINT clandestine means of obtaining intelligence cannot replace COMINT as a source of intelligence.

It regarded as substitute for
in areas where COMINT is effective
 In particular, clandestine intelligence is generally less timely, less complete and less authoritative than COMINT.

Information from clandestine sources needs a sometimes difficult process of evaluation before it can be accepted, is dependent on the availability of communications, and is frequently subject to considerable delay before it is received by the user agency. Further, on the basis of US and UK experience, which can be assumed to be representative of USSR experience, the value of intelligence from clandestine sources can frequently be greatly increased by correlation with COMINT. Moreover, the capacity to sustain successful clandestine arrangements to obtain intelligence often depends upon information derived from COMINT.

b. Although it must be presumed that penetration by agents of the USSR ~~of appropriate authorities~~ of NATO nations exists and will continue to exist, it is considered that,

[redacted] are concerned,

this is becoming increasingly difficult.

1. [redacted] there has been a definite improvement in the overall security situation, and further improvements are planned. In the Armed Forces and security agencies specific steps have been taken to place in effect a security system which is

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~TAB A
FSC 53/1/R1
004EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

of December, 1952. However, there remain significant handicaps--political and administrative--to improvement. The level of overall security in

← In the light of these developments it cannot be assumed that clandestine sources of intelligence for the USSR will be significantly reduced [redacted] the near future. Nevertheless, the operation of clandestine sources ^{is expected to} ~~will~~ become increasingly difficult, and, therefore, it is felt that the USSR could not find adequate compensation for the loss of potential COMINT through increased clandestine activity.

2. As regards other NATO countries from which the potential value of COMINT is estimated to be high there is insufficient collated evidence available to the Sub-Committee to assess the state of their security. In particular there is not available any report such as that produced by

[redacted] ^{not considered base} conclusive evidence it is assumed that the level of overall security is ~~is~~ higher than that of [redacted] described above.

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~TAB A
FSC53/1/R1
004

c. In time of war, due to the introduction of security measures which are not possible in peacetime clandestine operations become much more difficult. The ready means of communication afforded by diplomatic missions and consulates are also no longer available. It is therefore considered that the value of information from clandestine sources will be substantially diminished at least initially by an outbreak of hostilities.

6. OTHER SOURCES

a. It is difficult to assess to what extent ^{can} other sources (newspapers, trade publications, public documents and statements, etc.) or diplomatic reportage could be a substitute for COMINT.



volume and value at any time. In wartime, censorship and other extraordinary security measures, will reduce drastically the flow of intelligence from such sources and the value to the USSR of any available COMINT will be correspondingly increased.

b. It should be noted that, as in the case of clandestine sources, the value of intelligence from other sources can be greatly increased by information derived from COMINT.


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TAB A
FSC53/1/RI
004




joined the Communist bloc since it is to be expected that its ciphers and communications procedures would then be radically improved in any case,

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

V SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS



however they also constitute a potential source of highly valuable intelligence for the USSR.



is any better, the USSR could not compensate adequately for the loss of COMINT as a potential source of timely and authoritative intelligence of high value through other sources of information.



COMINT to the USSR. The possibility that any NATO country might defect

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TAB A
FSC73/1/R1
004

from the NATO alliance is not estimated to affect the validity of this conclusion.

VI RECOMMENDATIONS

10. a. The Sub-Committee recommends therefore that action should be taken as a matter of urgency to make the national communications used by NATO countries secure, and that the first priority

[Redacted]

b. The Sub-Committee also recommends that action should be taken to insure that NATO communications security regulations are universally and closely observed for the electrical transmission of all "NATO" documents.

"COSMIC" and information

[Handwritten mark]

VII SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE FACTORS AFFECTING

ACTION TAKEN

11. The nature of the action will largely be determined by technical considerations. From the point of view of intelligence and general security however the action must:

[Redacted]

a. [Redacted]
b. [Redacted]
c. [Redacted]

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The committee predicated its discussions upon the following assumptions:


a. The capabilities of the USSR to intercept and exploit radio communications are at least equivalent to our own.

b. Although the possibility that the USSR may have access to communications passed solely by land line cannot be excluded, there is no evidence to assess the extent of this possibility.

II. VALUE TO THE USSR OF COMINT DERIVED FROM NATO COMMUNICATIONS

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. Diplomatic ciphers in peace time.



~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

considered to represent a potential source of valuable intelligence to the USSR.



valuable intelligence to the USSR.

g. It should be noted that the COSMIC security system provides sufficient protection for the "COSMIC" and "NATO" communications passed electrically. However, the COSMIC system does not



3. Diplomatic ciphers in wartime.

It is considered that an outbreak of active hostilities would alter the situation only to the extent that the value to the USSR of the information derived from the NATO communications would be very greatly increased.


4. Armed Forces ciphers.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

of effort that has been expended against the various systems. It,



b. In general it is thought that under peace time conditions Armed Forces communications are unlikely to be an important source of valuable intelligence to the USSR. In cases of active hostilities  it is, however, considered that vulnerable Armed Forces ciphers are a very valuable potential source of information to the USSR and, in the case of general hostilities, are of the very highest value.

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~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605III

Other sources of intelligence open to the USSR.

5. Clandestine Sources

- a. Other factors being equal Non-COMINT clandestine means of obtaining intelligence are considered to be less valuable than COMINT as a source of intelligence in that they are usually less timely and less authoritative. In particular, the information from clandestine sources needs a sometimes difficult process of evaluation before it can be accepted, is dependent on the availability of communications, and is frequently subject to considerable delay before it is received

the capacity to sustain successful clandestine arrangements to obtain intelligence depends upon information derived from COMINT.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

- b. Although it must be presumed that penetration by agents of the USSR of appropriate authorities of NATO nations exists and will continue to exist, it is considered that,

this is becoming increasingly difficult. Improvements

take place, are also making the work of lower grade agents less effective. Although these considerations are largely conjectural it appears likely therefore that the USSR could not find compensation for the loss of potential COMINT in increased clandestine activity in these three countries. In other NATO countries from

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION~~EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

which the potential value of COMINT is estimated to be high, there is insufficient evidence to justify a conclusion.

- c. In time of war, due to the introduction of security measures which are not possible in peacetime clandestine operations become much more difficult. The ready means of communication afforded by diplomatic missions and consulates are also no longer available. It is therefore considered that the value of information from clandestine sources will be substantially diminished by an outbreak of hostilities.

6. OPEN SOURCES

- a. There is no sure basis in recent appreciations of

NATO communication and of information known to be openly available to the USSR on which to estimate the extent to which the USSR finds open sources (newspapers, trade publications, public documents and statements etc.) to be a substitute for COMINT sources of valuable intelligence.



and value at any time. In wartime, due to censorship and other extraordinary security measures, it is considered that open sources will be reduced drastically as a means whereby the USSR could obtain intelligence of comparable value which they may obtain through COMINT.

- b. It should be noted that, as in the case of clandestine sources, the value of intelligence from open sources can be greatly enhanced by information derived from COMINT.


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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

IV



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